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Abstract
This thesis studies some of the recent developments within the German education
system. The aim is to provide an orientation with respect to the effectiveness and ap-
propriateness of the institutional setting within today’s education system. My main
interest for the analyses is to evaluate how the institutional setting affects educational
chances and choices. The studies focus on the two fringes of formal education: early
and higher education. With respect to early education, this thesis studies how school
entrance screenings affect the individual and the class composition of competencies at
school entry. My research on higher education evaluates recent changes in the higher
education sector. First, the implementation of the Bachelor degrees in Germany is
studied in order to show whether the restructuring of degrees affected the number of
matriculated students and drop-outs. Second, I assess the influence of multidimen-
sional university rankings and an excellence competition on the application behavior
of prospective students. Third, I analyze a reform decentralizing university admis-
sion to law schools with respect to the efficiency and quality of student-university
matching within centralized and decentralized university admission procedures.
Keywords: economics of education, early education, higher education
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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation werden einige der jüngsten Entwicklungen innerhalb des deut-
schen Bildungssystems betrachtet. Ziel der Analysen ist, institutionelle Regelungen
des Bildungssystems genauer zu betrachten und bezüglich ihrer Effektivität und Ad-
äquanz zu bewerten. Dabei liegt das Hauptaugenmerk darauf, wie institutionelle Rah-
menbedingungen die Bildungschancen und -entscheidungen beeinflussen. Es werden
beide Ränder der formalen Bildung betrachtet: die Elementar- als auch die Hochschul-
bildung. Im Bereich der Elementarbildung wird analysiert, inwiefern Einschulungs-
untersuchungen die Komposition von Kompetenzen innerhalb einer Schuleingangs-
kohorte beeinflussen. Meine Forschung im Hochschulbereich umfasst die Evaluierung
einiger der erst kürzlich umgesetzten Reformen. Ich untersuche erstens die Imple-
mentierung der Bachelor Abschlüsse und die damit zusammenhängende Entwicklung
der Studienanfänger- und Studienabbrecherzahlen. Zweitens ermittele ich den Ein-
fluss von multidimensionalen Universitätsrankings sowie der Exzellenzinitiative auf
die Wahl der Universität leistungsstarker Abiturienten. Und drittens nutze ich die De-
zentralisierung der Studienplatzvergabe als natürliches Experiment, um die Matching
Effizienz und Qualität des zentralen und dezentralen Vergabeverfahrens miteinander
zu vergleichen.
Schlagworte: Bildungsökonomik, Elementarbildung, Hochschulforschung
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1 Introduction
The beginnings of formal education date back to the ancient times of the Greek
and Roman Empires. The first complete system of compulsory schooling, however,
was not introduced until 1559. At that time, the German state of Württemberg
implemented a system consisting of three different schools: elementary schools, Latin
schools and universities. After John Amos Comenius disseminated his ideas for a
system of universal education throughout Europe in the 17th century, it was then the
state of Prussia and its minister of education, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who introduced
today’s scientific and humanistic philosophy of education (Cubberley, 1920).
The German education system of today is constituted in the “Grundgesetz” of 1949
and is decentrally governed by the 16 German federal states. Within the last approx-
imately 60 years, the system of education experienced several times of intense reform
debates. Starting with the “Sputnik Crisis” of 1957, the Western nations extensively
debated weaknesses of their educational systems as the Sovjet Union demonstrated
its predominance in the field of astronautics. The U.S. as well as European states
initiated programs to promote and modernize education. In the 1970’s, a major topic
of debate was the concept of the “Gesamtschule”, which was suggested to replace the
traditional tracking of students by performance to guarantee equality of opportunities
(Führ, 1997).
This aspect of social justice and equality reappeared in the late 1990’s after the results
of international standardized competence tests indicated substantial performance het-
erogeneity within the German education system (TIMMS, 1997; PISA, 2000). The
internationalization in general and the comparative competence tests in particular
increased the comparability of different educational systems with respect to their effi-
ciency and fairness. The international comparability in turn enhanced the eagerness
1
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to reform the institutional setting within the education system. For instance, the im-
portance of early education received new attention. As other countries start formal
education earlier and as recent research supports the importance of the first years
in life for education (Cunha and Heckman, 2007), the pre-school education has been
expanded within Germany. Furthermore, the enlargement of the European Union
led to major reforms also within the higher education sector. The Bologna Process,
initiated in 1999, aims at constructing a homogenous European Higher Education
Sector with comparable tertiary degrees all over Europe. Consequently, many Euro-
pean countries – including Germany – restructured their systems of higher education
towards the Anglo-Saxon system of Bachelor and Master degrees.
From an economist point of view, it is important to ask which objectives an education
system should serve. The intention to increase human capital production and thereby
the well-being of a nation is probably the most important goal and seems to be
consensus. More controversially discussed is the objective of equal opportunities
within the framework of social justice. However, even more difficult is the search
for the optimal design of an education system to achieve the agreed-upon objectives.
Taking into account that investments in education are constrained by limited financial
resources, there are important decisions to be taken. At which age is it especially
important to invest in education? Is it the best for children to enter school as early
as possible? Should all children be instructed together or is a tracking system based
on performance more effective? How do we allocate scarce and expensive university
places efficiently?
This thesis studies some of the recent developments within the German education sys-
tem at the beginning of the 21st century. The aim is to provide an orientation with
respect to the effectiveness and appropriateness of the institutional setting within
today’s education system. My main interest for the analyses is to evaluate how the
institutional setting affects educational chances and choices. This is of importance
2
when it comes to suggesting possibilities to improve the future design of the educa-
tion system. My analyses focus on the two fringes of formal education: early and
higher education. With respect to early education, this thesis studies how school
entrance screenings affect the individual and class composition of competencies at
school entry. My research on higher education evaluates recent changes in the higher
education sector. First, the implementation of the Bachelor degrees in Germany is
studied in order to show whether the restructuring of degrees affected the number of
matriculated students and drop-outs. Second, I assess the influence of multidimen-
sional university rankings and an excellence competition on the application behavior
of prospective students. Third, I analyze a reform decentralizing university admis-
sion to law schools with respect to the efficiency and quality of student-university
matching within centralized and decentralized university admission procedures.
Furthermore, my thesis contributes to the research of education by exploring new
administrative data sets. The analyses with respect to the school entrance screenings
are carried out using the administrative data of the Brandenburg health authority
which is responsible for screening all children prior to school entry within the German
federal state of Brandenburg. A similar data set so far has only been used by one
other study within the field of economics of education (Salm and Schunk, 2011). For
my studies of the recent reforms within the higher education system, I apply two
different large administrative data sources. First, I use the administrative student
data provided by the statistical offices of Germany which comprises all students at
German higher education institutes. Being one of the first researchers employing
this data set, data validation showed that the quality and validity can be further
improved. However, the most important improvement could be achieved by providing
an individual identifier to construct a longitudinal data set. Second, process data
of the German central clearinghouse, which allocates students to universities, were
exploited. This data set provides high data quality and is very comprehensive as it is,
3
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in fact, the data base used by the clearinghouse to match students and universities.
Due to the data originating from the internal procedures of the clearinghouse, the
data also needs a lot of formatting for the purpose of research. Therefore, it would be
very interesting to think of a scientific-use-file along the introduction of new admission
procedures for the central clearinghouse.
Chapter 2 of this thesis studies how differences in age and development influence
a child’s probability of being recommended for school and assesses whether develop-
mental gaps close by delaying school entry. Recent literature shows that fixed cutoff
dates regulating school entry create disadvantages for children who are young relative
to their classmates (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010). Early
and late school enrollment, though, might mitigate these disadvantages. As a com-
pulsory health examination and in order to assure a minimum developmental level
for school start, all German federal states rely on medical screenings of the school
entering cohort. The responsible government pediatricians thoroughly examine the
health status of the children and perform tests on pre-academic skills such as cogni-
tive development, social behavior or motor skills. At the end of the examination, the
pediatrician decides whether to recommend the child to start compulsory primary
schooling.
The results show that impairments in cognitive, socio-emotional and motor develop-
ment as well as health are negatively related to the probability to receive a school
recommendation. Moreover, younger children are less likely to be recommended for
school. This occurs for two reasons: first, they show developmental impairments more
often; second, they have a lower probability of being recommended per se. Delaying
school entry allows children to improve, although their developmental status remains
below average. Especially children who are still fairly young when being retained
catch up during a one-year delay of school entry. This study of my thesis thus shows
4
that flexible school entry rules which – besides age – also take childrens’ development
into account could mitigate disadvantages for relatively young children.
Chapter 3 discusses the introduction of Bachelor degrees within the German higher
education sector in the course of the Bologna Process. For this purpose, short-term
effects of the implementation of the Bachelor degree on student enrollment and drop-
out rates are estimated at the level of university departments. The main component
of the reform is the replacement of the traditional higher education degrees with
a homogeneous Bachelor-Master system. The idea was that the comparability of
higher education degrees should improve student and labor force mobility, generate
competition between universities, and thus increase international competitiveness of
the European system of higher education. In some countries – Germany being one of
them – an additional political objective was to increase the number of higher education
graduates and thereby to address the lack of highly skilled personnel. Compared to
the traditional degrees, the Bachelor degree can be obtained in a shorter period of
time and is therefore less costly. This could encourage more students to invest in
higher education and to finish their degrees. On the contrary, the returns to the new
degrees are still uncertain. It is therefore unclear whether the reform has an effect on
college enrollment and drop-out rates.
The estimation strategy exploits differences in the timing of the implementation of
the Bachelor degrees at the university department level to identify the effects of
the reform. The analyses reveal that the introduction of the Bachelor degree has
no significant impact on enrollment or drop-out rates for most subjects. However,
enrollment to the subjects of electrical, mechanical and industrial engineering as
well as to physics is significantly negatively affected by the Bachelor introduction.
This result might be interpreted as a sign of students avoiding the new degrees in
these subjects because the traditional German engineering degrees have a very good
reputation. If this is the case, the observed negative effect should eventually vanish
5
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as the traditional degrees are increasingly replaced by Bachelor programs. Hence, we
should keep in mind that the effects of the reform on the number of first-year students
as well as on drop-out rates may be different in the long-run, when all departments
will have implemented the reform.
The analyses of Chapter 4 shed light on the importance of university rankings
for choosing a university. It is analyzed whether prospective high-ability students
use ranking indicators as a source of information within the application process and
whether the influence of the indicators differs with respect to various quality dimen-
sions – e.g. research quality, mentoring, faculty infrastructure, student assessment
and excellence status. Every year, secondary school graduates who want to pursue
higher education have to decide which university they want to apply to. This is a
crucial decision for their future trajectories made under imperfect information regard-
ing their own ability, university quality and the corresponding returns to a degree.
Therefore, quality indicators like university rankings and an excellence competition
may provide valuable information for the process of choosing a university.
As identification relies on the variation in ranking indicators and excellence status
over time, I can disentangle the effect of the additional information provided by the
rankings from the common knowledge regarding university quality. The evaluation
shows that the share of applicants increased on average by 19 % at the universities
which have received excellence status. Furthermore, the non-research dimensions
students-staff ratio, equipment and infrastructure, and the satisfaction of current
students rather than the research-related indicators influence university choice of high-
ability students. In general, this chapter shows that university rankings are important
if they add new information to the common knowledge on university quality.
Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether a centralized or a decentralized uni-
versity admission procedure is better suited to match prospective students to uni-
6
versities. Prospective students in the U.S. as well as graduate students in the UK
need to apply directly at their preferred universities. All undergraduate students in
the UK, however, need to apply with the central authority “UCAS” (Universities &
Colleges Admission Service) and merely indicate a preference list of universities. In
Germany, the central clearinghouse (‘ZVS’) allocates students to universities in those
subjects which exhibit a shortage of university places. Within the field of law stud-
ies, the centralized admission procedure was replaced by a decentralized procedure in
2002.
To compare the centralized and decentralized student-university matching, the decen-
tralization of university admission in the field of law is examined as a natural exper-
iment. Using a differences-in-differences strategy, the outcome variables measuring
matching efficiency and matching quality are (i) the number of first-year students, (ii)
the number of unassigned university places, and (iii) the drop-out rate. The results
of my study show that the number of first-year students increased and the number of
unassigned places decreased after the decentralization. This increase in the matching
efficiency is mainly driven by enabling law schools to abolish all admission restric-
tions. My estimates with respect to the drop-out rates are not significantly affected
by the decentralization. Nevertheless, a comparison between the effects for all treated
law schools and for the subgroup of law schools which have always applied admission
restrictions suggests that abolishing admission restrictions could be associated with
increasing drop-out rates.
Chapter 6 concludes and suggests some ideas for future research.
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Abstract
Fixed cutoff dates regulating school entry create disadvantages for children who are
young relative to their classmates. Early and late school enrollment, though, might
mitigate these disadvantages. In this paper, we analyze in a first step which factors
determine school entry if entrance screenings allow for early and late enrollment. Sec-
ond, we study whether children benefit from a delayed school entry. Using data on a
compulsory school entrance screening of a German federal state, we show that children
with impairments in cognitive, socio-emotional, motor and health development but
also young children are less likely to be recommended to start school. Delaying school
entry allows the delayed children to improve, although their developmental status re-
mains below average. School entrance screenings, thus, induce more flexible school
entry rules that attenuate performance differences within a class and, as a result,
mitigate disadvantages for children being young compared to their classmates.
Keywords: Child development, school entrance, school entrance recommendation
JEL: J13, I21, I38
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2.1 Introduction
It has been documented across many countries that children born in the summer
months on average perform worse than otherwise identical children. These age effects
have been found with respect to various school and labor market outcomes (e.g.
Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010).
They are induced by birthday cutoff dates determining a child’s school entry age,
which are usually fixed in fall. Hence, children born in the summer months are
younger when starting school, younger when taking important tests, and they are
always the youngest in class. Complying with the fixed cutoff dates, thus, creates
disadvantages for children born in the summer months. As a consequence, some
studies have suggested more flexible school entry regulations that besides a child’s
age also take factors like child development into account (Strom, 2004; Jürges and
Schneider, 2007).
Although most countries formally rely on fixed cutoff rules to regulate school entry,
other factors besides age are also sometimes considered for the decision to enter school.
In the U.S. for example, children are supposed to start compulsory schooling with
kindergarten at the age of five. In some states, however, the children may need to go
through a school readiness test or may be interviewed by the school principal before
entering school. The final decision about school entry is taken by the parents, and
therefore, some children are retained and thus deviate from the fixed cutoff rule.
Deviations from the cutoffs also occur in Germany. Schooling in Germany starts one
year later with the entrance into primary school at the age of six. In contrast to
the U.S., compulsory standardized medical screenings are carried out in all federal
states prior to school enrollment. A government pediatrician thoroughly examines
the health status of the children and performs tests on pre-academic skills such as
11
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cognitive development, social behavior or motor skills. At the end, the pediatrician
decides whether to recommend the child to start compulsory primary schooling or
to delay school entry. Depending on the school law of the particular state, either
the parents or the school principal ultimately decides on school entry taking the
pediatrician’s decision into account. Such developmental school entrance screenings,
thus, also reduce compliance with strict age-based school entry rules and allow for a
more flexible school entry.
The question that arises from these observations is whether such standardized school
entrance screenings indeed mitigate the disadvantages for children born in the sum-
mer. Therefore, we study the following two aspects. First, if it is not (only) age
that determines school entry, which other factors drive a child’s probability to be
recommended for school? And does deviating from strict cutoff rules yield develop-
mentally more homogeneous school cohorts? Second, as some children are retained
from schooling due to the screening, it is important to ask wether the selective group
of retained children benefits from delaying school entry. This paper addresses these
two aspects by analyzing how early differences in age and development influence a
child’s probability to be recommended for school and whether developmental gaps
close over a one-year delay. For our study, we use a novel and unique administrative
data set on the school entrance screening of all children in the school entrance cohorts
2006 and 2007 living in the German federal state of Brandenburg.
Regarding our first research question, the recent school entrance literature indirectly
hints at the fact that age effects are smaller when non-compliance with the fixed cut-
off rules is observed. Starting with the seminal paper by Angrist and Krueger (1991),
the recent literature on school entrance age identifies the causal effect of absolute
and relative age gaps on child outcomes using school entry cutoff dates in an Instru-
mental Variable (IV) approach. Many studies followed this identification strategy
analyzing the effect of absolute and relative age on school outcomes (Strom, 2004;
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Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Datar, 2006; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Crawford et al.,
2010; Robertson, 2011), on tracking (Allen and Barnsley, 1993; Puhani and Weber,
2007; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010) and on labor market outcomes (Fredriksson and
Öckert, 2006; Black et al., 2008; Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010). Predominantly, these
studies find that children who are young relative to their classmates perform worse.
The IV estimates of the causal effect of age on performance represents differences
between young and old children that comply with the fixed cutoff dates. Bedard and
Dhuey (2006) and Jürges and Schneider (2007) compare the IV estimates of the age
effect to the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. In all countries
studied, the OLS estimates suggest smaller disadvantages for young children than
the IV effects. Both studies attribute the difference between IV and OLS results to
early and late enrollment as well as to grade retention, i.e. non-compliance with the
fixed cutoff dates. Thus, non-compliance with fixed cutoff rules, e.g. by considering
more factors than only a child’s age, seems to reduce performance heterogeneity in
the classroom. Despite its importance for the identification of age effects, little is
known about the determinants of early and late school enrollment and whether a
school entrance screening yields developmentally more homogenous classes.
Regarding the second question, evidence with respect to grade retention is extensive.
However, the majority of the existing studies analyzes grade retention in primary
school or later, e.g. third grade in primary school or sixth grade in high school (Jacob
and Lefgren, 2004; Greene and Winters, 2007). Using regression discontinuity designs,
these studies find small but positive effects on the retained students in primary school.
Examining the effect on all students, not only on the retained, and exploiting state-
level differences in retention rates, Babcock and Bedard (2011) find a positive effect
of grade retention in primary school on hourly wages. The results on kindergarten
retention point in a similar direction. The most recent study by Dong (2010) analyzes
early grade retention in kindergarten and finds a positive but diminishing effect when
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accounting for the selection in retained students. As the literature on grade retention
focuses on the causal effect of retaining, it shows how the retained children perform
compared to their enrolled counterparts. However, little is known about how retained
children compare to their now younger peers.
Our paper complements the literature by analyzing how early differences in age and
development influence a child’s probability to be recommended for school. Although
the recommendation is not formally binding, parents and school principal usually
follow the pediatrician’s advice. Using the school recommendation as a proxy for
school entry, we provide first evidence regarding the determinants of early and late
school enrollment. Furthermore, we add to the scarce literature on early grade re-
tention and delayed school entry. This is important as the decision on school entry
age and whether children catch up during a one-year delay determines the extent to
which developmental and performance gaps in fact exist in a classroom and, thus,
whether school entrance screenings can mitigate disadvantages for summer-born chil-
dren caused by fixed cutoff rules.
The analyses benefit from a very rich and novel administrative data set. As the
screening is mandatory for all children living in the German federal state of Branden-
burg, we observe all children who reach school age in the years 2006 and 2007, i.e.
about 22,000 observations each year. Only children with severe physical and mental
disabilities may be exempted from the examination. Furthermore, we can observe the
children who delayed school entry twice – at the initial screening in 2006 and when
repeating the screening in 2007. Due to a missing panel identifier, we employ propen-
sity score matching to identify the first nearest neighbors for the non-recommended
children of 2006 within the group of repeating children of 2007. The nearest neighbor
is ideally the same child. The matching allows us to study whether children catch
up by delaying school entry. To our knowledge, only one other economic study uses
data of a school entrance examination and analyzes the impact of health on cognitive
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and language abilities (Salm and Schunk, 2008). But similar to most epidemiological
studies, the authors rely on data from a local health authority and thus on a much
smaller data set.
Our results show that developmental status and also age are important predictors for
the pediatrician’s school recommendation. Impairments in cognitive, socio-emotional
and motor development as well as health are negatively related to the probability to
receive a school recommendation. Moreover, younger children are less likely to be
recommended for school even if developmental status is controlled for. This result is
of particular importance to the children who are born in months close to the cutoff
month. As they are the youngest, they are systematically more likely to be held back
for one year.
Regarding the second question, delaying school entry allows children to improve al-
though their developmental status remains below average. Especially children who
are still fairly young when being retained catch up during a one-year delay of school
entry. This might be easier for them as a smaller fraction of non-recommended
younger children shows developmental impairments in the first place. Pediatricians
might either anticipate the improvement of younger children or might want to place
them into a more favorable age position in the cohort of the following year. In sum, a
school entrance screening provides a means to mitigate developmental heterogeneity
in a classroom. Thus, standardized examinations can attenuate disadvantages for
children born in the summer by introducing more flexible school entry regulations.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives some background informa-
tion on the school entrance screening (Section 2.2). The novel administrative data
set is described in Section 2.3, the estimation strategy is presented in Section 2.4,
and the interpretation of the results follows in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background
In Germany, children usually start formal schooling with entrance into primary school
in the year they turn six years old. Before starting school, all children need to attend
a school entrance screening. This is a detailed medical screening, which is mandatory
to all children who turn six. Its main purpose is to check on children’s health and
development as some of the children may not have been presented to their family
pediatrician for any preventive voluntary routine check-ups for babies and infants. If
the child shows developmental impairments, parents get advice for further medical
treatment, and a controlling scheme is implemented. At the end of the examination,
the pediatrician also decides whether to recommend the child to start compulsory
primary schooling.
In addition to the recommendation, parents in the federal state of Brandenburg may
request for their children to delay or start school early. However, the final decision
on school entry is up to the school principal taking the pediatrician’s recommen-
dation and parents’ requests into account.1 Although the recommendation of the
pediatrician is not formally binding, parents and school principal usually follow the
recommendation.2 In general, there is a tendency of the parents to request a delay
although their child has been recommended for school than to request an early start
without a recommendation of the pediatrician.3
1For the details of the legislation, consult the school law of Brandenburg (Landtag Brandenburg,
2006).
2As shown in Section 2.3, the vast majority of the children (93-94%) who delay school entry have
been recommended to do so by a pediatrician. Thus, only very few parents and school princi-
pals deviate from the pediatrician’s recommendation by retaining children who received a school
recommendation.
3Our data hints at this as we do observe more children repeating the screening in 2007 than were
not recommended in 2006 (see Section 2.4.2).
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The screenings take place from January to May each year. They are administered on
the county level by government pediatricians according to standards set by the min-
istry of health in Brandenburg. All indicators and the sub-tests used are described
in a handbook, which is available to all government pediatricians who administer the
screenings (Landesgesundheitsamt Brandenburg, 2008). The screenings comprise a
complete medical assessment of the child and a questionnaire answered by the par-
ents. The medical assessment covers the body health status of the children, tests on
cognitive and socio-emotional development as well as on motor skills. In the question-
naire, parents give some information on home and family environment by answering
questions on parental education, their labor market participation, immigration back-
ground and the child’s behavior at home and in kindergarten.4
Cognitive development is measured using an articulation test and a grammar test for
expressive language. Children who show a disorder of speech and language according
to the articulation and the grammar test are further tested with respect to receptive
language disorders and general intelligence. The general intelligence test is a nonver-
bal test and is especially developed for children who showed difficulties with speech
and language. Psychiatric disorders in socio-emotional development are screened us-
ing questions from a structured interview with the parents. The assessment includes
measures for anxiety, anti-social (i.e. aggressive) behavior, attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD) and enuresis.5 Tests on motor development include measures
for gross motor skills to examine physical strength, coordination as well as dynamic
and static balance. Tests used include standing and jumping on one leg as well as
walking in a straight line using tandem gait (heel-to-toe-walking).6 The body health
4The examinations are based on a core set of indicators of the International Classification of Func-
tioning, Disability and Health (ICF) developed by the World Health Organization (Üstün et al.,
2003; Simeonsson et al., 2003). See the Appendix for details on the sub-tests and the parental
questionnaire.
5The questions used for diagnosis are displayed in Figure A.2.1 in the Appendix.
6The development of motor functions is important for the overall development of perception and cog-
nition. Although there seems to be no systematic relationship to later school performance (Blomeyer
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screening is very comprehensive and includes the domains height, weight, Body Mass
Index (BMI), allergies and asthma, musculoskeletal system, endocrine system, hear-
ing and seeing as well as the skin.
2.3 Data
Our data include all children participating in the school entrance screenings in Bran-
denburg in the years 2006 and 2007.7 As participation in the screening is mandatory
for all children of a cohort, the results can serve as a representative overview on the
status of the population of school starters in the state of Brandenburg in the respec-
tive year.8 The legal cutoff date for starting school in this state is September 30th
each year.
Figure 2.1 explains the structure of our data. Children who turn six by the end of
September 2006 (September 2007) have to attend the school entrance examination in
2006 (2007). The children who need to attend the school entrance screening in 2006
are born between October 1st, 1999 and September 30th, 2000. Analogously, children
attending the screening in the following year, i.e. 2007, are born between October 1st,
2000 and September 30th, 2001. For the year 2006, we have data on 22,755 children
who attend the school entrance screening. We have to drop 68 observations (0.3%)
because information on the school recommendation or the date of birth are missing.
In the following year, 21,504 children attended the examination, and 56 (0.3%) were
et al., 2009), motor skill problems and poor performance in physical education might put these chil-
dren at a higher risk of being bullied (Bejerot and Humble, 2007; Bejerot et al., 2011).
7Researchers may request access to the data by applying at the Landesgesundheitsamt Brandenburg,
Dr. Gabriele Ellsaesser, Wuensdorfer Platz 3, D-15806 Zossen. The authors are willing to advise
others about access to the data and the application process.
8As responsibility for education is on the federal state level in Germany, no nationwide standardized
testing procedures for school entrance screenings exist. Moreover, the screenings are administered
at the county level, so comparable data and comprehensive reports on the federal state level are
scarce.
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Figure 2.1: Structure of School Entrance Cohorts
Examination 2006
N= 22,687
Date of Birth
Sept, 30th 
1999
Late Attendee Early Attendee
11.8% 81.8% 6.4%
Regular School Age
Late Attendee Early AttendeeRegular School Age
9.7% 83.9% 6.4%
Examination 2007
N= 21,448
Sept, 30th 
2000
Sept, 30th 
2001
Retained 2006 
N=1,970
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations.
dropped because of missing information on the same variables. Our estimation sample
thus consists of 22,687 observations for 2006 and 21,448 observations in 2007.
For children born after September 30th – especially if they are born before the end of
December – parents can request for their child to attend the school entrance screening
a year early. We refer to these children as “early attendees”. This applies to about
6.4% of all children in both years. Note that “early attendees” are a positively selected
group of children due to this procedure. In contrast, some children in our samples are
above compulsory school entry and attend the screening for a second time. This is the
case for 11.8% of the children in 2006 and 9.7% in 2007. Most of these “late attendees”
(93% in 2006, 94% in 2007) were not recommended the year before and attend the
entrance screening a second time. Thus, they represent a negatively selected group
which was retained from an earlier school entry. 1,970 children were retained in 2006
and examined a second time in 2007. We use this sample of children for our analysis
on the development of retained children presented in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2. Note
that our data unfortunately do not contain any panel identifier. Therefore, we use
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Figure 2.2: Screening Dimensions
socio-emotional
development
health
cognitive
development
screening
dimensions
motor
development
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006.
a matching procedure to identify the non-recommended children of 2006 within the
group of children who repeat the screening in 2007.
The developmental status is assessed in four screening dimensions: cognitive abilities,
socio-emotional wellbeing, motor skills and health (see Figure 2.2). As these indica-
tors are not measured on continuous scales, we use binary variables for each of the
dimensions which indicate whether a child shows developmental impairments in this
dimension or not. All indicators in the four dimensions depend on several sub-tests
and on the clinical judgment of the physician.9
The school entrance recommendation of the pediatrician is a condensed assessment
given based on the pediatrician’s own observations, a questionnaire completed by the
parents and the results of the standardized assessments for developmental status and
health. Unfortunately, we neither observe whether parents request a delay of school
9The pediatricians are given detailed and comprehensive information on all parts of the examination
in a handbook. This is constantly updated, and regular quality meetings are held to reinforce the
standards set by the ministry of health in Brandenburg. Although most pediatricians commit to
these standards, the data show that not all of them deduce their diagnosis from the sub-tests.
We therefore consider both subtests and the pediatrician’s judgement to classify developmental
impairments. See Section 2.2 and the Appendix for details on the sub-tests.
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start although their child has been recommended nor whether they request for their
child to start school without a recommendation. As the final decision of the school
principals is not available in the data either, we do not know whether a child in fact
delays school entry. Hence, our analysis uses the pediatrician’s decision as a proxy
for actual school entry. This is justifiable as we have shown before that deviations
from the pediatrician’s decision are not very common.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
To assess the importance of school entrance screenings for detecting and mitigating
early performance differences, we are interested in two questions. First, which fac-
tors influence a child’s probability to be recommended for school, and second, do
developmentally gaps close by delaying school entry? In the following, we explain the
estimation strategies to answer these questions.
2.4.1 Determinants of School Entrance Recommendation
To answer the first question, we use the school entrance recommendation as dependent
variable. The indicator variableReci is 1 if the child i is recommended to start primary
school in the year of the examination and 0 otherwise. The underlying estimation
equation is displayed in Equation 2.1 and estimated using a probit model.
Rec∗i = β0 + β1Agei + β2DEVi + β3Ci + β4Fi + β5Mi + ui (2.1)
The main variables of interest are age (Agei) and a vector of our four developmental
status variables (DEVi). Age is measured in months at the time of the entrance
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examination. The binary development variables pick up impairments in each of the
four domains cognitive development, social behavior, motor skills and health.
Furthermore, we sequentially include interaction terms between the developmental
indicators and age separately for each dimension as shown in Equation 2.2. These
interactions capture the joint effect of age and development on recommendation and
thereby indicate heterogenous effects of the developmental status with respect to
age.
Rec∗i = β0 + β1Agei + β2DEVi + β3DEVi × Agei + β4Ci + β5Fi + β6Mi + ui (2.2)
Control variables for both equations include a vector of child (Ci) and family (Fi)
background variables as well as dummies for the month of examination (Mi). Back-
ground information on the child (Ci) include gender, birth weight, non-German
mother tongue and attendance of institutional child care. We also include binary
variables indicating children below (“early attendees”) and above regular school age
(“late attendees”) as these are positively (“early attendees”) or negatively (“late atten-
dees”) selected groups. Family background variables (Fi) provided by the parents are
parental education, their labor market participation, immigration background, family
type and the number of siblings. Parental education and labor market participation
are combined into a variable capturing the socio-economic status (SES) for both par-
ents.10 Dummies for the month of examination (Mi) are included to control for the
10We use the SES-classification provided and published by the ministry of health in Brandenburg
(Böhm et al., 2007). Parents are classified into high socio-economic status if both have a high-school
diploma (more than 10 years of compulsory school education) and at least one of them is full-time
employed. In case of missing values or single parenthood, the characteristics of the remaining parent
are also assigned to the second parent. We include dummy variables for single parenthood and
missing values in our regression. Results do not change when using education and labor market
participation of the mother instead of the predefined socio-economic status.
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length of the period until school entry.11 As development of children in this age group
might change within a few months, pediatricians could possibly recommend children
more “generously” in the early months of the examination period, e.g. January and
February, as there is still some time left for improvements until school entrance in
September.
2.4.2 Development of Retained Children
To analyze whether the performance differences in school are mitigated by retaining,
we exploit the fact that some children repeat the screening. Children who are not
recommended to school in 2006 spend an additional year in kindergarten and attend
the school entrance screening again in the following year. As early child development
is very heterogenous and tightly depends on age, developmental impairments might
not be persistent, and children might catch-up. Furthermore, the pediatricians are
advised to recommend further treatment to the parents of children who were diag-
nosed with developmental impairments. Therefore, we expect that retained children
improve during the one-year delay.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow the tracking of children over time by a panel iden-
tifier. However, using the data of 2006 and 2007, we observe the non-recommended
children of 2006 and the repeaters of the examination in 2007. As the school rec-
ommendation is not binding, we observe 1,970 non-recommended children in 2006
and 2,316 repeaters in 2007.12 As we are interested in the development of the non-
11The examination is predominantly taken from January to May; however, there are very few children
tested in the months June to December. The control variable for month January thus includes also
the months October, November, December. The variable for month May includes also the months
June, July, August and September. Reference category is March as this is the month where most
examinations are taken.
12The addition of 346 children is caused by parents who hold back their children although they have
been recommended.
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recommended children, we restrict the 2007 sample to those repeaters who we most
likely already observe in 2006. Subsequently, we compare the development of this
adjusted group of repeaters to their developmental status a year earlier.
In order to identify the repeaters in 2007 who were most likely not recommended
in 2006, we employ propensity score matching without replacement to match an
observation of 2006 to its first nearest neighbor in 2007 (which is ideally the same
child) according to its characteristics. We exclude the 346 repeater observations of
2007 which were not identified as nearest neighbors and are thus left with 1,970 non-
recommended children in 2006 and 1,970 repeating children in 2007. Resulting from
the matching, these groups contain most likely the same children. In the following, we
refer to this subsample of repeating children in 2007 as the group of repeaters. The
characteristics of the 1,970 non-recommended children in 2006 and the original 2,316
repeaters in 2007 are largely overlapping so that we can assure common support (see
Figure A.2.3 in the Appendix). We only match on characteristics of the child and the
parents which we expect to be constant over time (gender, birth month and year, birth
weight, non-German mother tongue, maternal school education, single parenthood
and siblings) and obtain a sample which is largely balanced (see Table A.2.3 in the
Appendix for t-tests on the differences in characteristics for retainees and repeaters).
Our sample for 2007 contains 21,102 observations after the matching and is thus
smaller by the 346 observations which do not have a non-recommended counterpart in
2006. We use this adjusted data set to analyze the development of retained children.
By comparing the probability for developmental impairments at the two examina-
tions the repeating children attend, we can describe the development of the retained
children during the one-year school delay. This is done by pooling the matched cross-
sections of the examinations in 2006 and 2007. Hence, the data contains all children
examined in 2006 and 2007 apart from the 346 repeating children in 2007 who are
not a nearest neighbor to a non-recommended child in 2006. In this sample, we define
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dummy variables indicating that a child was non-recommended in 2006 (NonRec06 i)
and is a repeater in 2007 (Repeater07 i). By that, we can compare the probability
of developmental impairments for children at the time they are not recommended
with the developmental status of their matched counterparts one-year later. The
estimation equation reads as follows:
DEV ∗i = β0 + β1NonRec06 i + β2Repeater07 i (2.3)
+ β3Repeater06 i + β4NonRec07 i + β5Y ear07
+ β6Ci + β7Fi + β8Mi + ui
Our binary outcome variables for the four developmental dimensions DEVi equal
one if child i shows an developmental impairment in the according dimension. The
indicators for being non-recommended in 2006 (NonRec06 i) and a repeater in 2007
(Repeater07 i) are our variables of interest we want to compare. To ensure that we
always refer to the same group of children as the reference group, we additionally
include dummy variables for being a repeater in 2006 (Repeater06 i), being non-
recommended in 2007 (NonRec07 i) and a year dummy for 2007 (Y ear07 ). Moreover,
the same child (Ci), family (Fi) and month of examination (Mi) control variables as
in Equation 2.1 are included in the estimation. Hence, the probability of showing a
developmental impairment is calculated in reference to non-repeating, recommended
children of 2006 with similar child and family characteristics. The average partial
effects on the two dummy variables of interest (NonRec06 i and Repeater07 i) are
calculated only for the children belonging to the group of repeaters, i.e. as average
treatment effect on the treated. The difference between the partial effects of the two
groups can be interpreted as the reduction in the share of children with developmental
impairments, which is achieved by delaying school entry.
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2.5 Results
The results of our analysis regarding the two research questions are discussed in
the following. In Section 2.5.1, we present the estimation results with respect to
the determinants of a school entrance recommendation, and Section 2.5.2 focuses on
the retained children and whether they improve with respect to their developmental
status by delaying school entry.
2.5.1 Determinants of School Entrance Recommendation
Before estimating the determinants of receiving a recommendation for school, we first
compare the mean characteristics of recommended and non-recommended children.
At the 2006 examination, 90.5% (20,717) of the children are recommended for school.
Table 2.1 shows the differences between the recommended and non-recommended
children with regard to child characteristics, developmental impairments and parental
background.13
The comparison shows that the recommended and non-recommended children differ
substantially, especially with regard to the measures of developmental status and
health. In the recommended cohort, fewer children show impairments in cognitive,
socio-emotional or motor development. Most of the children affected by cognitive im-
pairments are diagnosed with developmental disorders in language, and only very few
(2% out of the 11% of the non-recommended children) show deficits in intelligence.
Disorders in socio-emotional development comprise anxiety, anti-social (i.e. aggres-
sive) behavior, enuresis and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 3%
13For the full sample of 2007, the recommendation rate is 91.1% (19,535 out of 21,448). For the
sample of 2007, the analysis of group means yields similar results as for 2006. Some of the variables
have a small amount of missing values, see table notes of Table 2.1. The regressions include dummies
for missing values.
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Table 2.1: Means of Recommended vs. Non-recommended Children in
2006 (%)
Recommended Non-
recommended
Child
Female 0.48 0.36
Age (in months) 72.02 67.49
Non-German mother tongue 0.02 0.03
Birth Weight (in kg) 3.39 3.23
Child care > 3 years 0.70 0.49
Early attendee 0.05 0.18
Late attendee 0.13 0.00
Developmental Impairments
Cognitive development 0.11 0.50
Socio-emotional development 0.08 0.34
Motor development 0.12 0.44
Health 0.39 0.52
Family Background
Low SES 0.18 0.32
Medium SES 0.55 0.51
High SES 0.26 0.17
Single Parent 0.17 0.21
Siblings 0.66 0.68
N 20,717 1,970
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations. The number of ob-
servations is the total number without considering missings. The following variables have
missing values: non-German mother tongue, birth weight, child care, social status, single
parent and number of siblings. The maximum share of missing values amounts to 3.9% for
the recommended and to 6.7% for the non-recommended children. T-tests on the group
means are performed. All differences are significant at the 1% level, except the difference for
non-German mother tongue (not significant) and siblings (significant at the 10% level).
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of the recommended and 11% of the non-recommended children are diagnosed with
ADHD behavior.
The comparison shows further that recommended children are more frequently girls,
are older, have had a higher birth weight and longer child care experience. Children
above compulsory school age (“late attendees”) are always recommended. Children
with a low social status are less often recommended to start school. Recommended
and non-recommended children do not differ much with regard to the presence of
siblings or living in a single-parent household.
The probit model introduced in Equation 2.1 confirms the results of the mean com-
parison. Table 2.2 reports the results of this regression for different specifications.
The marginal effects presented in the table are average partial effects, i.e. we cal-
culated the individual probability for each observation and then averaged over all
observations.
The results presented in the first column reveal that there is a substantial posi-
tive influence of age. Each month the child is older when attending the screening
raises the probability of being recommended for school by 2.0 percentage points. In-
cluding the four variables for developmental status in specification (II) shows that
they significantly influence the probability to be recommended. Especially cognitive
and socio-emotional development seem to be important for school recommendation.
Compared to the reference group of mean age children with the same background
and without impairments in the four dimensions, showing e.g. cognitive impairments
reduces the probability to be recommended to school by 15.6 percentage points. Al-
though slightly decreasing, the age effect persists when controlling for developmental
status. Age increases, ceteris paribus, the probability of school recommendation by
1.6 percentage points per month. Thus, an age difference of 12 months would result
in a larger impact than showing an impairment in cognitive development. We also
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Table 2.2: Probit Regression of School Recommendation on Age, Developmental
Status and Interaction Terms (2006)
Average partial effects
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Age (in months) 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Development
Cognitive -0.156*** -0.236 -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.007) (0.156) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Socio-emotional -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.871*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Motor -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.106 -0.068***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.108) (0.005)
Health -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.027
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.062)
Interaction terms
Cognitive × age 0.022***
(0.003)
Soc.-em. × age 0.023***
(0.003)
Motor × age 0.011***
(0.002)
Health × age 0.002*
(0.001)
Child controls yes
Family background yes
Month of examination yes
Missing dummies yes
Pseudo−R2 0.2268 0.3778 0.3778 0.3811 0.3778 0.3778
N 22,687
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10/5/1 percent level. Child controls include variables female, non-German mother tongue, birth weight, child
care duration longer than 3 years as well as dummies for early and late attendees. Control variables on family
background include dummies for socio-economic status, single parenthood and siblings living in the household.
The month of examination is controlled for by dummy variables. Missing dummies are included to indicate
observations with missing values in one of the variables. Missings are set to zero (dummy variables) or to the
mean (continuous variables) and included in the regression. The average partial effects for the control variables
are presented in Table A.2.1 in the Appendix.
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estimated the age effect including binary variables for different age groups in order
to check for non-linearities in age. The estimates suggest an concave age effect, i.e.
especially the very young children are less likely to be recommended for school merely
due to their age (see Table A.2.2).
Finally, we interact age and developmental status to assess whether age affects chil-
dren with and without developmental impairments differently (III-VI). The results in
the third column show the estimated marginal effects when including the same vari-
ables as before and adding an interaction term for cognitive impairment and age.14
Similar as in specification (II), the age effect for children without an impairment
amounts to 1.6 percentage points. Taking the cognitive interaction term into ac-
count, we find that the age effect for children with a developmental disorder increases
to 3.8 percentage points.15 Hence, for a child with a cognitive impairment, each month
of age raises the probability to be recommended much more than for a child without
cognitive impairments. The age effect for a child with a socio-emotional disorder is
similar (3.8 percentage points), while age is less important for children with a motor
(2.7 percentage points) or health (1.8 percentage points) disorder.
The other socio-economic background and child variables are related to the probability
to receive a school recommendation, albeit to a low extent. Average partial effects
for the control variables are reported in Table A.2.1 in the Appendix. Being female,
birth weight, child care experience and high socio-economic status of the parents
are positively related to school recommendation. Furthermore, both early and late
attendees are more likely to be recommended for school. For late attendees, this
result indicates that not recommending children for school might not be an option
14The marginal effects of the interaction terms are computed using the method introduced by Ai and
Norton (2003). Effect sizes and significance levels are similar to estimating all interaction effects
together in a linear probability model with robust standard errors.
15In order to calculate this effect, we need to sum the age effect for children without impairments
(1.6 percentage points) and the age effect for children with an impairment as opposed to children
without any developmental disorders (2.2 percentage points).
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once they are already older than their peers. For early attendees, the positive effect
seems plausible as well as they might be a very selective group with characteristics
not entirely captured by the parental control variables.16 The results for the month
of examination dummies suggest that children examined earlier in the year have a
slightly higher probability to be recommended. The pediatricians may take into
account that early tested children still have some months to develop until school
starts.
Figure 2.3: Developmental Status and Age by Month of Birth
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations.
The influence of age on the school entrance recommendation is particularly important
for those children born close to the cutoff month set by federal state law. Children
who are born earlier in their school cohort (e.g. in the fourth quarter of the year)
are older when passing the school entrance screening compared to children who are
young in their cohort (i.e. born in the third quarter of the year). Figure 2.3 shows
the inverse relationship between age (dashed line) and share of children diagnosed
16As a robustness check, we estimated the equations on a sample of 18,551 children, excluding early
and late attendees. These estimations yield similar results for all covariates, e.g. the age effect is
between 1.7 and 1.9 percentage points depending on the specification.
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with cognitive impairments (solid line) by month of birth.17 The age at the school
entrance examination is constantly decreasing the closer a child’s month of birth is
before the school entry cutoff date end of September. As seen, these children have a
lower probability of being recommended for school because developmental disorders
are more prevalent among the young children and because there is an additional
negative impact of being young.
Moreover, comparing the sample of all children at school entry age to the group of
recommended children provides evidence that young children with a high share of
impairments are less likely to receive a recommendation (Figure 2.4). Here, the solid
line indicates the share of children showing an impairment within the group of all chil-
dren at school entry age, compared to the share within the group of recommended
children (dashed line) by age in months at the time of examination. In the full cohort,
the share of impairments decreases by age in all four screening dimensions. Within
the group of recommended children, the share of cognitive and socio-emotional dis-
orders are almost equally distributed across age. This change in composition is less
pronounced for the indicators motor skills and health, which confirms their lower
importance for the recommendation.18 The entrance screening, thus, especially re-
duces heterogeneity between the children of the school entrance cohort with respect
to cognitive and socio-emotional development.
To summarize the results of the first part, recommending children for school based
on the results of a developmental screening procedure yields a school cohort with less
developmental heterogeneity compared to a pure age-based entry regulation. The
17The relationship also pertains for the other developmental indicators (socio-emotional development,
motor skills and health).
18Most sub-tests also indicate a higher share of impairments for young children. For example, young
children in particular show ADHD behavior (Figure A.2.2). However, this should not be misinter-
preted as “misdiagnosing” young children with ADHD as the questions inducing an ADHD impair-
ment are quite rudimentary and, thus, only constitute an initial suspicion (see ADHD questions in
Figure A.2.1 in the Appendix).
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Figure 2.4: Developmental Impairments by Month of Age at Examination (in %)
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations.
estimations show that the pediatricians give their recommendation not only based on
the child’s development but also take the age of the child into account (see results
in Table 2.2). Hence, the screening can be seen as a minimum hurdle which creates
a more homogeneous school entry cohort. We show that performance differences in
school, as described by the literature on school entry age, can be mitigated by school
entrance screenings because better developed and older children are more likely to
receive a school recommendation. However, this is only the case if the developmental
status of retained children improves during a one-year delay of school entry. This is
what we analyze in the next step.
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2.5.2 Development of Retained Children
Having information on the school entrance screening in two subsequent years allows
us to compare the developmental status and health of the retained children in the
first examination in 2006 with the second examination in 2007. In this section, we
assess by how much non-recommended children in 2006 deviate from non-repeating,
recommended children of 2006 with respect to their development. Then we compare
the developmental status of the non-recommended children in 2006 one year later (re-
peater 2007) to the same reference group and see whether the children’s development
improved during the one-year delay. In addition, we estimate separate effects for
children of different age groups in order to assess whether retaining has heterogenous
effects with respect to age.
Table 2.3 shows mean statistics of the repeating children in 2006 and 2007. Ad-
ditionally, mean differences between non-recommended (repeating respectively) and
recommended children in the two years are depicted. Comparing the means between
the non-recommended children of 2006 and the repeaters of 2007 shows that child and
background variables are similar with exception of the time-varying variables age and
time spent in child care, which are larger due to the one-year delay. The values on the
developmental status indicate improvements in all four dimensions, e.g. the share of
children with cognitive impairments decreases by 17 percentage points, from 50% of
the non-recommended children in 2006 to 33% of the repeaters in 2007. Disorders in
the health dimension are more persistent. Retained children in this dimension catch
up by only 7 percentage points.
The same improvement can be seen when looking at the mean difference to the recom-
mended children as displayed in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.3. For example, the gap
in cognitive impairments of 39 percentage points in 2006 decreases to 20 percentage
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Table 2.3: Mean Values for Repeaters and Mean Differences Between Repeaters
and Recommended Children
Means 2006 Means 2007 Difference to
rec. children
Rec.
2006
Non-
rec.
2006
Rec.
2007
Rep.
2007
Non-
rec.
2006
Rep.
2007
Child
Female 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 -0.12 -0.12
Age (in months) 72.02 67.4 71.64 79.23 -4.53 7.59
Non-German mother tongue 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
Birth weight (in kg) 3.39 3.23 3.38 3.23 -0.16 -0.15
Child care > 3 years 0.70 0.49 0.69 0.80 -0.21 0.11
Early attendee 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.13 -0.05
Late attendee 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.85 -0.13 0.76
Developmental impairments
Cognitive development 0.11 0.50 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.20
Socio-emotional development 0.08 0.34 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.10
Motor development 0.12 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.09
Health 0.39 0.52 0.37 0.45 0.13 0.08
Background
Low SES 0.18 0.32 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.12
Medium SES 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.54 -0.04 0.00
High SES 0.26 0.17 0.29 0.17 -0.09 -0.12
Single Parent 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.03
Siblings 0.66 0.68 0.02 0.65 0.03
N 20,717 1,970 19,195 1,970 20,717 19,195
1,970 1,970
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006 and 2007. The number of observations is the total
number without considering missings.The following variables have missings: non-German mother tongue,
birth weight, child care, social status, single parent and number of siblings. The maximum share of
missing values in 2006 (2007) amounts to 3.9% (6.6%) for the recommended and to 6.7% (8.8%) for the
non-recommended (repeating) children.
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points in 2007.19 Albeit smaller, the difference for 2007 is still positive. This indi-
cates that the developmental status of the group of repeaters improves but also that
they are on average still more likely to show impairments than the group of children
they enter school with. Nevertheless, 99.4% of the repeaters are recommended for
school.
The multivariate results presented in Table 2.4 confirm the mean comparisons. Non-
recommended children catch up in all screening dimensions by delaying school entry
if compared to the reference group of non-repeating, recommended children in 2006.
Children who are not recommended in 2006 have, given all other characteristics, a
prevalence of cognitive development impairments 38.9% higher than recommended
children. After a one-year delay this difference drops to 11.4%. Hence, although they
delayed school entry and are above the age average now, they still show development
impairments with a significantly higher probability than an average non-repeating,
recommended child in 2006. The same holds for the other three developmental di-
mensions. However, children catch up to a lesser extent with respect to health.
In order to consider heterogenous results of delaying school with respect to children’s
age, we additionally calculate the risk of developmental disorders separately for three
different age groups: the young children born after September 2000 who attend the
first examination a year earlier than they would have to, the middle-aged children
born between April and September 2000, and the old children born before April 2000.
Looking at these age groups reveals that older non-recommended children have more
often problems with cognitive development, motor development and health, while
younger children only show developmental impairments with respect to the socio-
19For cognitive impairments, the 2006 gap of 39 percentage points is calculated as the difference
between non-recommended children, of whom 50% show cognitive impairments, and recommended
children, of whom 11% show cognitive impairments. For 2007, it is the gap between repeaters (who
are most likely the non-recommended children of 2006 examined one year later), of whom now
33% show cognitive impairments, and recommended children in 2007, of whom 13% show cognitive
impairments (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.4: Probit Regression of Developmental Outcomes as Dependent
Variable: Average Partial Effects for Repeating Children
Cognitive Socio-
emotional
Motor Health
All children
Non-recommended 2006 0.389 *** 0.261*** 0.286*** 0.122***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Repeater 2007 0.114 *** 0.055*** 0.081*** 0.056***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018)
Young children
Non-recommended 2006 0.279 *** 0.253*** 0.226*** 0.091***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Repeater 2007 0.096 *** 0.048** 0.047** 0.083**
(0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029)
Middle-aged children
Non-recommended 2006 0.391 *** 0.267*** 0.285*** 0.120***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Repeater 2007 0.095 *** 0.043** 0.077*** 0.022
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023)
Old children
Non-recommended 2006 0.527 *** 0.239*** 0.367*** 0.164***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)
Repeater 2007 0.302 *** 0.127*** 0.284*** 0.193***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040)
N 43,789
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006 and 2007. */**/*** indicate significance
at the 10/5/1 percent level. Regression using the pooled sample of 2006 and 2007 and the
estimation as described in Equation 2.3. The partial effects for the dummy variables “Non-
recommended 2006” and “Repeater 2007” are calculated as treatment effects on the treated,
i.e. they are averaged within the group of non-recommended children 2006 and Repeater 2007,
respectively. Control Variables for children, parental background, month of examination and
missing dummies are included. Child controls include variables female, non-German mother
tongue, birth weight, child care duration longer than 3 years as well as dummies for early and
late attendees. Control variables on family background include dummies for socio-economic
status, single parenthood and siblings living in the household. The month of examination is
controlled for by dummy variables. Missing dummies are included to indicate observations
with missing values in one of the variables. Missings are set to zero (dummy variables) or to
the mean (continuous variables) and are included in the regression.
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emotional dimension more often. This shows that young children are frequently held
back solely due to age and not because of developmental impairments.
One year later, almost all age groups show fewer impairments in all screening dimen-
sions. Only within the group of older children, more health disorders are observed
in 2007. In general, younger children seem to catch up to a larger extent than older
children, an exception being the cognitive dimension in which the oldest children
improve to a similar extent. It might be easier for the younger non-recommended
children (who have less severe problems) to improve during the year. Delaying school
entry should, therefore, be combined with interventions and encouragement especially
for children who are already relatively old in their school cohort.
The results of the second part of our analysis suggest that delaying school entry allows
retained children to improve. Their developmental status remains below average, but
developmental gaps are closing at least to some extent during the one-year delay.
Furthermore, younger children seem to catch up more often. Regarding the literature
on school entry age, our results also indicate that school entrance screenings can be an
opportunity to attenuate the disadvantages of fixed cutoff dates for relatively young
children by means of delaying school entry.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we use novel and unique administrative data of a school entrance screen-
ing to analyze how early gaps in age and development influence children’s probability
to be recommended to start school at the regular age and whether developmental
gaps close by delaying school entry. This is important since the previous litera-
ture on school entry age has shown that a strict application of cutoff dates leads to
within-cohort differences in age which have large effects on school performance. The
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literature also finds OLS estimates of the age effect to be smaller than the causal
IV effects and mainly attributes these differences to early and late enrollment, i.e.
non-compliance with the fixed cutoff dates. Our study sheds light on the reasons for
the different effect sizes of OLS and IV estimates by studying the determinants of
school entry in the presence of school entrance screenings, which allow a more flexible
school entry. Furthermore, we show if and how school entrance screenings reduce
performance gaps in a class and, consequently, whether disadvantages for children
born in the summer months induced by fixed cutoffs are mitigated.
Our results indicate that age and developmental status are important predictors for
school recommendation. Impairments in cognitive, socio-emotional and motor devel-
opment as well as health are negatively related to the probability to receive a school
recommendation. Moreover, younger children are less likely to be recommended for
school. This occurs for two reasons: First, they show developmental impairments
more often. Second, they have a lower probability of being recommended per se.
The probability to be recommended for school increases by 1.6 percentage points per
month of age, all else being equal. The influence of age is of particular importance
to the children who are born in months close to the cutoff month as they are always
the youngest. By not recommending younger and developmentally disordered chil-
dren, the screenings set a minimal developmental requirement which mitigates the
developmental gaps within a class.
Delaying school entry allows children to improve with respect to developmental sta-
tus although their developmental status remains below average. Especially children
who are still fairly young when being retained catch up during a one-year delay of
school entry. This might be easier for them as a smaller fraction of non-recommended
younger children shows developmental impairments in the first place. However, after
the delay of one year, the repeating children of all ages still show more develop-
mental impairments than the average of the recommended children. Nevertheless,
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performance differences and thus disadvantages for younger children are attenuated
by school entrance screenings.
Pediatricians seem to be sensitive with regard to child age and tend to deny rec-
ommendation for very young children. They either anticipate the improvement of
younger children during a one-year delay or might want to place them into a more
favorable age position in the cohort of the following year. School entrance screenings
thus can harmonize school entrance cohorts with respect to age and developmental
differences.
Fixed cutoff rules, which have been studied in the recent school entry literature, de-
termine school entry solely by age, while entrance screenings also consider a child’s
developmental status. Our paper shows that, in general, flexible school entry rules
taking – besides age – also children’s development into account mitigate the disad-
vantages for relatively young children born in summer as described by the recent
literature on school entry age.
However, the question remains of whether school entrance screenings are a beneficial
policy. An answer to this question requires knowledge of the direct and indirect
costs as well as the monetary benefits of the screenings and delayed school entry.
This involves an assessment of the long-term consequences of delaying school entry,
relating the possible benefits of better school performance to the forgone earnings
of entering the labor market one year later. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of school
entrance screenings, similar to the cost-benefit analysis of the optimal school starting
age by Borghans and Diris (2010), is a highly desirable and interesting topic for future
research.
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School entrance screening in Brandenburg
The school entrance screening in Brandenburg is based on a core set of indicators of
the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) developed
by the World Health Organization (WHO). Information on body and mental health
of the child is obtained from observation of the pediatrician, interviews with parents
and child as well as medical assessments. Qualifiers are used to indicate the degree
of an impairment in three levels – mild, moderate and severe (Landesgesundheitsamt
Brandenburg, 2008).
The examination serves as a check-up for age-appropriate physical and psychological
development. For the estimations, we use indicators on developmental status with
regard to cognitive abilities, socio-emotional wellbeing, motor skills and health. All
of the four dimensions are measured using several sub-tests, which are described in
more detail in the following.
The assessment of cognitive development includes measures for:
• articulation
• expressive language
• receptive language
• general intelligence
Cognitive development is measured using four sub-tests of the “Basisdiagnostik für
umschriebene Entwicklungsstörungen im Vorschulalter”, (BUEVA, Esser andWyschkon,
2002) to detect developmental language disorders. The sub-tests include an articula-
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tion test (Möhring (1939)) and a grammar test for expressive language (PET, Anger-
maier, 1974). For children who are affected by a disorder of speech and language
according to these tests, two further tests are administered, one on expressive lan-
guage disorders (PET, Angermaier, 1974) and one on general intelligence (Columbia
Mental Maturity Scale, CMM, Burgemeister et al., 1972). The last one is a nonverbal
test and can be used for children who showed difficulties with speech and language.
The assessment of socio-emotional development includes measures for:
• anxiety disorder
• anti-social behavior
• attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
• enuresis
Psychiatric disorders in socio-emotional development are screened using questions
from the “Mannheimer Elterninterview” (MEI, Esser et al., 1989). The assessment
includes measures for anxiety, anti-social (i.e. aggressive) behavior, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and enuresis. The questions used for diagnosis are
displayed in Figure A.2.1.
The assessment of motor development includes measures for gross motor skills to
assess:
• power
• coordination
• dynamic and static balance
Motor impairments are assessed using tests on gross motor skills. The development of
motor functions is important for the overall development of perception and cognition.
Although there seems to be no systematic relationship to later school performance
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Figure A.2.1: Measures of Psychiatric Disorders in Socio-emotional Development
My child… Agree Disagree Classification by federal health office 
 
gets distracted easily while playing at home  
 
○ ○ 
gets distracted easily at the nursery 
 ○ ○ 
is very restive and fidgety and can´t sit still at home  
(e. g. while eating) 
 
○ ○ 
is very restive and fidgety and can´t sit still at the nursery 
 ○ ○ 
ADHD:  
agreed to both items of “at 
home“ or “at the nursery”  
 ADHD 
 
 
is often not following directions  at home 
 
○ ○ 
is often not following directions  at the nursery 
 ○ ○ 
is often involved in fights with other children 
 ○ ○ 
Anti social behavior: 
2 of 3 items agreed 
 affective-social 
disorder 
 
is often joshed, teased or beaten by other children 
 
○ ○ 
is afraid of other children 
 ○ ○ 
Anxiety disorder: 
both items agreed 
 affective-social 
disorder 
wets the bed at least once a week ○ ○ 
Enuresis: 
agreed 
 enuresis 
 
Source: Landesgesundheitsamt Brandenburg (2008).
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(Esser and Schlack, 2009; Esser and Wyschkon, 2000), motor skill problems and poor
performance in physical education might put these children at higher risk for being
bullied (Bejerot and Humble, 2007). Tests used include standing and jumping on one
leg as well as walking in a straight line using tandem gait (heel-to-toe-walking).
The assessment of body health includes the following domains:
• sex, age in months
• height, weight, BMI
• allergies and asthma
• musculoskeletal system
• endocrine system
• hearing and seeing
• skin
The sub-tests used are described in a handbook, which is available to all of the gov-
ernment pediatricians who administer the examination(Landesgesundheitsamt Bran-
denburg, 2008). The results are collected in a standard form and completed by the
information on family background variables. These include:
• parental education and labor force participation
• mother tongue of the child
• number of children in household
• number of adults in household
• duration of child care participation
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Figure A.2.2: ADHD Behavior by Month of Age at Examination
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calculations.
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Figure A.2.3: Area of Common Support in Nearest Neighbor Matching
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006 and 2007, own calculations.
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Table A.2.1: Average Partial Effects for the Control Variables not Displayed in Table 2.2
(2006)
Average partial effects
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Child Controls
Female 0.051*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***
Non-German 0.002 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017
Birth Weight (in kg) 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
Child care > 3 years 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***
Early attendee 0.014** 0.010* 0.009* 0.007 0.009* 0.009*
Late attendee 0.027* 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.044***
Family Background
Medium SES 0.051*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
High SES 0.077*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
Single Parent 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Siblings -0.011*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Month Dummies
January (and before) -0.006 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017***
February 0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
April -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
May (and after) -0.074*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.058***
Missing Dummies
Mother-tongue -0.042*** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024**
Birth weight -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
Child care 0.014* 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Siblings -0.072 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032
Parental situation 0.045* 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
SES 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. Non-
German refers to non-German mother tongue. The examination is predominantly taken from January to April; however,
there are very few children tested in the months June to December. The control variable for month January thus includes
also the months October, November, December. The variable for month May includes also the months June, July, August
and September. Reference category is March as this is the month where most examinations are taken.
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Table A.2.2: Probit Regression of School Recommen-
dation on Age Categories and Developmental Status
(2006)
Average partial
effects
Very young children ref.
(born after June 2000)
Young children 0.060***
(born April-June 2000) (0.003)
Middle-aged children 0.086***
(born Jan.-March 2000) (0.003)
Old children 0.093***
(born before Jan. 2000) (0.003)
Development
Cognitive -0.156***
(0.007)
Socio-emotional -0.102***
(0.007)
Motor -0.068***
(0.005)
Health -0.009***
(0.003)
Child controls yes
Family background yes
Month of examination yes
Missing dummies yes
Pseudo−R2 0.3765
N 22,687
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006, own calcula-
tions. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Child controls include variables female, non-German mother tongue,
birth weight, child care duration longer than 3 years as well as
dummies for early and late attendees. Control variables on fam-
ily background include dummies for socio-economic status, single
parenthood and siblings living in the household. The month of ex-
amination is controlled for by dummy variables. Missing dummies
are included to indicate observations with missing values in one of
the variables. Missings are set to zero (dummy variables) or to the
mean (continuous variables) and included in the regression.
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Table A.2.3: Means for Total and Recommended Cohort
Mean t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control t p > |t|
Female Unmatched 0.356 0.363 -0.420 0.677
Matched 0.356 0.363 -0.430 0.666
Year of birth Unmatched 2000 2000 -1.010 0.312
Matched 2000 2000 -0.520 0.600
Month of birth Unmatched 7.590 7.634 -0.590 0.555
Matched 7.590 7.567 0.300 0.764
Non-German Unmatched 0.027 0.020 1.500 0.134
Matched 0.027 0.021 1.140 0.253
Birth weight Unmatched 3.238 3.258 -0.980 0.325
Matched 3.238 3.236 0.130 0.895
Maternal school education Unmatched 2.129 1.990 6.750 0.000
Matched 2.129 2.000 6.100 0.000
Single parenthood Unmatched 0.203 0.213 -0.810 0.415
Matched 0.203 0.202 0.120 0.905
Siblings Matched 0.673 0.680 -0.500 0.618
Unmatched 0.673 0.678 -0.340 0.734
Data Source: Health Ministry of Brandenburg 2006 and 2007.
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Abstract
This paper estimates the short-run effects of the Bologna Process, a change in de-
gree regulations such that students need less time to earn a first degree, on college
enrollment and drop-out rates. We use variation in the timing of the reform at the
university department level to identify the effects of the reform based on longitudinal
administrative student data from Germany. Results differ between subjects, but for
most subjects we find no significant effects on college enrollment or drop-out rates.
Keywords: Higher education, college enrollment, Bologna Process
JEL: C23, I28, I21
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3.1 Introduction
Several European countries have introduced new types of degrees in tertiary education
over the last few years with the aim of creating a harmonized European Higher
Education Area. During the so called ’Bologna Process’, national degree systems were
to be gradually replaced with a two-tier degree system based on an undergraduate
(Bachelor) and a graduate (Master) cycle. Some European countries, such as the
United Kingdom, were already operating under such a Bachelor-Master system, but
other countries, e.g. Italy, Portugal and Germany, needed to adjust their higher
education degree system according to the Bologna declaration (European Ministers
of Education, 1999).
The traditional study programs in Germany were usually designed to last four to
five years and did not include a separate undergraduate degree. However, in 1999,
before the change of degree regulations, only 33% of the students in Germany, in
fact, graduated within five years (OECD, 2001). After the introduction of the two-
tier Bachelor-Master degree system, students can now achieve a first degree within
three years. As a consequence, obtaining a first degree qualifying for the labor market
has become less costly than under the old degree system. This could encourage more
students to invest in higher education and to finish their studies.
One of the political objectives of the Bologna reform in Germany was indeed to in-
crease the number of higher education graduates to address the increasing demand
for high-skilled personnel. According to theory, direct and indirect costs of study-
ing are a major determinant of the decision to pursue tertiary education (Becker,
1964). However, empirical evidence on students’ financial constraints with respect to
higher education is mixed (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Dearden et al., 2004; Van-
denberghe, 2007), and the returns to the new Bachelor and Master degrees are still
57
3 The Effects of the Bologna Process
uncertain. From a theoretical point of view, it is therefore a priori unclear whether
the Bologna Process with its major change to shorter study programs has had an
effect on college enrollment and drop-out rates.
Existing evidence on the impact of the introduction of the Bachelor degree in the
framework of the Bologna process is limited. This is due to the fact that the reform
has only been implemented very recently and that it was too early to measure its
effects up to now. The literature does provide numerous descriptions of the imple-
mentation process (e.g Kehm and Teichler, 2006), but to our knowledge, only few
papers provide causal evidence regarding the impact of the change in degree regu-
lations on enrollment and drop-out rates as yet. For instance, Portela et al. (2009)
compute the effect of the Bachelor implementation on the number of applications by
university department in Portugal. They find that the number of applicants is sig-
nificantly higher at departments that implemented the Bachelor degree than at those
departments that still award traditional degrees. Using survey data of secondary
school graduates in Italy, Cappellari and Lucifora (2009) provide evidence that the
enrollment rate increased by 15% in the period after the reform. Moreover, case
studies of Italian universities reveal that the individual probability of dropping out
did not change significantly after the implementation of the Bologna reform (Boero
et al., 2005; Bratti et al., 2006).
Our paper contributes to the literature by addressing the question of whether the
shorter duration of study programs induced by the Bologna reform affects student
enrollment and drop-out rates. We add to the as yet scarce literature on the impact of
the Bologna Process by providing first empirical evidence on the effects of the reform
for Germany.
Using administrative data on all German students from 1998 to 2008, we estimate
the short-term effects of the implementation of the Bachelor degree, which leads to
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a first degree in a shorter period of time, on student enrollment and drop-out rates
at the university department level. We do not look at graduation rates because it is
still too early to assess them. We use differences in the timing of the implementation
of the Bachelor degrees at the university department level to identify the effects of
the reform. Estimating a fixed effects model, we find that the introduction of the
Bachelor degree has no significant impact on enrollment or drop-out rates for most
subjects at this stage of the reform process. We cannot distinguish the effect of
the introduction of the Bachelor degree from that of simultaneous changes in the
admission requirements. We therefore estimate these two effects jointly, as if changes
in admission requirements were part of the Bologna process, which from a policy
point of view is indeed the case.
In the remainder of the paper, we first present the data and descriptive statistics
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 then provides the identification strategy and assump-
tions, followed by the empirical results and interpretation in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use administrative data on all German higher education students for the years
1998 to 2008.1 More specifically, we use the data collected during the winter semesters
(October to March), which include every enrolled student in that academic year. The
advantage of the administrative student data is that we can observe all students in
Germany over a long period of time. The data contain detailed information on the
course of studies and a limited number of student background variables. In addition,
we use institutional data on the quality of universities provided by the CHE (Centre
1Statistical Office Germany, Higher Education Statistics. Data are available as from 1995.
59
3 The Effects of the Bologna Process
for Higher Education Development).2 This data is collected for the purpose of a
national ranking of higher education departments and is available for a majority of
subjects and universities.
Due to the absence of an individual panel identifier, we aggregate the data at the
level of university departments. In order to obtain a balanced panel of departments,
departments opening or closing during the observation period are dropped. Table 3.1
lists the number of departments included in our analysis for each of the 19 subjects.3
Subjects in which the implementation of the reform had not started until 2008, such
as medical studies and law, were excluded from the analysis. Students of a teaching
degree (’Lehramt’) are not considered either because the reform of the degree system
is still in the pilot phase. As for some years data are missing in the federal state of
Hamburg, the universities of this state are excluded from the analysis as well.
The data allow us to calculate the number of first-year students, the percentage of
first-year students enrolled in the Bachelor and in the traditional degree programs as
well as a measure of the drop-out rate at the department level. Since the data do
not allow us to identify the same student over time, the drop-out rate in year t is
computed by dividing the number of second-year students in year t by the number
of first-year students in year t − 1. We thus follow cohorts of first-year students
and calculate drop-out rates for each cohort. Due to the one-year time lag that is
necessary in order to observe the second-year students, the latest cohort in the drop-
out analysis are the first-year students of 2007. Because drop-out rates are defined
2For more background information see also http://www.che-ranking.de [last accessed: November
7th 2011].
3For the drop-out analysis, we use a slightly different sample as we need to balance the sample only
over the years 1998 - 2007. The observation period for the drop-out sample ends with the first-year
students of 2007; due to the one-year time lag, we need to observe the second-year students. The
samples for the analysis of the first-year students and the drop-out sample also differ with respect
to the definition of first-year students. For the analysis of first-year students, we define students
entering the higher education system for the first time as first-year students. In the drop-out sample,
we consider all students who are in the first year of their current studies.
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Table 3.1: Number of Departments in the Balanced Panel for the Enrollment Analysis
(1998-2008)
Departments Departments
All Subjects Pooled 929 German Lang. and Lit. 43
Biology 42 History 32
Business Administration 94 Industrial Engineering 53
Chemical Engineering 20 Information Systems 37
Chemistry 49 Mathematics 56
Computer sciences 78 Mechanical Engineering 82
Construction Engineering 52 Physics 50
Economics 25 Political Science 31
Electrical Engineering 83 Psychology 39
English Lang. and Lit. 40 Sociology 23
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008), own calculations.
at the level of the university departments, students who change university or subject
are counted as drop-outs. The drop-out rate is therefore a measure of the capacity of
the department to retain its students. Whether they switch or give up studying as a
whole cannot be distinguished.
The change in degree regulation due to the Bologna Process was implemented in Ger-
many as from the academic year 2000/01. University departments were free to decide
in which year they would start offering Bachelor programs. In this paper, a univer-
sity department is considered to have implemented the Bachelor (BachDept dummy
equals one) if all first-year students are attending a Bachelor program. Figure 3.1
shows the share of departments that implemented the new degree over time for all
subjects pooled. We observe that the Bachelor degree started taking off as from 2004.
In the academic year 2008-2009, at the end of the observation period, 86 % of the
university departments had switched to the Bachelor degree.4 Figures A.3.1 to A.3.4
4The observation period for the drop-outs ends with the cohort of the first-year students of 2007.
By then, on average 72% of the departments had introduced the Bachelor degree.
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Figure 3.1: Share of Departments Offering only the Bachelor Degree (by Year and
Subject, 1999-2008)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1999-2008), own calculations.
in the Appendix show that the timing of the transition to the Bachelor degree was
similar for all different subjects.
Summary statistics for the number of first-year students and the drop-out rates over
all academic years are given in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. The tables also depict the
statistics separately for departments that switched to the Bachelor degree and for
those that still operate under the traditional degree system. Pooled across all sub-
jects, the Bachelor departments are significantly smaller than departments that have
not yet implemented the reform (see Table 3.2). However, the difference is not signif-
icant in half of the subjects, and the relative size of Bachelor and traditional degree
departments varies across disciplines. We observe considerable variation in the aver-
age department size by subject as well. While business administration departments,
for instance, have 146 first-year students on average, history and chemical engineering
departments are the smallest with about 40 first-year students.
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Pooled across all subjects, drop-out rates are not significantly different in Bachelor
versus traditional degree departments (see Table 3.3). But similarly to the enroll-
ment numbers, important differences between subjects emerge. In about half of the
subjects, differences in drop-out rates between Bachelor and traditional degree de-
partments exist in either positive or negative directions. Drop-out rates of more than
30% are observed in the fields of chemistry, English language and literature as well
as in mathematics, whereas psychology departments only have an average drop-out
rate of about 8%.
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Table 3.2: Average Number of First-year Students by Department, Subject and Transition to the
Bachelor Program (1998-2008)
Pooled Bachelor Dept=0 Bachelor Dept=1 t-test
Mean Std.
Dev.
Mean Std.
Dev.
Nb of
Depts
Mean Std.
Dev.
Nb of
Depts
All Subjects Pooled 84.84 (74.03) 87.02 (76.57) 8054 76.70 (63.07) 2165 ***
Biology 96.26 (39.82) 95.21 (37.16) 356 99.76 (47.71) 106
Business Admin. 145.98 (89.45) 147.58 (90.06) 831 139.44 (86.83) 203
Chemical Engin. 41.32 (23.27) 37.95 (23.12) 159 50.11 (21.44) 61 ***
Chemistry 69.54 (39.45) 67.62 (39.38) 409 75.58 (39.22) 130 **
Computer Sciences 95.14 (83.63) 103.92 (90.69) 664 65.08 (40.39) 194 ***
Construction Engin. 74.50 (38.94) 75.73 (39.12) 442 70.30 (38.17) 130
Economics 108.40 (83.61) 118.47 (88.83) 210 75.88 (52.50) 65 ***
Electrical Engin. 75.45 (60.03) 79.37 (62.02) 740 58.68 (47.25) 173 ***
English Lang. and Lit. 51.50 (38.59) 48.20 (31.45) 316 59.94 (51.79) 124 ***
German Lang. and Lit. 87.93 (83.06) 90.82 (83.59) 366 78.05 (80.83) 107
History 38.35 (35.55) 35.17 (32.65) 242 45.36 (40.51) 110 **
Industrial Engin. 92.50 (78.09) 93.74 (78.19) 474 87.11 (77.78) 109
Information Systems 62.40 (35.72) 65.42 (37.26) 288 55.08 (30.63) 119 ***
Mathematics 50.62 (49.02) 48.78 (47.56) 518 60.37 (55.36) 98 **
Mechanical Engin. 119.44 (118.63) 122.35 (122.29) 750 105.09 (97.73) 152
Physics 62.65 (42.11) 62.95 (41.35) 442 61.42 (45.28) 108
Political Sciences 71.20 (49.84) 71.81 (52.80) 268 68.95 (37.26) 73
Psychology 67.78 (26.34) 67.08 (26.47) 383 73.61 (24.79) 46
Sociology 71.92 (50.36) 74.11 (51.40) 196 64.42 (46.25) 57
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); *, **, *** respectively stand for statistical significance of the difference at the 10,
5 and 1% confidence level.
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Table 3.3: Drop-out Rates by Department, Subject and Transition to the Bachelor Program
(1998-2008)
Pooled Bachelor Dept=0 Bachelor Dept=1 t-test
Mean Std.Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Nb of
Depts Mean
Std.
Dev.
Nb of
Depts
All Subjects Pooled 0.20 (0.25) 0.20 (0.26) 8073 0.19 (0.18) 1487
Biology 0.14 (0.11) 0.13 (0.10) 363 0.19 (0.11) 67 ***
Business Admin. 0.12 (0.16) 0.12 (0.16) 811 0.12 (0.18) 139
Chemical Engin. 0.21 (0.24) 0.21 (0.26) 168 0.18 (0.16) 42
Chemistry 0.31 (0.14) 0.31 (0.13) 414 0.31 (0.15) 86
Computer Sciences 0.20 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14) 654 0.21 (0.15) 136
Construction Engin. 0.19 (0.14) 0.19 (0.13) 436 0.17 (0.15) 94
Economics 0.29 (0.15) 0.29 (0.15) 218 0.29 (0.17) 42
Electrical Engin. 0.18 (0.57) 0.18 (0.62) 724 0.21 (0.17) 126
English Lang. and Lit. 0.30 (0.17) 0.33 (0.16) 324 0.20 (0.17) 86 ***
German Lang. and Lit. 0.27 (0.19) 0.29 (0.19) 397 0.17 (0.17) 73 ***
History 0.26 (0.37) 0.27 (0.42) 253 0.22 (0.14) 87
Industrial Engin. 0.16 (0.19) 0.17 (0.19) 468 0.15 (0.22) 72
Information Systems 0.14 (0.15) 0.13 (0.15) 288 0.19 (0.13) 82 ***
Mathematics 0.30 (0.19) 0.30 (0.20) 552 0.32 (0.16) 58
Mechanical Engin. 0.16 (0.15) 0.17 (0.16) 714 0.14 (0.12) 116 *
Physics 0.24 (0.11) 0.23 (0.11) 441 0.27 (0.14) 69 ***
Political Sciences 0.15 (0.17) 0.15 (0.18) 261 0.14 (0.12) 49
Psychology 0.08 (0.10) 0.07 (0.08) 384 0.14 (0.27) 26 ***
Sociology 0.22 (0.19) 0.24 (0.14) 203 0.11 (0.36) 37 ***
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); *, **, *** respectively stand for statistical significance of the difference at the
10, 5 and 1% confidence level.
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3.3 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the number of first-year students and the drop-out rates per university
department as a function of the implementation of the Bachelor degree in a fixed
effects panel setting. The department fixed effects control for all time-constant ob-
served and unobserved department characteristics. For instance, these could include
regional differences in the higher education institutions or differences in the quality
of the management and prestige at the university or department level. Year dum-
mies are included to capture enrollment trends over time that may be related to e.g.
changes in the expectations as to economic activity (a measure of the expected oppor-
tunity costs of studying) or to variation in the number of secondary school graduates
who have acquired the formal right to attend higher education. We also include a
dummy indicator for the introduction of tuition fees as two federal states introduced
fees in 2006 and four federal states in 2007.5 Finally, we include a dummy variable
indicating whether a department simultaneously offered a Bachelor and a traditional
degree in a given year to control for possible selection effects.
The estimated equation thus reads:
yit = β1BachDeptit + β2MixDeptit + β3Feeit + β4Y eart + υi + it (3.1)
where yit is the natural logarithm of the number of enrolled students respectively
the drop-out rate at department i in year t, BachDeptit represents an indicator
variable equal to one if the department implemented the Bachelor degree,6 υi the
department fixed effects and Y eart represent the year dummies. MixDeptit equals
5Before the year 2006, no German federal state levied tuition fees.
6As described above, we define that a department has implemented the Bachelor degree once all
first year students are enrolled in a bachelor degree course of study.
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one if traditional and new degrees coexisted in a given department in year t. Feeit is
a dummy variable that equals one if a federal state introduced tuition fees.
This equation is estimated pooled over all subjects as well as separately for each
subject within a balanced panel of departments so that β1 identifies the within de-
partments effects of the Bachelor introduction. Heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors are clustered by department to allow for within-department serial correlation in
the error terms it. Furthermore, the analyses by subject allow us to observe potential
differences in the impact of the reform between subjects.
In the pooled regression, we additionally control for the number of departments in
each subject per year (in the unbalanced sample) in order to take into account the
effect of the total number of existing departments in a given subject and year on
enrollment in the observed departments. This is not necessary in the separate es-
timations per subject since variation in the number of departments is captured by
the year dummies. As an additional robustness check for the effect of departments
that were newly established or closed down during the observation period, we also
estimate the model at the subject level. That is, we regress the share of departments
that implemented the Bachelor degree per subject on the total number of first-year
students per subject in the unbalanced sample.
The number of first-year students (and possibly as well the drop-out rate) of a uni-
versity department is determined by demand and supply of higher education. While
demand is constrained by the number of students that have a secondary degree giv-
ing them access to higher education, supply of study places is constrained by the
teaching capacity of universities. If the admission restrictions (for instance numerus
clausus) are constant over time, the department fixed effects will account for them.
However, if admission restrictions change simultaneously to the Bologna process, this
will affect our estimates. We cannot distinguish the effect of the introduction of the
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Bachelor degree from that of simultaneous changes in the admission requirements.
We therefore estimate these two effects jointly as we consider changes in the admis-
sion requirements to be part of the Bologna Process. From a policy evaluation point
of view, this seems a meaningful way to proceed since capacity constraints of uni-
versities are a real constraint to the effectiveness of the policy. Our estimates thus
reflect this combined policy effect of the Bologna Process.
Our identifying assumption for the analysis on the department level is that the timing
of the implementation of the reform is not related to department characteristics. In
order to investigate the plausibility of this assumption, we regress the timing of the
reform (that is the year in which the department implemented the Bachelor degree)
on observable department characteristics before the reform. In this estimation, we
include the average change in the number of first-year students (department growth)
and the average number of first-year students (department size) between 1995 and
2000, i.e. before the start of the transition process. Furthermore, we include depart-
ment quality measures taken from the CHE ranking data. The available department
quality variables vary by subject and year. The quality measures of the ranking
are collected only every 3 years, for the first time in 2001, 2002 or 2003 depending
on the subject. We use the earliest available department quality measures for each
subject. Depending on the subject, these may include the number of PhD students
per 10 professors, the research reputation and reputation among professors, the num-
ber of citations, the amount of external funding per researcher, as well as students’
evaluations of the quality of teaching, organisation, mentoring and infrastructure.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of this estimation. It appears that, although
some correlations appear significant in certain disciplines, none of the variables is sig-
nificant across disciplines or consistent in the direction of the effect. We do observe
that the average growth rate of physics and electrical engineering departments before
2000 is related to earlier implementation of the reform. In these two subjects, faster
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growing department implement the Bachelor degree earlier. This may bias the mea-
sured effect of the Bachelor reform on the number of first-year students upwards in
these disciplines as the increase in the number of students related to the department
trend is picked up by the Bachelor coefficient. The average department size before
2000 is significantly correlated with the timing of the transition in many subjects,
but its coefficient is close to zero.
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Table 3.4: Timing of the Reform and Department Characteristics I (OLS)
Growth
rate
Average
size # PhD
Res.
Reput. Reput. Citation Ext. $ Obs.
Biology 4.81(5.10)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.72
(0.42)
-0.12
(0.76)
-0.15
(0.65)
-0.90**
(0.40)
1.32***
(0.41) 42
Chemical Engineering 0.77(3.36)
0.00
(0.04) - -
0.05
(0.61) - - 20
Chemistry 0.96(1.89)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.57
(0.50)
0.71
(1.01)
-0.71
(0.79)
-0.03
(0.93)
0.37
(0.32) 49
Computer Sciences 0.46(0.58)
0.00**
(0.00) - -
0.40*
(0.22) - - 78
Construction Engineering -2.72(1.66)
0.02**
(0.01) - -
0.35
(0.35) - - 52
Economics 0.14(1.34)
0.01***
(0.00)
-1.06**
(0.41)
1.63***
(0.38)
-
1.63***
(0.44)
- -0.17(0.29) 25
Electrical Engineering -0.85*(0.47)
0.00
(0.00) - -
-0.14
(0.22) - - 67
English Language and Literature -0.48(0.32)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.40
(0.27)
1.15
(0.77)
-0.94
(0.62) - - 40
German Language and Literature -1.12(1.47)
0.00
(0.00)
-.18
(0.38) -
-0.03
(0.32) -
-0.02
(0.36) 43
History 1.41(0.95)
0.02
(0.01)
0.23
(0.40) -
0.79**
(0.37) -
-1.02
(0.46) 32
Information Systems 0.46(0.58)
0.00**
(0.00) - -
0.40*
(0.22) - - 78
Mathematics 0.34(0.39)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.57
(0.38)
0.90
(0.90)
-0.39
(0.91) -
0.16
(0.40) 56
Mechanical Engineering -0.57(0.89)
0.01**
(0.00) - -
-0.06
(0.25) - - 82
Physics -2.36*(1.30)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.36
(0.53)
-0.53
(0.40)
-0.57
(0.55)
0.75
(0.46)
0.36
(0.48) 50
Political Sciences 1.77(2.19)
0.01
(0.01) -
0.00
(1.03)
-0.39
(1.06) - - 31
Psychology -3.31(2.69)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.45) -
-0.20
(0.34)
-0.14
(0.35)
0.18
(0.34) 39
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); Dep. variable: year of transition to the Bachelor degree; Robust std. err. in
parentheses (clustered by department); *, **, ***: 10, 5 and 1% confidence level; regional dummies are included in all estimations;
growth rate of the department is calculated based on the 5 years before the transition; ’ -’ department characteristic not available.
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Table 3.5: Timing of the Reform and Department Characteristics II (OLS)
Growth
rate
Average
size
#
PhD
Res.
Reput Reput.
Quality
men-
toring
Quality
Teach-
ing
Org.
study IT Rooms Ext. $ Obs.
Business
Administration
0.78
(0.87)
0.00
(0.00) - -
0.13
(0.20)
-0.00
(0.53)
-
0.71**
(0.35)
0.42
(0.41)
0.06
(0.27)
0.11
(0.33) - 94
Industrial
Engineering
0.81
(0.53)
0.01***
(0.00) - -
-0.27
(0.22)
-
2.94**
(1.40)
0.59
(0.67)
3.23**
(1.30)
0.62
(0.56)
-
1.10**
(0.41)
- 60
Sociology -2.68(0.79)
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.08)
-0.40
(0.40)
0.80
(0.25)
-0.13
(0.13)
-1.04
(0.33)
3.27*
(0.36)
0.24
(0.10) 23
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); Dep. variable: year of transition to the Bachelor degree; Robust std. err. in parentheses (clustered by
department); *, **, ***: 10, 5 and 1% confidence level; regional dummies are included in all estimations; growth rate of the department is calculated based
on the 5 years before the transition; ’ -’ department characteristic not available.
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3.4 Results
In this section we present fixed effects (FE) estimates for the effect of the bachelor
introduction on the log of the number of first-year students and drop-out rates.7 In
the estimation of the drop-out rate, the marginal effects are divided by the standard
deviation of the outcome variables. The coefficients thus represent percentages of a
standard deviation in the outcome variable. This is done to facilitate comparison of
the magnitude of the results across disciplines.
Estimating the fixed effects model, we do not find a significant change in the number
of first-year students due to the introduction of the new degree system with a shorter
duration of studies in the pooled sample (Table 3.6).8 The results are similar for three
quarters of the subjects when estimated separately. Therefore, the reform overall does
not seem to have changed the incentives to pursue higher education for the moment.
Also depicted in Table 3.6 are the marginal effects for the mixed department dummies.
This control dummy variable takes into account that some departments offer the
traditional and the new Bachelor degree simultaneously. The effect is significant in 8
out of 19 subjects. We interpret this as the control dummy capturing the unobserved
selection in characteristics of departments offering the traditional and the new degree
simultaneously.
We find significantly negative effects of the Bachelor implementation on enrollment
for the subjects of electrical and mechanical engineering. In these subjects, the num-
ber of first-year students in Bachelor departments is 12% lower than in departments
offering the traditional degrees. A possible interpretation is that students avoid the
new degrees. During the implementation process, students can indeed choose whether
7OLS estimates can be found in the Appendix.
8The estimations are based on the balanced panel. Estimations using the unbalanced panel yield
similar results.
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they want to apply for a Bachelor or a traditional degree department. Considering
the solid reputation of German engineering degrees, students may prefer avoiding the
university departments proposing the Bachelor degrees in order to pursue the tradi-
tionally renown programs. If that is the case, the departments that have implemented
the reform should attract fewer students, which results in a negative estimate of the
Bachelor implementation. This effect should be transitory because, once all depart-
ments have introduced the Bachelor degree, avoiding the Bachelor will no longer be
an option.9
Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of the Bachelor Implementation on the Number of
First-year Students (OLS, Department Fixed Effects)
Bachelor Dpt. Mixed Dpt.
Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err. N
All Subjects Pooled 0.02 (0.03) 0.10*** (0.02) 10,219
Biology 0.09 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 462
Business Admin. 0.09 (0.11) 0.10* (0.05) 1,034
Chemical Engineering 0.11 (0.17) 0.47*** (0.14) 220
Chemistry 0.06 (0.07) 0.11* (0.06) 539
Computer sciences 0.14* (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 858
Construction Engineering -0.09 (0.07) -0.00 (0.05) 572
Economics 0.07 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14) 275
Electrical Engineering -0.12* (0.07) 0.09* (0.05) 913
English Lang. and Lit. 0.35** (0.16) 0.25** (0.11) 440
German Lang. and Lit. 0.32** (0.15) 0.17 (0.13) 473
History 0.17 (0.14) -0.05 (0.13) 352
Industr. Engineering 0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.08) 583
Information Systems 0.08 (0.10) -0.00 (0.06) 407
Mathematics 0.05 (0.13) 0.16* (0.09) 616
Mechanical Engineering -0.12* (0.07) 0.03 (0.04) 902
Physics -0.00 (0.07) 0.18*** (0.06) 550
Political Science 0.25 (0.16) 0.11 (0.11) 341
Psychology -0.03 (0.04) -0.185*** (0.04) 429
Sociology -0.06 (0.23) 0.40 (0.20) 253
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); Dependent variable: ln(number of students per depart-
ment); Year and tuition fee dummies included; Pooled estimation in addition contains subject dummies
and the number of faculties per subject; *,**, ***: significance at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level.
9We indeed find stronger negative effects in these disciplines using the 1998-2006 sample. The
coefficients for the current sample are closer to zero and less significant.
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Secondly, we find that the Bachelor introduction increases enrollment in English and
German language and literature departments as well as in computer sciences de-
partments. The first two subjects are usually chosen primarily because students are
interested in the field and less because of their returns on the labor market. It is
possible that the shorter duration of the new degree has made it more attractive to
pursue these subjects. Furthermore, computer sciences and English language should
provide relatively many opportunities for exchange with English speaking countries
where the Bachelor degree already exists. The international comparability of degrees
may, thus, be more relevant for these subjects.
At the subject level, controlling for year and subject fixed effects, we find that the
share of Bachelor departments per subject is not significantly related to total en-
rollment per subject (p-value=0.258). Based on our results, we can state that the
introduction of the Bachelor degree overall did not increase the number of first-year
students, neither within a subject nor overall at the department level.
Regarding the drop-out rate, we find that the Bachelor implementation overall did
not affect the drop-out rates in the estimation using all subjects pooled (Table 3.7).10
Taking subjects separately, we find that the Bachelor introduction had a significant
effect in four subjects. Drop-out rates seem to increase for biology departments,
whereas we observe a significantly smaller drop-out rate in business administration
as well as in English and German language and literature departments that have
implemented the Bachelor reform. Similar to our interpretation of the increase in
enrollment, the shorter duration of studies may also lead to decreasing drop-out
rates. Due to lower opportunity and direct costs of studying, more students might
be able and motivated to continue their studies.
10The estimation here is based on the balanced panel. Estimations using the unbalanced panel yield
similar results.
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of the Bachelor Implementation on Drop-out
Rates (OLS, Department Fixed Effect)
Bachelor Dept. Mixed Dept.
Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err. N
All Subjects Pooled -0.01 (0.04) 0.11*** (0.04) 9,560
Biology 0.70** (0.32) 0.84*** (0.25) 430
Business Admin. -0.38** (0.18) 0.01 (0.12) 950
Chemical Engineering -0.03 (0.57) 0.57 (0.43) 210
Chemistry 0.06 (0.20) 0.22 (0.17) 500
Comp. sciences -0.05 (0.19) 0.07 (0.14) 790
Constr. Eng. -0.07 (0.17) -0.01 (0.13) 530
Economics 0.41 (0.29) 0.07 (0.27) 260
Electr. Eng. 0.02 (0.08) 0.17* (0.09) 850
English Lang. -0.42* (0.23) -0.25 (0.18) 410
German Lang. -0.44** (0.17) -0.11 (0.15) 470
History 0.30 (0.39) 0.33 (0.24) 340
Industr. Eng. 0.07 (0.28) -0.09 (0.13) 540
Information Systems -0.04 (0.17) -0.14 (0.23) 370
Mathematics 0.09 (0.15) 0.13 (0.18) 610
Mech. Eng. -0.10 (0.21) 0.15 (0.15) 830
Physics 0.08 (0.21) 0.07 (0.15) 510
Political Science 0.00 (0.25) 0.03 (0.23) 310
Psychology 0.60 (0.44) -0.22 (0.16) 410
Sociology -0.23 (0.27) 0.05 (0.19) 240
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); No sign. eff. in other disciplines; Year and tuition
fee dummies included; Coeff. divided by Std. Dev.; *, **, *** respectively stand for statistical
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level.
For most subjects, however, we do not identify significant changes in drop-out rates
due to the change in degree regulations such that students need less time to earn a
first degree. This result is in line with what we would expect for several reasons. First
of all, we have seen that the number of first-year students is not significantly affected
by the reform and that there is no evidence of systematic selection into the Bachelor
degrees with respect to family background or students’ final grades in secondary
school either (Mühlenweg, 2010). The composition of the student population should
therefore have remained the same. Moreover, the costs of higher education have been
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largely covered by the German federal states. Until recently, no tuition fees have
been levied. This could imply that opportunity costs are not such an important
determinant of the drop-out decision.
Besides the shorter duration of study programs after the introduction of the Bologna
Process, an alternative reason to expect an effect of the Bachelor implementation
on drop-out rates could be the reorganization of the course of studies. However,
there is no evidence that curricula have been systematically restructured during the
reform (Winter et al., 2010). The existing courses of the traditional degrees were
often merely split between a Bachelor and a Master program. Furthermore, students
did not perceive any changes in the quality of mentoring in the Bachelor program as
compared to the traditional degrees (Mühlenweg, 2010).
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the short-term effects of the implementation of a Bachelor
degree shortening the time to a first degree on enrollment and drop-out rates. We
estimate a fixed effects panel model at the level of university departments. For most
subjects, we do not find a significant change in the number of first-year students
due to the implementation of the Bachelor degree in Germany. Overall, the reform
thus does not seem to have changed the incentives to pursue higher education for the
moment.
However, differences by subjects exist. Indeed, we find significantly negative effects
of the Bachelor implementation on enrollment for the subjects of electrical and me-
chanical engineering but an increase in enrollment in English and German language
and literature departments as well as in computer sciences departments. We interpret
the decrease in enrollment in mechanical and electrical engineering as a possible indi-
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cation that students avoid the new degrees in these subjects because the traditional
German engineering degrees have a very good international reputation. If this is the
case, the observed negative effect should gradually vanish as it becomes no longer
possible to avoid the Bachelor degrees. As to the increase in size of the English and
German language and literature departments, it is possible that the shorter duration
of the new degrees made these subjects more attractive to pursue.
Drop-out rates in most subjects do not seem to be affected by the introduction of
the Bachelor degree either. Only business administration as well as English and
German language and literature departments experience a declining drop-out rate,
whereas drop-outs increased in biology. Business administration as well as English
and German language and literature students thus seem to react as expected to the
reduction in opportunity costs. This is not the case for the majority of subjects,
though. It is possible that the strong financial support to the higher education sector
by the German federal states reduces the relevance of the cost factor for drop-out
decisions.
To conclude, it is important to note that results with respect to enrollment and
drop-out rates might change once all departments will have implemented the two-tier
Bachelor and Master degree system or once the labor market returns to the Bachelor
degree become known.
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Appendix
Figure A.3.1: Share of Departments that Implemented the Bachelor Reform, by Year
and Subject (1999 - 2008): I
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Chemical Eng. Mechanical Eng. Construction Eng.
Electrical Eng. Industrial Eng.
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1999-2008), own calculations.
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Figure A.3.2: Share of Departments that Implemented the Bachelor Reform, by Year
and Subject (1999 - 2008): II
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Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1999-2008), own calculations.
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Figure A.3.3: Share of Departments that Implemented the Bachelor Reform, by Year
and Subject (1999 - 2008): III
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Figure A.3.4: Share of Departments that Implemented the Bachelor Reform, by Year
and Subject (1999 - 2008): IV
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Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1999-2008), own calculations.
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Table A.3.1: Marginal Effects of the Bachelor Implementation on the Number
of First-year Students (OLS)
Bachelor Dept. Mixed Dept.
Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err. N
All Subjects Pooled -0.14*** (0.04) 0.23*** (0.03) 10219
Biology 0.15 (0.12) 0.28** (0.11) 462
Business Admin. 0.03 (0.15) 0.24** (0.09) 1,034
Chemical Engineering 0.05 (0.21) 0.43** (0.15) 220
Chemistry -0.18 (0.17) 0.07 (0.12) 539
Computer sciences 0.22 (0.14) 0.48*** (0.13) 858
Construction Engineering -0.26* (0.13) 0.18* (0.10) 572
Economics -0.65*** (0.19) -0.07 (0.20) 275
Electrical Engineering -0.29** (0.10) 0.36** (0.13) 913
English Lang. and Lit. 0.36 (0.21) 0.25 (0.15) 440
German Lang. and Lit. -0.04 (0.17) 0.08 (0.13) 473
History 0.30 (0.29) 0.27 (0.27) 352
Industr. Engineering. -0.42** (0.17) 0.12 (0.12) 583
Information Systems 0.13 (0.16) 0.08 (0.09) 407
Mathematics -0.10 (0.17) 0.33** (0.14) 616
Mechenical Engineering. -0.43*** (0.13) 0.24* (0.13) 902
Physics -0.48** (0.22) 0.11 (0.11) 550
Political Science -0.25 (0.17) -0.15 (0.18) 341
Psychology -0.03 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 429
Sociology -0.32 (0.23) -0.15 (0.27) 253
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); Dependent variable: ln(number of students per depart-
ment); Pooled estimation in addition contains subject dummies and the number of faculties per subject;
Year and tuition fee dummies included; *, **, *** respectively stand for statistical significance at the 10,
5 and 1% confidence level; Data: 1998-2008
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Table A.3.2: Marginal Effects of the Bachelor Implementation on Drop-out
Rates (OLS)
Bachelor Dept. Mixed Dept.
Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err. N
All Subjects Pooled -0.05 (0.04) 0.06** (0.03) 9560
Biology 0.69** (0.27) 0.67*** (0.20) 430
Business Admin. -0.21 (0.17) -0.06 (0.15) 950
Chemical Engineering 0.23 (0.36) 0.45 (0.28) 210
Chemistry -0.12 (0.22) 0.10 (0.20) 500
Comp. sciences -0.17 (0.19) 0.16 (0.13) 790
Constr. Eng. -0.33 (0.20) 0.19 (0.23) 530
Economics -0.09 (0.35) -0.46 (0.31) 260
Electr. Eng. 0.00 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 850
English Lang. -0.71*** (0.18) -0.37* (0.20) 410
German Lang. -0.65*** (0.17) -0.24 (0.15) 470
History 0.11 (0.35) 0.28 (0.25) 340
Industr. Eng. 0.01 (0.18) -0.03 (0.10) 540
Information Systems 0.00 (0.24) 0.04 (0.22) 370
Mathematics 0.05 (0.12) 0.06 (0.08) 610
Mech. Eng. -0.08 (0.14) 0.24* (0.13) 830
Physics 0.26 (0.20) 0.21 (0.13) 510
Political Science 0.15 (0.27) -0.07 (0.26) 310
Psychology 0.62 (0.43) -0.22 (0.19) 410
Sociology -0.29 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22) 240
Note: Administrative Student Data (1998-2008); Year and tuition fee dummies included; Coeff. di-
vided by Std. Dev.; *, **, *** respectively stand for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%
confidence level; Data: 1998-2008
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how high-ability students respond to different indicators of uni-
versity quality when applying for a university. Are some quality dimensions of a
ranking, e.g. research reputation or mentoring more important than others? I es-
timate a random utility model using administrative application data of all German
medical schools. As identification relies on the variation in quality indicators over
time, I can disentangle the response to changes in quality indicators from the com-
mon knowledge regarding the overall university attractiveness. Results show that
the ranking provides more relevant information in the quality dimensions mentoring,
infrastructure and students’ satisfaction than with respect to research.
Keywords: higher education, university choice, college admission
JEL: I21, I23, C25
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4.1 Introduction
Every year, secondary school graduates who want to pursue higher education have
to choose a university. This is a crucial decision for their future trajectories made
under imperfect information regarding their own ability, university quality and the
corresponding returns to a degree. From an economist’s point of view, it is very
important that prospective students apply for the universities that fit them best in
order to maximize human capital production and to minimize drop-outs. Therefore,
university rankings and indicators of excellence may provide valuable information for
the decision of prospective students.
In this paper, I analyze whether high-ability students in fact use different university
quality indicators as a source of information and whether some quality dimensions
are more important for an applicant’s decision than others. For this purpose, I es-
timate the effect of different quality indicators from a German university ranking –
as well-established as the U.S. News & World Report ranking in the U.S. – on the
university application decision of high-ability students. As an additional quality indi-
cator, I use an excellence competition run by the German government, which declared
some universities to be “excellence universities” and granted them extra money. Iden-
tification relies on the variation induced by changes in the ranking indicators over
time and the introduction of the excellence status. This allows me to disentangle the
response to changing quality indicators from the time-constant common knowledge
regarding the overall university attractiveness.
In contrast to the U.S. higher education system, the German system is traditionally
based on public universities, which were recognized as quite homogeneous with respect
to their quality. During the last couple of years, however, several changes towards a
more competitive market have been implemented. With the publication of university
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rankings in the media starting from the 1990’s on, the quality of different institu-
tions has become directly comparable for the first time. Furthermore, the European
Bologna Declaration from 1999 induced a change in the German higher education
system to create comparable tertiary degrees throughout Europe and to increase the
international competitiveness of the European system of higher education.1 From
2006 onwards, some German federal states introduced tuition fees,2 and in 2006 and
2007, the German government has run an excellence initiative awarding extra funding
to the universities with the best future concept for research. This said, it is very likely
that university choice has recently become more important for prospective students.
Especially, as Brewer et al. (1999) and Strayer (2002) show that the type of university
an individual chooses significantly affects post-school earnings.
The theoretical literature characterizes the “College Admission Problem” as a two-
sided market (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1989). On the one
hand, prospective students decide where to apply and, once admitted, whether to
accept the university’s offer. On the other hand, universities (or a central admission
authority) determine who is admitted. The admission problem can be evaluated
from three different perspectives: (i) the prospective student who most likely wants to
maximize his human capital, (ii) the universities which try to maximize the aggregated
human capital of their graduates, and (iii) a social welfare perspective where the
optimum depends on the assumed social welfare function. According to Becker (1973)
and Chade et al. (2011), welfare is maximized by assigning the best students to the
best universities as long as student and university quality are complements. Such
a sorting of prospective students into universities exists in a two-sided market only
if universities differ sufficiently in quality (Chade et al., 2011). Along this line, a
hypothesis is that publishing quality indicators may enhance human capital and –
1For an evaluation of the German Bologna Process see Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2010).
2For analyses regarding the introduction of tuition fees in Germany see Dwenger et al. (2011) and
Hübner (2009).
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depending on the social welfare function – may also enhance a welfare maximizing
assortative sorting.
An extensive empirical literature exists on the decision whether or not to attend
university. However, this paper contributes to the more recent literature on where
to attend university. Existing evidence in the field of university choice addresses
both the influence of financial aid (e.g. Ehrenberg and Sherman, 1984; McPherson
and Schapiro, 1991; Moore et al., 1991; Avery and Hoxby, 2003) and non-monetary
factors (e.g. Toutkoushian, 2001; Mueller and Rockerbie, 2005; Griffith and Rask,
2007; Berkowitz and Hoekstra, 2011) on the matriculation (or application) decision.
For the U.S., Weiler (1996) analyzes monetary and non-monetary factors influencing
the matriculation decision of high-ability students and shows that attendance costs
as well as non-monetary characteristics, such as university quality and reputation,
are significant factors.
The influence of rankings on university choice, is explicitly studied by Monks and
Ehrenberg (1999), Mueller and Rockerbie (2005) and Griffith and Rask (2007). Monks
and Ehrenberg (1999) study the influence of the U.S. News & World Report rankings
on admission at selective private institutions. They show that low-ranked universities
accept a higher share of applicants, that more accepted applicants do not matriculate,
and that matriculated students have lower SAT scores. Using Canadian application
data, Mueller and Rockerbie (2005) find that an improvement in rank, in general,
has a positive influence on the aggregated number of applications. The U.S. study by
Griffith and Rask (2007) on an individual level also suggests that the matriculation
decision of high-ability students is influenced by changes in rank and that rankings
can affect individuals heterogeneously with respect to gender, nationality and ability.
However, the Anglo-Saxon higher education system has always been more competitive
than the comparatively homogeneous German higher education sector. Therefore, it is
not obvious whether the international evidence is applicable to the German context.
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The German studies by Büttner et al. (2003) and Helbig and Ulbricht (2010) analyze
the influence of German university rankings on the number of matriculated students
and the sorting of students according to ability. They show that rankings also seem
to influence the matriculation decision in Germany. However, both German studies
fail to disentangle the effect of the additional information provided by the rankings
from the common knowledge regarding university attractiveness.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on university rankings by distinguish-
ing the importance of different quality dimensions, while controlling for the common
knowledge regarding university attractiveness. To my knowledge, this analysis is the
first to provide evidence regarding the importance of different ranking dimensions.
The international literature, so far, has been limited to the influence of the overall
rank of an university. The German multidimensional ranking of the Center for Higher
Education Development (CHE ranking), however, allows me to study several quality
dimensions separately. The main quality dimensions published are research reputa-
tion, mentoring, faculty infrastructure as well as a recommendation by professors and
students. An additional quality indicator studied is the excellence status awarded
by the German government within an excellence competition. My results thus pro-
vide additional knowledge on which quality dimensions are (most) important for the
university choice of prospective students.
A random utility model explaining the application decision by university and indi-
vidual characteristics of the applicants is estimated using a conditional logit model.
Due to the inclusion of university fixed effects, identification relies on the variation
in rankings and excellence status over time. The estimated effects of the different
quality indicators on university choice thus only comprise the response to changes
in university quality as suggested by the indicators. The estimates do not reflect
the time-constant common knowledge regarding university attractiveness, which is
captured by the university fixed effects.
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I use a very comprehensive, administrative data set provided by the German central
agency (‘ZVS’) administering the application process for medical schools, which is
subsequently called central clearinghouse.3 The data set contains individual informa-
tion on all applicants at German medical schools for the years 2002-2008. This data
set offers two important advantages for my analysis. First, I can study the application
rather than the matriculation decision. This is important as the application decision
is less driven by supply constraints. Second, the individual nature of the data allows
me to control for the distance between a student’s hometown and each university in
the choice set, which is shown to be a very important determinant of the application
decision.
The results show that achieving excellence status increases the individual application
probability by 19%. Hence, the excellence competition run by the German govern-
ment significantly affects the university choice of high-ability students. Regarding the
ranking indicators, a high rank with respect to students’ satisfaction increases the ap-
plication probability, and a low rank in mentoring, faculty infrastructure as well as
in the indicator students’ satisfaction lowers the probability to apply. The research
oriented indicators of the German university ranking show no significant influence
on the application probability. Research quality, nevertheless, proves to be a very
important determinant for choosing a university. However, it seems to be common
knowledge and therefore part of the general attractiveness of a university. In this
case, the non-research indicators of the ranking provide more relevant information
for the university choice of high-ability students than the research-oriented ranking
indicators. Publishing multidimensional university rankings, thus, widens the basis
of information for a well-informed university choice.
3In Germany, the university application process for the subjects medicine, pharmacology, veteri-
nary medicine, dentistry, psychology and biology has been administered by a central agency called
‘Zentralstelle zur Vergabe von Studienplätzen’ (ZVS) during the observation period.
93
4 University Rankings in Action?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I give a
more detailed overview on the institutional background of the German university
ranking, the excellence initiative and the central admission procedure (Section 4.2).
Subsequently, Section 4.3 describes the application data including first descriptive
evidence, Section 4.4 explains the estimation strategy, and Section 4.5 presents the
results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background
The German higher education sector used to be quite homogeneous with respect
to the quality of universities. The share of private institutions is traditionally very
low. The public universities are administered and financed by the 16 German federal
states. Unlike in the Anglo-Saxon system, no specific universities were considered as
elite institutions, and no tuition fees existed until 2006. In general, only a registration
fee of about 100 Euro had been levied each term by the universities. However, com-
petition between universities has been encouraged lately. Besides the introduction of
tuition fees and changes in the degree system due to the European homogenization,
university rankings became publicly available and presumably also more important
to prospective students due to encouraged competition.
German university rankings have been published in the media since the 1990’s. For the
first time, universities and prospective students could compare the quality regarding
various quality dimensions between institutions. The university ranking of the Center
for Higher Education Development (CHE ranking) is used for the analysis in this
paper. It was first published in 1998 and is – similar to the U.S. News & World
Report rankings for the U.S. – the most comprehensive and most detailed ranking
of German higher education institutions. The first ranking of medical schools was
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published in 2003 in the weekly magazine "Stern", and the second ranking of 2006
was issued with the weekly newspaper "Die Zeit". Both newspapers are well-known
and widely recognized outlets within Germany.4
Unlike the well-known rankings, such as the U.S. News & World Report ranking in the
U.S. or the world-wide “The Times Higher Education Supplement” and the “Shanghai-
Ranking of World Universities”, the German CHE ranking provides information on the
subject level. Hence, rather university departments than universities as a whole are
compared, which allows a much more detailed assessment. Another difference is that
the CHE ranking does not publish league tables. The departments are instead merely
sorted into a top, middle and bottom quality group. Most important for my analysis,
the CHE ranking assesses various quality dimensions and publishes the results in all
dimensions separately without aggregating them into an overall rank. This procedure
avoids the controversial assignment of weighting factors to each indicator and enables
prospective students to consider the quality dimensions most important to them.
All quality indicators rely either on facts collected on the university department level,
on an evaluation by professors of the respective subject or on an assessment by current
students. The ranking comprises all major subjects, and every subject is ranked in a
three-year cycle. The main indicators in the publications of medical schools rankings
– which are the ones used in my analysis – are:
• professors’ recommendation
• research reputation
• student-professor ratio
• number of clinic beds
• students’ satsifaction
4Other German rankings published during the observation period 2003-2008 are the ranking of the
magazine “Focus” (2004,2007) and the magazine “Spiegel” (2004,2006). However, both rankings are
not as comprehensive as the CHE ranking. Note also that there is a general discussion on the quality
and methodology of university rankings. This paper, though, aims to assess in a first step whether
quality indicators indeed influence students’ application choice. In case that rankings are indeed
important for university choice, a thorough analysis of the rankings’ methodology is necessary.
95
4 University Rankings in Action?
For each of these measures, the published indicators only display whether the re-
spective university is ranked into the top, middle or bottom group and whether that
position has changed since the last ranking. To construct the indicator “professors’
recommendation” (“research reputation”), professors are asked to name the top five
universities in their field with respect to the overall university quality (research qual-
ity). Note, professors cannot recommend the university at which they are currently
teaching. Universities named by more than a quarter of the professors are sorted into
the top quality category and universities not mentioned at all form the bottom qual-
ity group. Information on the indicators “student-professor ratio” and the quantity of
“clinic beds” are collected at the university department level. The “student-professor
ratio” indicates the number of students per professor and the indicator “clinic beds”
gives the quantity of beds per 100 students.5 The departments are sorted into quality
groups by calculating quantiles. Finally, the “students’ satisfaction” regarding their
current study program is evaluated. The top, middle and bottom quality groups for
this indicator are constructed by calculating means and confidence intervals for the
subject as a whole and for each department. If the mean of a department and the
full range of its confidence interval is higher than the subjects’ mean, the department
is grouped into the top category. Is the departments’ mean and its confidence in-
terval below the subjects’ mean, the department is assigned into the bottom quality
group.
In addition to the introduction of university rankings, the excellence initiative run
by the German Government in 2006 and 2007 has been another move towards com-
petition. In principle, the initiative is a competition for extra funding between all
German universities. It is not restricted to a special subject (e.g. medical studies)
but addresses universities as a whole. The aim of the initiative was to strengthen
German universities, to enhance their international competitiveness, and to promote
5The number of clinic beds of a medical school is relevant because it determines how much practical
experience prospective students can expect.
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the visibility of German top-level research. As part of the nationwide competition,
additional funding has been given to the best proposals for (i) graduate schools pro-
moting young academics, (ii) clusters of excellence, and (iii) institutional strategies of
universities promoting top-level research. Successful graduate schools were granted
approximately one million Euro per year, clusters of excellence in a specific field on
average receive 6.5 million Euro per year, and universities with promising institu-
tional strategies to promote top-level research were awarded about 21 million Euro
in total. This funding is limited to a maximum of five years. Important to note is
that especially the winning universities in the competition for strategies to promote
excellent research have received high media attention and have been recognized as
“excellence universities” since then.
Out of all 34 medical departments in Germany, six departments are located at univer-
sities which became “excellence universities”. Munich was the only university with a
medical department that received the excellence status in October 2006. In October
2007, the Universities of Aachen, Berlin, Freiburg, Göttingen and Heidelberg followed.
As the results of the excellence competition were announced in October and the ap-
plication deadline for medicine is in July, the excellence status became first relevant
for the applicants of the University of Munich in 2007 and for all other “excellence
universities” only in 2008. However, in January 2006 and 2007, the committee of the
excellence initiative already announced which universities had been shortlisted.
The application procedure for universities in Germany differs by subject. For most
subjects, prospective students address their applications directly to the universities.
However, the application process is centrally administered by the central clearing-
house for some subjects. During the years 2002 to 2008, six subjects – medicine,
pharmacology, veterinary medicine, dentistry, psychology and biology – had a cen-
tralized application and admission process. Within the central application process,
every applicant may indicate a preference list of up to six universities and may apply
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within three different selection procedures. A competition by (i) the final secondary
school grade, a procedure based on (ii) the duration that an applicant already is wait-
ing for a university assignment, and (iii) a direct assessment by the universities are
applied sequentially. If an applicant cannot be placed in procedure (i), his application
is transferred to procedure (ii) and, if necessary, further to procedure (iii). Since 2004
(before 2004), 20% (51%) of the places to study have been assigned by the secondary
school grade, 20% (25%) by the time of waiting, and 60% (24%) of the places have
been allocated directly by the universities. The allocation process within these three
procedures, though, has not changed over time.
Within procedure (i) the competition by secondary school grades, it is verified in a
first step whether an applicant can be admitted at the university of his first prefer-
ence. If there are more applicants than places to study, the secondary school grade is
decisive. In case an applicant could not be placed at his first preference, the central
clearinghouse examines the possibilities at the university listed as the second prefer-
ence. However, all applicants who listed this university as their first preference are
placed at this university first. This demonstrates the high importance of the first
preference in the listing.6 The competition by (ii) the time of waiting is very similar.
Here, the time of waiting is decisive if there are more applicants than places. The
criteria for (iii) the direct admission by universities differ by university, but in general,
the secondary school grade is very important once again.
4.3 Data and Descriptives
The data set I use to assess whether the excellence initiative and the university
rankings have influenced the application decision of prospective students contains all
6For a more detailed description of the centrally administered application process see Braun et al.
(2010) and Braun and Dwenger (2009).
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applicants at German universities in the centrally administered subjects within the
years 2002 to 2008. A major advantage of this data set is that applications rather
than matriculations are observed. The revealed preferences are, thus, less likely to be
biased by supply side constraints.
Although the application data include all centrally administered subjects, I restrict
the sample to applicants in the field of medical studies, which is by far the subject with
the most applicants. Pharmacology, dentistry and veterinary medicine are excluded
from the analysis as these subjects are only offered by very few universities resulting
in a very limited choice set for prospective students. In the fields of psychology and
biology, Bachelor and Master degrees were introduced, and since then, the application
process is no longer centrally administered. Therefore, the analysis focuses solely on
applicants for medical studies.
Similar to Dwenger et al. (2011), my estimations are based on the first university
preference listed in the selection procedure using the secondary school grades. This is
justified as the first preference is very important for the allocation process (see Sec-
tion 4.2 and Braun et al. (2010)). In order to rule out any strategic preference listings,
I only consider high-ability students who received the best possible grade (i.e. 1.0)
in the final secondary school exam. This subgroup of students is not constrained by
admission thresholds as the most restrictive threshold is having received the best final
secondary school grade (1.0) and applying at the specific university with first priority.
Hence, all applicants in my sample can state their true university preferences. The
sample is further restricted to applications for the semester beginning in fall from
2003 to 2008 as only few universities accept applications for the semester beginning
in spring and as the first ranking of medical schools was only published in 2003. In
case someone applied for two subjects at a time (only possible until 2004), I only
consider the application if medical studies is the first subject preference. Repeated
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Table 4.1: Mean Statistics Disaggregated by Quality Indicators (2003-2008)
Exc. Prof. Rec. Res. Rep. Stud./Prof. Clinic Beds Stud. Sat.
Top Group/Exc.
Appl./Uni (%) 12.63 13.63 13.41 3.02 9.55 3.10
Female (%) 66.83 63.46 63.30 70.66 65.57 71.93
N 3,920 1,894 1,951 1,002 938 1,001
Middle Group/Non-Exc.
Appl./Uni (%) 6.89 3.48 3.46 9.29 8.00 10.85
Female (%) 66.63 69.24 68.51 65.57 66.71 65.10
N 615 2,565 2,341 2,533 2,412 2,682
Bottom Group
Appl./Uni (%) n.a. 0.74 2.20 8.50 6.17 3.16
Female (%) n.a. 59.21 75.72 65.35 67.39 65.91
N n.a. 76 243 964 1,012 792
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations. The number of observations deviates due to missings in
the ranking variables. The indicator student-professor ratio (clinic beds, students’ tip) is missing for five (one,
two) universities. Appl./Uni: Average share of applicants at a university, Exc.: Excellence University, Prof. Rec.:
Professors’ Recommendation, Res. Rep.: Research Reputation, Stud./Prof.: Students per Professor, Stud. Sat.:
Students’ Satisfaction.
applications of applicants who were not assigned to a university in their first year of
application are also excluded from the analysis.
Table 4.1 displays the average share of applications per university and the individual
characteristics of the remaining 4,535 medicine applicants of the years 2003-2008.
The descriptives are disaggregated by excellence status and the main quality indica-
tors.7 The average share of applicants is significantly higher for “excellence universi-
ties” and the top ranked departments in the categories “professors’ recommendation”
and “research reputation”. The average share of applicants at an “excellence univer-
sity” amounts to 12.63%, while the average share in the non-excellence group is only
6.89%. With respect to the other quality indicators “student-professor ratio”, “clinic
7In addition, Table A.4.1 in the Appendix provides a comprehensive overview on all 34 medical
schools and their corresponding quality indicators.
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beds” and “students’ satisfaction”, there is not such a clear sorting pattern. Never-
theless, the differences are also significant in a t-test. Examining the average share
of female applicants in each quality group shows also heterogeneous results of the
various ranking indicators. It seems that female applicants prefer universities that
are highly ranked in the categories “student-professor ratio” and “students’ satisfac-
tion”, whereas high ranks in “professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation”
are more important for male applicants. These differences are significant. Statisti-
cally non-significant, however, are the deviations in the ranking indicators “excellence
university” and “clinic beds”.
However, whether this selection pattern is induced by the quality indicators or by
other confounding factors, e.g. overall prestige of a medical school, is not clear by
simply looking at descriptive evidence. A mean comparison disaggregated by excel-
lence status and year, for example, showed that “excellence universities” already had a
high share of applicants before they received the official excellence status. Therefore,
the question I want to answer is whether the share of applicants has increased even
further due to the excellence initiative, and whether changes in the rankings over
time influence the application decision.
Figure 4.1, therefore, depicts the mean share of applicants over time for the universi-
ties experiencing either an improving or a worsening in ranking indicators. Comparing
mean application shares after the new ranking of 2006 with respect to different qual-
ity dimensions mainly indicates small gains for universities improving in rank. The
indicator “research reputation” exhibits a strong increase in the average share of appli-
cations in 2007 and 2008 but not in 2006, when the new ranking was already available.
Looking at the improving universities with respect to research in more detail shows
that this increase is mainly driven by the University of Berlin becoming “excellence
university” in 2008 (see Figure 4.2). Downgrading a university ranking in particular
seems to lower the application probability if the ranking is worsening in the dimension
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Figure 4.1: Share of Applicants at Universities with a Change in Ranking (2003-2008)
Data Source: ZVS Data 2003-2008, own calculations.
“student-professor ratio” or with respect to the number of “clinic beds”. While the
average share of applicants for universities with a decreasing rank in these dimensions
increased until 2005, the share decreases after the publication of the second university
ranking in 2006. Despite a worsening ranking in “research reputation” and “students’
satisfaction”, the average share of applicants for these universities is slightly increas-
ing in 2006. On the one hand, this could hint at other quality dimensions being more
important for university choice. On the other hand, these descriptive results could
also be driven by other confounding factors. Interestingly, the indicator “professors’
recommendation” is the most stable indicator. Universities improving or worsening
in this dimension show the least changes in the average share of applicants.
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Figure 4.2: Supply and Demand at “Excellence Universities” (2003-2008)
Data Source: ZVS Data 2003-2008, own calculations.
Regarding the supply and demand of university places at “excellence universities”,
Figure 4.2 depicts the share of applicants and the number of university places over
time for each of the six medical schools located at “excellence universities”. It pro-
vides descriptive evidence on whether the probability to apply at a university has
increased in the course of the excellence initiative. The medical departments at the
universities of Munich, Berlin, and too a lower extent, also the University of Aachen
indeed experience an increase in the share of applications at the time of the excel-
lence initiative. The share of applicants in Munich has been increasing already since
2005. The increase in Berlin and Aachen, however, sets off in 2007, which is the year
they are shortlisted in the excellence initiative. The demand for the other univer-
sities seems to be stable or even decreases (University of Freiburg) in the years of
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the excellence initiative (2006, 2007 and 2008). The supply side, i.e. the number of
university places, is constant over time for most universities. In Munich, though, the
supply of university places slightly increases from 2005 to 2006. As there may also be
other confounding factors – i.e. tuition fees were introduced in many federal states
simultaneously to the excellence initiative – the descriptive evidence is not conclusive.
Therefore, the next section explains the multivariate estimation strategy.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section, I introduce the estimation strategy to estimate the influence of uni-
versity rankings and the excellence competition on the application probability in a
multivariate setting. Similar to Griffith and Rask (2007), the estimations are based
on a random utility model (Equation 4.1). The utility Uij of individual i applying at
university j is explained by a deterministic part of applicant-university match spe-
cific characteristics (Xij), university characteristics (Zj) as well as by an unobserved
random component ij. Assuming that applicants reveal their true preferences and
behave rationally, the observed choice of university maximizes their utility.
Uij = αXij + βZj + ij (4.1)
Following Mc Fadden (1974), I estimate the choice model using a conditional logit
approach. In contrast to a multinomial logit, this allows me to consider applicant-
university-match-specific variables (e.g. distance from hometown). For the condi-
tional logit model, the data needs to be in long form with j university observations
for each applicant i. As there are 34 different universities offering medical studies, my
data set expands from 4,535 individual observations to 154,190 applicant-university
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observations. Intuitively, the data set then contains the whole choice set of medical
schools for each applicant. The outcome yij is a binary variable indicating the uni-
versity the applicant actually has chosen to apply for. Thus, the estimation equation
is specified as follows:
yij = α1EXCij +α2RANK1ij +α3RANK3ij +α4X˜ij + βUj + γUj ×Dij + ij (4.2)
The model incorporates EXCij, RANK1ij and RANK3ij as variables of interest.
EXCij is a binary variable being equal to one if university j has received an excel-
lence status at the time individual i is applying. RANK1ij (RANK3ij) is a vector
of ranking outcomes indicating whether university j is ranked in the top (bottom)
group of a specific quality measure. Hence, the ranking indicators for being in the
top (bottom) group are estimated in reference to the group of medium quality. X˜ij
represents all applicant-university – respectively also time-university8 – specific vari-
ables, which are distance to university, distance squared, a binary variable indicating
the introduction of tuition fees and the number of supplied university places. A set
of dummy variables Uj controls for university characteristics which are constant over
all individuals and over time – e.g. university quality that is common knowledge.9 In
other words, Uj represents university fixed effects that account for the time-constant
common knowledge regarding university attractiveness. By additionally interacting
the university fixed effects with the distance Dij of student’s i hometown to university
j, I also take into account that students may be willing to move further away for some
8Note that variables varying over time also vary between individuals as repeated cross-sections are
pooled over six years.
9Also city-specific characteristics, e.g. costs and quality of living, are captured by Uj if they are
constant over time.
105
4 University Rankings in Action?
universities but not for others. Hence, the importance of distance to university does
not only differ between individuals but also between universities.
The variation used for conditional logit estimation is within a student’s choice set.
Hence, the estimation approach links the binary outcome variable indicating the
chosen university to the university- and applicant-university-specific attributes and
estimates the coefficients that maximize the probability for the chosen category out of
the student’s choice set. In order to correct for correlations between the error terms
within an individual’s choice set, I cluster the standard errors by individuals.
Due to the university fixed effects Uj, the identification of the variables of interest –
excellence status and ranking indicators – solely relies on variation over time, i.e. the
introduction of the excellence competition and changes in the ranking between 2003
and 2006. Hence, unlike Büttner et al. (2003) and Helbig and Ulbricht (2010), who
estimate the effect of rankings without a university fixed effect, I can disentangle the
common knowledge regarding prestige and attractiveness of a medical department
from changes in the different quality indicators. Table 4.2 depicts the variation over
time due to changes in the ranking indicators from 2003 to 2006 and the introduction
of the excellence competition respectively. I observe between 2 and 10 universities
out of the 34 universities (5.88% - 29.41%) for which the according ranking indicator
changes between 2003 and 2006. Thus, there is reasonable variation over time that I
can exploit for my identification strategy.
Moreover, the quality indicators studied are most likely exogenous to the applicants’
university choice. Nevertheless, endogeneity concerns could emerge with respect to
the indicator “students’ satisfaction”. This indicator represents how satisfied current
students are with their studies overall at a specific university. Peers of prospective
students who study medicine already may influence the ranking indicator and, at the
same time, directly the university choice of prospective students. However, endo-
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Table 4.2: Number of Universities with a Change in Excellence Status
or in a CHE Ranking Indicator over Time
Top Group / Excellence Bottom Group
# Universities % # Universities %
Excellence Status 6 17.65 n.a. n.a.
Professors’ Rec. 2 5.88 5 14.71
Research Reputation 5 14.71 8 23.53
Student-Prof. Ratio 7 20.59 10 29.41
# Clinic Beds 7 20.59 7 20.59
Students’ Satisfaction 5 14.71 9 26.47
Data Source: CHE ranking data (2003 and 2006), own calculations.
geneity is a minor concern for the indicators evaluated by the professors (“professors’
recommendation” and “research reputation”) and even more so for the hard facts
“student-professor ratio” and the number of “clinic beds”.
A common concern when applying a conditional logit model is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. The assumption requires the relative risk of
two alternatives to be unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of other alternatives. In
my case, an exclusion or change in quality of university A should not affect the relative
risk of applying at university B versus applying at university C. I use a standard
Hausman-type test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) to check this assumption. The
results suggest that my application of conditional logit estimation is not rejected by
the Hausman test.
4.5 Results
This section presents the results of the conditional logit estimations that indicate if
and how prospective high-ability students are influenced by different quality indica-
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tors when choosing a university. The estimated effects are displayed as odds ratios.10
Odds ratios can be interpreted as a percentage change in the outcome variable in-
duced by a unit change in the variable of interest holding all other variables constant.
More formally, the odds ratio for variable xij is a proportional change in the odds of
applicant i applying for university j for a unit increase of xij all else being equal. An
effect above (below) one indicates an increase (decrease) in the odds to apply.
Table 4.3 depicts the odds ratios for the different quality indicators of the ranking and
the excellence initiative based on different specifications. According to the final spec-
ification (V), receiving excellence status increases the probability to apply by 19.3%.
This translates to an increase in application share for the treated “excellence univer-
sities” by about 2.44 percentage points.11 In specification (VI), I add two variables
to account for the shortlist announcement in 2006 and 2007: a binary variable being
one if a university was on the shortlist in 2006 or 2007 and another binary variable
indicating a failed excellence application. The indicator for being shortlisted depicts
a positively significant effect suggesting an increase in the application probability by
28.9%, while the application probability for a failed university does not change sig-
nificantly. Thus, I observe an announcement effect, which is a typical example of an
Ashenfelter’s Dip (Ashenfelter, 1978). The effect of being one of the universities on
the shortlist even exceeds the estimated effect for the winners of the excellence initia-
tive. This seems plausible as the media attention during this phase of the initiative
was at its highest.
Regarding the different quality dimensions of the ranking, only the indicator “stu-
dents’ satisfaction” increases the probability to apply at a highly ranked univer-
10Odds ratios are calculated as eβˆ .
11The effect in percentage points is calculated by multiplying the average share of applications at
“excellence universities” (12.63%, see Table 4.1) with the percentage change indicated by the odds
ratios (12.63% × 0.193% = 2.44 percentage points). This calculation corresponds to the idea of an
average treatment effect on the treated.
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Table 4.3: Effect of the Quality Indicators on the Application Probability (Odds
Ratios)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Excellence 1.122* 1.264*** 1.329*** 1.250** 1.193** 1.377***
(.068) (.097) (.110) (.111) (.102) (.150)
Exc. Shortlist 1.289***
(.127)
Exc. Failure .933
(.164)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 2.918*** 3.102*** 3.305*** .948 .982 .933
(.162) (.236) (.254) (.189) (.199) (.207)
Res. Rep. 2.537*** 3.007*** 2.826*** 1.313** 1.178 1.128
(.146) (.234) (.220) (.164) (.124) (.120)
Stud./Prof. 1.130** 1.064 1.071 1.113 1.113 1.066
(.067) (.070) (.072) (.122) (.121) (.118)
Clinic Beds 1.194*** 1.137** 1.108* .948 .920 .959
(.059) (.061) (.060) (.085) (.084) (.089)
Stud. Satisf. 1.172** 1.359*** 1.368*** 1.362** 1.355** 1.257*
(.085) (.109) (.110) (.169) (.170) (.173)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .344*** .275*** .301*** .761 .830 .870
(.042) (.033) (.036) (.167) (.185) (.196)
Res. Rep. .694*** .769*** .696*** .818 .832 .919
(.053) (.057) (.054) (.107) (.117) (.132)
Stud./Prof. .863*** .628*** .649*** .702*** .698*** .674***
(.037) (.031) (.034) (.067) (.066) (.065)
Clinic Beds 1.410*** 1.311*** 1.290*** .843 .804** .732***
(.069) (.073) (.071) (.095) (.089) (.084)
Stud. Satisf. .895** .861*** .869*** .828* .801** .790**
(.039) (.044) (.047) (.081) (.076) (.076)
Controls
Distance .976*** .976*** .976*** .983*** .983***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001)
Distance2 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Tuition Fees .767*** .783** .786** .809**
(.055) (.076) (.077) (.079)
Uni Places 1.000 1.002** 1.001** 1.001**
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Uni FE yes yes yes
Uni x Distance yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.1145 0.4051 0.4055 0.4319 0.4477 0.4479
# Individuals 4,535
N 154,190
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; additional missing dummies are included for the
quality indicators students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the number of clinic beds; clustered standard
errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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sity (+35.5%). The bottom rank variables for the “student-professor ratio”, the num-
ber of “clinic beds” and the “students’ satisfaction” suggest that prospective students
try to avoid universities ranked poorly in these quality dimensions. The odds ra-
tios manifest a significant decrease in the probability to apply by 21 % to 33 %.
The ranking dimensions “professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation” do
not significantly influence the university choice of prospective students in the final
specification. Hence, the non-research indicators mentoring, infrastructure and stu-
dents’ satisfaction seem to provide more important information for the prospective
students.
Bearing in mind that I look at the university choice of high-ability students, this
might seem counterintuitive. In fact, the mean statistics in Table 4.1 show a clear
sorting along the indicators “professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation”
with higher shares of applications in the top quality group. Hence, research quality is
indeed very important to the applicants. A possible explanation for the insignificant
research indicator is that the information on research quality is common knowledge
even without the university ranking. The publications of ranking indicators with
respect to research quality then contain only little new information. Furthermore,
if high-ability students only apply for the universities which are always ranked top
in the research dimension, an improving research quality of another university is
unlikely to affect their university choice. This interpretation is supported by the
data as the significant influence of both research oriented indicators disappears when
I include university fixed effects and their interaction with distance to university,
which capture the commonly known and time-constant attractiveness of a university
(see specifications (III), (IV) and (V)).
In addition to the university fixed effects and their interactions with distance, I fur-
ther control for the distance between each university and a student’s hometown, the
distance squared, the introduction of tuition fees from 2006 onwards and the number
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of university places supplied. Most importantly, the individually calculated distance
to each university and its square explains the university choice to a very large extent.
While the Pseudo-R2 for specification (I) – containing only the university quality
variables – amounts to 0.1145, adding the distance variables rises the explanatory
power to 0.4051 (specification (II)). Hence, distance to a university overall is the
most important determinant of university choice even for the high-ability students in
Germany. In the main model, each kilometer a university is further apart lowers the
probability to apply by 1.7 %. Considering that the average distance between the
nearest and the second nearest university amounts to about 38 kilometers, German
applicants are fairly immobile. As to be expected, tuition fees decrease the applica-
tion probability by about 21 %, and per 10 additionally provided university places
the application probability rises by 1 %.
All in all, the rankings seem to provide high-ability students mainly with informa-
tion concerning the non-academic quality. They use the additional information of
the ranking primarily to avoid universities with the worst quality in mentoring, fac-
ulty infrastructure and the student assessment. However, receiving excellence status
- which is also closely related to research quality – increases the application prob-
ability significantly. Therefore, the excellence competition may be regarded as an
additional quality indicator providing new information that exceed the commonly
known university quality.
Regarding the IIA assumption, I use a Hausman test to check whether the assump-
tion holds and thus whether my application of a conditional logit model is appropri-
ate. Excluding one university at a time while estimating the university choice model
(specification (V)), the Hausman test mainly confirms the independence of irrelevant
alternatives. The test fails for only 3 out of 33 sequentially excluded universities at
a significance level of 1 %.
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Table 4.4: Heterogeneous Effects of Quality Indicators by
Gender (Odds Ratios)
Women Men
Excellence 1.259** 1.553*** 1.113 1.167
(.131) (.210) (.163) (.218)
Exc. Shortlist 1.420*** 1.010
(.173) (.188)
Exc. Failure .989 .915
(.216) (.274)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.117 1.099 .751 .709
(.276) (.300) (.271) (.280)
Res. Rep. 1.128 1.061 1.315 1.291
(.149) (.143) (.232) (.230)
Stud./Prof. 1.035 .994 1.275 1.238
(.134) (.132) (.262) (.258)
Clinic Beds .917 .968 .911 .927
(.100) (.107) (.156) (.160)
Stud. Satisf. 1.558*** 1.378* 1.030 1.019
(.232) (.226) (.254) (.272)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .744 .808 1.159 1.170
(.206) (.227) (446) (.451)
Res. Rep. .950 1.087 .562** .584*
(.158) (.186) (.152) (.161)
Stud./Prof. .768** .737*** .583*** .574***
(.088) (.085) (.101) (.100)
Clinic Beds .674*** .590*** 1.142 1.101
(.091) (.083) (.221) (.220)
Stud. Satisf. .844* .831 .731* .726**
(.101) (.100) (.118) (.118)
Pseudo R2 0.4407 0.4411 0.4742 0.4742
# Individuals 3,023 1,512
N 102,782 51,408
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; covariates: distance,
distance2, tuition fees and uni places; additional missing dummies are included
for the quality indicators students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the num-
ber of clinic beds; clustered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate
significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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To analyze the results of the excellence and ranking indicators in more detail, Ta-
ble 4.4 presents the heterogeneous effects with respect to the applicant’s gender. The
results for women show the same significant results as in the full sample. Achiev-
ing excellence status and a good evaluation by current students raise the application
probability, while low quality in mentoring, faculty infrastructure and the student
assessment yields a decreasing application probability. For men, however, the picture
is different. Their university choice does not seem to be influenced by the excellence
initiative. Furthermore, I do not find a significantly positive effect for any top quality
ranking indicator. Similar to the estimates for women, men have a lower applica-
tion probability if the university provides an unfavorable student-professor ratio or if
current students evaluate it poorly. A low rank with respect to research reputation
also reduces the odds to apply for men, while female students do not react to this
indicator.
Note that the sample of men is by half smaller than the female sample. Some esti-
mates, thus, can also be insignificant due to the smaller sample size. Using a 50%
random sample of the females for estimation, which sample size then is comparable
to the men’s sample, only the bottom rank indicators “student-professor ratio”, the
number of “clinic beds” and the “students’ satisfaction” remain significant (see Table
A.4.2).
As a robustness check, I estimate a pseudo introduction of the excellence competi-
tion in 2004 and 2005 and a pseudo change in the university ranking in 2005 (see
Table 4.5). If the applied university choice model is appropriate, the quality indica-
tors should not affect the applicants’ decision at a point in time before the indicators
became public. Therefore, I create a dummy variable indicating that the “excellence
universities” received the excellence status already in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and
I assign the ranking indicators of the second ranking, published in 2006, already to
the corresponding universities in the year 2005.
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Restricting the observation period to the years 2003 - 2005 and estimating the main
models (specifications (V) and (VI) in Table 4.3) yields mainly non-significant results
for the achieving excellence status as well as for being shortlisted or having failed to
obtain excellence status. In the full sample, only the bottom rank indicator for the
number of clinic beds is negatively related to the application probability. This effect
is only significant at the 10 % level. Compared to the main estimations in Table 4.3,
the effect lost significance.
Estimations on the female sample yield the same weakly significant correlation be-
tween poor infrastructural quality and the application probability. The specification
incorporating only the main excellence indicator also shows a significant increase in
the probability to apply for “excellence universities” although the status “excellence
university” has not been awarded at this point in time. However, the effect loses its
significance in the specification incorporating dummy variables for the universities
being shortlisted and having failed within the excellence initiative. Estimations using
the sample of men do not show any significant results. As mentioned above, smaller
sample sizes may be partly responsible for the less significant results. These pseudo
estimations are only a crude check of robustness as they are based on only one post-
reform year of observation. Nevertheless and despite the few remaining significant
effects, the robustness check in general supports my results and suggests that my es-
timates indeed reflect the influence of changes in quality indicators on the university
choice of high-ability students.
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Table 4.5: Pseudo Introduction of Excellence Competition and Change
in Rankings (Odds Ratios)
Full Sample Women Men
Excellence 1.266 1.129 1.481** 1.286 .999 .825
(.192) (.388) (.292) (.557) (.245) (.479)
Exc. Shortlist .886 .859 .818
(.290) (.356) (.451)
Exc. Failure .783 .674 .887
(.288) (.312) (.572)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.306 1.267 1.189 1.112 1.504 1.540
(.381) (.379) (.427) (.415) (.779) (.802)
Res. Rep. .875 .871 .845 .839 .943 .943
(.137) (.137) (.168) (.166) (.253) (.253)
Stud./Prof. 1.199 1.177 1.137 1.093 1.188 1.199
(.213) (.210) (.246) (.239) (.395) (.400)
Clinic Beds .874 .891 .940 .977 .746 .749
(.128) (.134) (.169) (.181) (.195) (.198)
Stud. Satisf. .997 1.000 .964 .975 1.133 1.112
(.204) (.206) (.242) (.246) (.434) (.428)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.063 1.109 1.388 1.509 .529 .530
(.370) (.393) (.588) (.661) (.361) (.364)
Res. Rep. .704 .713 .765 .789 .678 .680
(.157) (.160) (.210) (.218) (.269) (.270)
Stud./Prof. 1.040 1.043 .963 .968 1.211 1.214
(.137) (.138) (.155) (.156) (.299) (.300)
Clinic Beds .734* .727* .687* .673* .691 .690
(.121) (.120) (.150) (.147) (.191) (.192)
Stud. Satisf. .903 .913 .826 .843 .981 .983
(.135) (.136) (.158) (.161) (.246) (.247)
Pseudo R2 0.4812 0.4812 0.4828 0.4829 0.5007 0.5007
# Individuals 1,969 1,266 703
N 66,946 43,044 23,902
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; covariates: distance, distance2, tu-
ition fees and uni places; additional missing dummies are included for the quality indicators
students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the number of clinic beds; clustered standard
errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I distinguish the importance of different university ranking dimen-
sions for the university choice of high-ability students. Quality indicators considered
are the “professors’ recommendation”, “research reputation”, “student-professor ratio”,
the number of “clinic beds” and “students’ satisfaction”. Furthermore, I provide an
evaluation of an excellence competition run by the German government awarding
universities with an outstanding future concept for top-level research. Using admin-
istrative application data for all German medical schools, I estimate a random utility
model of the high-ability students’ application choice in a conditional logit setting.
Identification relies on the variation over time induced by changes in the ranking
indicators between the first publication in 2003 and the second in 2006 as well as
by the introduction of the excellence initiative in 2006 and 2007. This allows me to
distinguish the effect of changes in the different quality indicators from the general
attractiveness of a university.
The evaluation of the excellence initiative shows that, in course of the competition,
the share of applicants increased at the winning universities, which are today known
as “excellence universities”. On average, achieving excellence status increases the
application probability by 19%, which relates for the “excellence universities” to an
increase in applications of about 2.44 percentage points. Hence, the excellence com-
petition and the accompanying media attention provide additional information that
exceed the common knowledge on university attractiveness and thus affect the uni-
versity choice of high-ability students.
The results regarding the different ranking indicators suggest that the non-research
dimensions “student-professor ratio”, the number of “clinic beds” and the “students’
satisfaction” rather than the research-oriented indicators widen the basis of informa-
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tion for choosing a university. This does not by any means suggest that high-ability
students in Germany do not care about research quality. In fact, research quality
affects their university choice significantly. However, the research quality of German
medical schools is rather recognized as part of the common knowledge regarding uni-
versity attractiveness and, as such, is captured by the incorporated university fixed
effects. Hence, the research dimension of the ranking does not provide the high-ability
applicants with any new information, while the indicators regarding mentoring, fac-
ulty infrastructure and the student assessment do. The ranking indicators are thus,
especially in the non-research dimensions, in action where they add new information
to the common knowledge of universities’ research reputation.
Providing information on all quality dimensions separately instead of publishing uni-
versity rankings in aggregated league tables can thus be useful to support a well-
informed university choice. This in turn could reduce drop-out rates, increase human
capital production and – depending on the social welfare function – also increase
overall welfare. An important prerequisite for the ranking to improve the applicant-
university match, though, is that the quality indicators reflect real quality differences.
Therefore, the discussions about ranking methodology are important for assessing the
benefits of university rankings (e.g. see Cremonini et al., 2008).
Another positive aspect of publishing multidimensional rankings is that the univer-
sities well-known for their top level research also need to guarantee a good standard
with respect to the non-research ranking indicators if they want to attract high-ability
students. Top research institutes, therefore, cannot completely specialize in research
and fully neglect e.g. mentoring quality as a low rank in the non-research indicators
also lowers the application probability of high-ability students. Hence, multidimen-
sional rankings could induce incentives for the top research institutes also to invest
in the non-research quality dimensions.
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When interpreting my results, it is important to keep in mind that the distance be-
tween a student’s hometown and the university remains the most powerful determi-
nant of university choice in Germany. Quality indicators, as shown, affect university
choice, especially if they add new information to the common knowledge of universi-
ties’ research reputation but, due to the immobility of students, only to a moderate
extent. Either German students are simply reluctant to move far away from their
hometown, even if they benefitted from attending a high-quality university, or they
still recognize the German medical schools as a group of homogeneous quality such
that there is no need for them to apply at universities further away from their home-
town.
A factor limiting the generalization of my analysis is that I focus on the university
decision of high-ability students. High-ability students are probably intrinsically mo-
tivated to a high degree and, therefore, are personally very interested in attending
one of the best universities. Moreover, students with the best grade in their final
secondary school exam are not constrained by admission thresholds. Therefore, the
influence of the different ranking indicators on average students can differ from my
results. The dimensions not related to research could be even more important for
average students as they, for example, might expect to need more and better men-
toring. Another concern is that medical students could be different from students of
other subjects. In that case, it is unclear whether the effects of the different quality
indicators can be translated to the behavior of university applicants in general. This
is even more so as the German job market in the field of medicine is not as competi-
tive as in other fields. To signal one’s quality on the labor market by the quality of
the attended university, therefore, could be even more important in other fields than
medicine.
Overall, by analyzing the importance of different quality indicators for choosing a
university, I show not only that university rankings do affect high-ability students
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in the application process but also that the influence of the ranking indicators differ
with respect to the quality dimensions. Therefore, publishing multidimensional uni-
versity rankings widens the basis of information for prospective students. University
applicants can decide which quality dimensions are most important to them and,
subsequently, may apply with a higher probability at the university that fits them
best.
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Appendix
Table A.4.1: Excellence Status and Ranking Indicators by University (2003 vs.
2006)
University of ... Exc. Prof. Rec. Res. Rep. Stud./Prof. Clinic Beds Stud. Sat.
’03 ’06 ’03 ’06 ’03 ’06 ’03 ’06 ’03 ’06
Aachen 2007 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1
Berlin 2007 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2
Bochum no 2 3 2 3 3 3 x 1 3 3
Bonn no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3
Dresden no 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Düsseldorf no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 x 3
Erlangen-Nürnb. no 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 x 2 2
Essen no 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
Frankfurt/Main no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2
Freiburg 2007 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
Gießen no 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Göttingen 2007 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
Greifswald no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Halle no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1
Hamburg no 2 2 2 2 1 3 x x 3 3
Hannover no 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2
Heidelberg 2007 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2
Heidelb.-Mannh. no 2 1 2 1 3 x 2 2 2 x
Jena no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1
Kiel no 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2
Cologne no 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3
Leipzig no 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2
Lübeck no 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1
Magdeburg no 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mainz no 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3
Marburg no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 x 3 2
Munich 2006 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
Münster no 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 1 1
Regensburg no 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
Rostock no 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 2
Saarbrücken no 2 3 2 3 3 2 x 1 2 3
Tübingen no 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Ulm no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
Würzburg no 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
Data Source: CHE Ranking 2003 and 2006; 1(2,3): top (middle, bottom) ranking group; x: indicator
missing; Exc.: Excellence status; Prof. Rec.: Professors’ Recommendation; Res. Rep.: Research Reputation
evaluated by Professors; Stud./Prof.: Student-professor ratio; Clinic Beds: Number of clinic beds; Stud.
Sat.: Students’ Satisfaction.
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Table A.4.2: Heterogeneous Effects
using a 50 % Random Sample of
Females (Odds Ratios)
Women
Excellence 1.261 1.449*
(.188) (.280)
Exc. Shortlist 1.278
(.218)
Exc. Failure .911
(.295)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.113 1.046
(.388) (.404)
Res. Rep. .953 .914
(.171) (.166)
Stud./Prof. 1.047 1.009
(.193) (.195)
Clinic Beds .831 .868
(.129) (.136)
Stud. Satisf. 1.297 1.197
(.273) (.282)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .659 .704
(.261) (.281)
Res. Rep. 1.102 1.222
(.258) (.298)
Stud./Prof. .745* .722**
(.120) (.118)
Clinic Beds .669** .609***
(.125) (.117)
Stud. Satisf. .650** .639***
(.110) (.110)
Pseudo R2 0.4460 0.4463
# Individuals 3,023
N 102,782
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own
calculations; covariates: distance, distance2,
tuition fees and uni places; additional miss-
ing dummies are included for the quality
signals students’ tip, student-professor ra-
tio and the number of clinic beds; clustered
standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** in-
dicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level.
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Abstract
In this paper, I study the decentralization of university admission as a natural exper-
iment in university admission. Is the centralized or decentralized procedure better
suited to match prospective students to universities? Using a differences-in-differences
approach, I estimate the effect of decentralizing admission to German law schools on
the matching efficiency (number of first-year students/unassigned university places)
and the matching quality (drop-out rates). My evaluation study uses administrative
data on all students within Germany and complements the prominent theoretical liter-
ature on college admission. The results show that the matching efficiency increased in
course of the decentralization. This increase is mainly driven by enabling law schools
to abolish admission restrictions. The matching quality is not significantly affected
by the decentralization process but suggests that abolishing admission restrictions
could be associated with increasing drop-out rates.
Keywords: Higher education, college admission problem, university admission
JEL: I21, I23, C23
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University admission can be either organized by a central clearinghouse or in a de-
centralized process by the universities themselves. Prospective students in the U.S.
as well as graduate students in the UK, for example, apply directly at their preferred
universities. All undergraduate students in the UK, however, need to apply with the
central authority “UCAS” (Universities & Colleges Admission Service) and merely
indicate a preference list of universities. Historically, decentralized matching proce-
dures were often object to market failure and were therefore replaced by centralized
mechanisms. A famous example being the introduction of a central clearinghouse in
the early 1950s for the entry-level labor market for American physicians (Roth and
Peranson, 1999).
Similarly in Germany, a central clearinghouse (‘ZVS’) was established in 1973 to
admit students in subjects with scarce university places as numbers of applicants
were increasing. However, the admission procedure for some subjects – e.g. for law
studies in 2002 – was decentralized again later on. Besides decreasing applications,
another reason for this turn was to allow for more competition between universities.
Decentralizing university admission comprised two major changes in the admission
procedure. First, prospective students apply directly at the universities and are sub-
sequently directly admitted by the universities without the coordination of a central
clearinghouse. Second, universities themselves decide on the admission criteria they
apply. In fact, some universities abolished all admission restrictions in course of the
decentralization, which enabled students to directly enroll into their programs.
In this paper, I exploit the natural experiment of a change from centralized towards
decentralized admission to German law schools in order to evaluate the centralized
and decentralized matching of students to universities. Using German administrative
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student data and applying a differences-in-differences strategy, I study the student-
university matching with respect to the outcomes (i) the number of first-year students,
(ii) the number of unassigned university places, and (iii) the drop-out rates. As
admission to all law schools except the ones in the largest German federal state of
North Rhine-Westphalia has been decentralized, I use the regional variation over time
between law schools in and outside of North Rhine-Westphalia for identification. In
addition, I employ medical schools as a second control group because admission to
medical schools has been centrally administered over the entire observation period.
Furthermore, my analyses consider both changes induced by the decentralization
process the abolishment of the central clearinghouse and of admission restrictions.
On the one hand, a decentralized admission process may be superior to a central-
ized process as the universities arguably have the most comprehensive information
to decide on their student body. On the other hand, decentralized admission may
increase uncertainty in the process as students need to send out multiple applications
and universities need to overbook their places. The decentralized procedure, thus,
may lead to (too) late assignment, late enrollment, and unassigned university places
(e.g. Roth and Xing, 1994; Müller, 2007, 2009). Furthermore, if universities are over-
burdened with the admission responsibilities, they may choose the wrong applicants
resulting in less human-capital production or higher drop-out rates. Since no admis-
sion procedure has been identified as being clearly superior so far, discussions on the
optimal university admission process are currently ongoing in Germany as well as on
an international level.1
The prominent theoretical literature on the “College Admission Problem” (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) studies different centralized matching mechanisms (a special set of
rules for assigning students to universities) with respect to their matching efficiency.
The centralized matching mechanisms are based on preference lists of students over
1See the discussion in the UK on reforming the central admission authority ‘UCAS’ (UCAS, 2011).
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universities as well as on the preferences of universities over students. The literature
building upon the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962) identifies two com-
peting mechanisms: the college proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is
optimal with respect to the colleges’ preferences, and the student proposing deferred-
acceptance mechanism, which is student-optimal (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Roth,
1984a). Within the college (student) proposing version, students (colleges) are able
to hold their so far most preferred offer without accepting it right away. Colleges,
however, have an incentive to state strategic preferences within the college-optimal
mechanism (Roth, 1985). 2 Within the related field of school choice, Abdulkadiroglu
and Sönmez (2003) study the theoretical properties of the “Boston Student Assign-
ment Mechanism”. This priority matching mechanism tries to match all students
to their school of first choice. However, if a student cannot be assigned at his first
school choice, it is unlikely that he is placed at his second preference as all places
may already be taken by students who have been placed according to their first
choice. Therefore, students and parents strategically decide on the first choice within
the Boston matching mechanism. All in all, the theoretical literature on centralized
matching mechanisms points out that well-defined matching mechanisms exist but
may be sensitive to strategic behavior.
The more recent theoretical literature on decentralized matching is less comprehen-
sive. Roth and Vate (1990, 1991) are the first to extend the theoretical college ad-
mission literature to decentralized systems by allowing some randomness within the
matching process. The literature shows that decentralized systems may produce effi-
cient matchings but also describes situations in which inefficiencies can occur (Roth
and Xing, 1994; Pais, 2008b,a; Haeringer and Wooders, 2011). For example, Roth
2Further evidence on the college admission problem is provided by e.g. Roth (1984b); Roth and
Sotomayor (1989); Roth (1991); Kara and Sönmez (1997); Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2005); Klaus
and Klijn (2006). For an introduction to the literature see Roth and Sotomayor (1992).
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and Xing (1994) report on imperfections that arise due to the timing of transactions
within decentralized markets.
Despite the vast theoretical literature on college admission, empirical evidence is very
limited. Portela et al. (2008) describe the centralized student allocation process in
Portugal and find a mismatch between demand and supply with some universities not
being able to fill their places. Related to college admission, Krishna and Ünver (2008)
compare two centrally administered matching mechanism for course allocation at an
American business school. Using a field and a laboratory experiment, they show
that efficiency can be improved by implementing the student proposing deferred-
acceptance mechanism. Analyzing a centralized application process to secondary
schools, Ajayi (2011) finds that imperfect information about admission chances and
differing decision-making skills lead to differences in application behavior. These
differences are mitigated by two recent policy reforms, which are examined as natural
experiments.
More comprehensive empirical evidence exists within the related field of labor mar-
kets, i.e. matching workers to firms. The theoretical literature on centralized match-
ing, for instance, has so far mainly been complemented by experimental and compu-
tational economics studying centrally organized entry level labor markets for e.g. new
physicians in the US and the UK (e.g. Roth and Peranson, 1999; Kagel and Roth,
2000; Roth, 2002). Empirical studies evaluating the matching efficiency of decen-
tralized labor markets predominantly employ the approach of the matching function,
which describes how the stock of unemployed workers and vacancies translate into
new matches/hires (see Petrongoli and Pissarides, 2001; Pissarides, 2011, for a sur-
vey). Fahr and Sunde (2009), for example, use the variation over time induced by a
German labor market reform as a natural experiment to show that the reform has
improved the matching efficiency of the labor market.
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The German centralized college admission system is empirically analyzed by Braun
et al. (2010). They show that the applied matching procedure allows for strategic be-
havior and moreover penalizes good secondary school graduates, although the mecha-
nism is supposed to be designed in favor of good students. Therefore, the theoretical
papers by Westkamp (2010) and Weiler (2009) suggest superior centralized matching
algorithms for university admission in Germany.3 With respect to decentralized ad-
mission in Germany, Müller (2007, 2009) describes frictions induced by the necessity
for prospective students to apply at multiple universities. Thus, both the centralized
and decentralized admission procedure within Germany exhibit inefficiencies.
This paper contributes to the scarce empirical literature on university admission by
evaluating a change from centralized towards decentralized admission as a natural ex-
periment. My analyses provide new empirical evidence with respect to the matching
efficiency and matching quality of centralized and decentralized admission procedures.
To my knowledge, no such empirical evaluation study exists as yet. Roth (2002) sug-
gests that experimental and computational economics can complement the theory on
mechanism design. Similarly, I believe that evaluation studies exploiting natural ex-
periments also provide important complementary evidence. Moreover, the theoretical
literature may identify inefficiencies in matching procedures, while empirical evalua-
tion studies – similar to Krishna and Ünver (2008) – may also quantify how prevalent
inefficiencies are in practice. My analyses are only a first attempt to evaluate differ-
ent procedures of university admission. More evaluation studies exploiting reforms in
college admission procedures are desirable. The extensive empirical literature on the
related field of job matching may suggest appealing directions to proceed.
The results of my comparison of centralized and decentralized university admission
show that the number of first-year students increased and the number of unassigned
3While Westkamp (2010) suggests a procedure in spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), Weiler (2009)
uses a computational optimization algorithm.
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places decreased in course of the the decentralization. This suggests a superior match-
ing efficiency within the decentralized procedure. However, considering only a sample
of law schools that have kept their admission restrictions, I find no significant changes
in these outcomes. Therefore, the decentralization affects the matching efficiency
mainly by enabling law schools to abolish all admission restrictions. My estimates
with respect to matching quality show no significant changes in the drop-out rates
induced by the decentralization. Nevertheless, a comparison between the effects for
all treated law schools and for the subgroup of law schools which have always ap-
plied admission restrictions suggests that abolishing admission restrictions could be
associated with increasing drop-out rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I give a more
detailed overview on the institutional background of the German higher education
system as well as on the centralized and decentralized admission procedure (Section
5.2). Subsequently, Section 5.4 describes the administrative student data, Section 5.5
exhibits first descriptive evidence, Section 5.3 explains the differences-in-differences
estimation strategy, and Section 5.6 presents the results. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Institutional Background
Contrary to the U.S. higher education system, almost all German universities are
publicly funded and administered by one of the 16 German federal states. No tuition
fees existed until 2006. Usually, only a registration fee of about 100 Euro had been
levied each term by the universities. Therefore, the German higher education sys-
tem has been considered to be quite homogeneous with respect to university quality.
However, competition between different institutions has been encouraged by recent
reforms. The Bologna Process initiated in 1999 established a new Bachelor and Mas-
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ter degree system throughout Europe in order to create comparable tertiary degrees.
This process also aims at increasing the international competitiveness of the European
system of higher education.4 Furthermore, some German federal states introduced
tuition fees from 2006 onwards. As tertiary education used to be free of charge, tu-
ition fees were – and still are – a matter of intense public discussions. Therefore,
some federal states which once decided to levy fees today have already abolished
them again.5 In 2006 and 2007, the German government further ran an excellence
competition awarding extra funding to the universities with the best future concept
for top-level research.6
Along this development towards more competition in the German higher education
system, the university admission process has been decentralized for some subjects.
Since 1973, the central clearinghouse has allocated university places in subjects for
which places were scarce. These subjects included e.g. law and medical studies,
biology, psychology, and business administration. As the number of applications
were decreasing over time and as students and universities recognized the central
clearinghouse mainly as too bureaucratic, some subjects abolished the centralized
admission process from 2002 onwards.
In the field of law studies, the student-university matching procedure was decen-
tralized in 2002. The decision to decentralize admission to German law schools was
taken very surprisingly in spring 2002. The publication of the central clearinghouse,
which was used to inform the applicants of the year 2002, still indicated admission
for law studies to be part of the centralized process. However, this information was
revised after the decision to decentralize admission has been communicated. The de-
centralization induced two major changes for the admission to law schools. First, the
4For an evaluation of the German Bologna Process see Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2010).
5For analyses regarding the introduction of tuition fees in Germany see Dwenger et al. (2011) and
Hübner (2009).
6For an evaluation of the excellence initiative see Horstschräer (2011).
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student-university matching is no longer coordinated by the central clearinghouse.
Prospective students after the reform, thus, apply directly at the universities and are
subsequently also directly admitted by the universities. Second, universities within
the decentralized admission procedure themselves decide on the admission criteria
they apply and may also abolish all admission restrictions. The absence of any re-
strictions enabled prospective students to directly enroll into the law programs of
these universities. Hence, the decentralization process can affect the outcome of the
matching procedure via two channels: the abolishment of the central coordination by
the clearinghouse and the annulment of admission restrictions.
Important for my estimation strategy is that admission to law schools has not been
centralized within the largest German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. As
the central clearinghouse is located within the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia
and as North Rhine-Westphalian universities were also excluded from other nation-
wide decentralization processes, this decision most likely was politically motivated.
The central clearinghouse, therefore, has been administering admission to law schools
within North Rhine-Westphalia also after the reform of 2002. As admission has been
decentralized in the other federal states, prospective students could apply directly
at the schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia and simultaneously also for the
centralized process within North Rhine-Westphalia.
Before comparing the different matching procedures, let me explain the German cen-
tralized matching procedure in more detail. Centralized admission in Germany con-
sists of two separate steps. In a first step, the prospective students are selected for
e.g. law studies, and in a second step, they are allocated to universities. In the first
step, the central clearinghouse selected students by three different procedures, which
are:
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• Procedure G: Admission according to the final secondary school grade.
• Procedure W : Admission according to the time applicants have already been
waiting for admission.
• Procedure U : Admission according to criteria set by the universities.7
These three procedures are applied sequentially. First, all university places that are
supposed to be filled by procedure G are assigned, second, procedure W is applied,
and last in row is procedure U . The amount of places to be filled by each procedure
has been fixed in advance. In 2000 for example, 55% of the overall available university
places were assigned by the secondary school grade (G), 25% by the time of waiting
(W ) and 20% by the universities’ criteria (U). Due to political discussion and the
public debate on the drawbacks of the central clearinghouse, procedure U has become
more important over time. Until 1999, students have only been selected with respect
to their grade and their waiting time, while, since 2005, 60% of the places are filled
according to the universities’ criteria. Within procedure U , many universities, how-
ever, relied on the secondary school grade as their only selection criteria (ZVS, 2000).
Therefore, the influence universities gained within the centralized admission process
has been limited. Furthermore, the change in the centralized procedure is only rel-
evant for the subjects remaining nationwide centrally administered after 2002 – e.g.
medical studies. Within the centralized admission process for law schools located
in North Rhine-Westphalia only procedure G and W have been applied again after
the reform of 2002. The selection criteria for these schools, thus, have not changed
severely over time.
While prospective students in procedure U are selected and allocated in one step,
students selected within procedure G and W are allocated to universities in a sepa-
7In fact, universities decide on the basis of the following admission criteria: (i) the final secondary
school grade, (ii) interviews with the applicants, (iii) the previous working experience, or (iv) a
combination of these three.
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rate second step. Prospective students in these two procedures are mainly allocated
according to their stated first university preference. In case more students indicated
a university as their first preference than this university offered places, the secondary
school grade or social criteria8 are used for tie-breaking. If a selected student cannot
be matched to his first choice, the central clearing house similarly tries to assign a
place at the school of second preference. However, all applicants who listed this col-
lege as their first preference are placed at this college first. The tie-breaking rules for
colleges changed several times within the observation period, but the indicated first
university preference has always been most important for the allocation of prospective
students in procedure G and W .
In order to relate the German admission procedure to the theoretical literature on
college admission, I can describe the second step of the centralized procedure, i.e.
the allocation of prospective students to universities, more formally. The allocation
mechanism within procedures G and W assigns students as follows:
• Step 1: For each university, consider the students who indicated the according
university as their first preference. Subsequently, assign the university places
among them according to their final secondary school grade (social criteria)
until all students are assigned at their first preference or no places remain.
• Step k: For each university with unassigned places, consider the students who
indicated the according university as their kth preference. Subsequently, assign
the university places among them according to their final secondary school
grade (social criteria) until all students are assigned at their kth preference or
no places remain.
8E.g. severe disabilities, spouse/child living close to the university, proximity to a student’s home-
town if registered at the parents home.
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This procedure corresponds to the prominent “Boston Student Assignment Mecha-
nism” studied within the theoretical literature on school choice. The Boston priority-
matching mechanism has been shown to produce stable outcomes, i.e. a situation in
which neither a student nor a college prefer one another compared to their assign-
ment. However, the mechanism gives an incentive for strategic preference lists as
prospective students may not state their true preference but choose a school as their
first choice at which they have realistic chances to be admitted (Abdulkadiroglu and
Sönmez, 2003).
The matching mechanism within procedure U corresponds to the college proposing
deferred-acceptance mechanism. Within the matching process, the universities with
qu places admit the qu students who rank highest with respect to the universities’
preferences. Each student subsequently accepts his highest-ranked offer and rejects
all others. In turn, the universities offer the places which remain unassigned after the
first round to the highest-ranked applicants who have not yet accepted an offer and
who have not yet received an offer by the according university. Again, students only
accept the highest-ranked offer. This algorithm stops when all students are assigned
or when no places remain to be allocated. The outcome of the college proposing
deferred-acceptance mechanism is the stable matching most preferred by colleges and
least preferred by students (Roth, 1984a). Furthermore, Roth (1985) shows that no
college-optimal deferred-acceptance mechanism exists, which makes it a dominant
strategy for all colleges to state their true preferences.
Within the decentralized admission process, all students apply directly at the univer-
sities. Students usually apply for multiple universities at the same time because they
have imperfect information about their chances to receive an offer. At the same time,
universities make more offers than their actual capacity as they must expect some
students to reject their offer. The consequences of this procedure may be e.g. (too)
late assignment, late enrollment, and unassigned university places (e.g. Roth and
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Xing, 1994; Müller, 2007, 2009). Furthermore, if universities are overburdened with
the new admission responsibilities, they may choose the wrong applicants resulting
in less human-capital production or higher drop-out rates.
All in all, the theoretical evidence with respect to centralized and decentralized univer-
sity admission in Germany points at possible inefficiencies in both systems. Therefore,
an empirical comparison of centralized and decentralized admission procedures may
provide important insights in how these inefficiencies affect the student-university
matching in practice.
5.3 Estimation Strategy
For comparing the matching efficiency and the matching quality of the centralized and
decentralized university admission procedure, I exploit the abolishment of the cen-
tralized admission in the field of law as a natural experiment. The applied differences-
in-differences approach does not only compare the matching efficiency and quality for
admission before and after the reform, but it also compares the development over
time to a control group of university departments which have not experienced any
change in university admission.
The decentralization of university admission in the field of law offers a setting which
is very well suited for differences-in-differences estimation. As the German federal
state of North Rhine-Westphalia – unlike all other federal states – has not decentral-
ized admission to law schools in 2002, the six law schools of this state form a natural
control group. This allows me to compare the development in the matching efficiency
and quality over time for the treated law schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia
with the control law schools within North Rhine-Westphalia. The decision of North
Rhine-Westphalia not to decentralize admission to law schools has been taken inde-
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pendently of the situation at North Rhine-Westphalian law schools. As the central
clearinghouse is located within North Rhine-Westphalia and as also other subjects
have not been decentralized in North Rhine-Westphalia, it was rather a political mo-
tive that drove this decision. Using the regional variation between federal states for
identification has the advantage that I can compare schools within the same subject.
Thus, differences between subjects, e.g. a different student body, do not influence my
results. However, regional differences and changes in the composition of treatment
and control group, i.e. prospective students now applying for law studies outside of
North Rhine-Westphalia because admission has been decentralized, may affect the
results of this comparison.
Therefore, I consider medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia as an addi-
tional, second control group. Admission to medical schools was organized centrally
over the entire observation period and thus was unaffected by the decentralization
process in the field of law studies. For this second control group, it is less likely that
the composition of treatment and control group changes as treatment and control
group differ in subject. Furthermore, university departments of the treatment and
control group in this comparison are located within the same geographical region.
Thus, regional differences do not influence the estimations employing the second con-
trol group. Differing trends between both subjects over time, however, may affect this
alternative differences-in-differences approach. Therefore, my estimations account for
differing time trends.
Being able to apply a differences-in-differences analysis with two alternative control
groups is an advantage because both approaches complement each other and therefore
increase the reliability of my estimation strategy. The formal representation of the
classical differences-in-differences analysis for both alternative control groups reads
as follows:
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yit = α1LAWtreatedi×AFTERt+α2LAWtreatedi+α3AFTERt+α4Xit+it (5.1)
The outcome yit for university department i in year t represents the outcome vari-
ables (i) the number of matriculated students, (ii) the number of unassigned university
places and (iii) the share of drop-outs. These measures of matching efficiency and
matching quality are described in more detail in Section 5.4. The classical differences-
in-differences approach includes as explanatory variables a binary variable indicating
the treated law schools LAWtreatedi for which university admission has been decen-
tralized, a binary variable indicating the years after the decentralization AFTERt,
and the interaction between these two variables LAWtreatedi×AFTERt, which co-
efficient represents the effect of interest. The classical approach, thus, controls for
differences between treated schools and control schools and for differences over time
before and after the decentralization of university admission in the field of law stud-
ies. The interaction of interest – i.e. the effect of decentralizing university admission
– thus only picks up changes in matching efficiency and matching quality after the
reform which are not simultaneously observed in the control group.
Furthermore, I include additional covariates Xit to control for the introduction of
tuition fees from 2006 onwards and for the introduction of an excellence status for
some universities within an excellence competition run by the German Government.9
The covariates also include separate time trends for the treated schools and the control
schools by interacting a binary variable indicating the treated schools and control
schools respectively with a continuous variable for all years of observation. These
interactions account for linear time trends in the treated schools and the control
schools before the reform and therefore avoid a bias in the estimates merely driven
9For a more detailed analysis of the excellence competition see Horstschräer (2011).
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by differing time trends. The descriptive evidence (Figures 5.2 - 5.4) suggests that
especially subject-specific time trends may be important for the comparison with
medical schools. Using a continuous year variable assumes linear time trends. This
assumption is justifiable as the matching quality indicators indeed seem to develop
approximately linear before the decentralization in 2002.
An alternative estimation approach exploits the panel structure of the data by ac-
counting for university department fixed effects. With this approach, the estimation
merely relies on the variation over time on the level of university departments. Ev-
erything that is constant over time for a specific law or medical school is netted out.
Thus, adding the fixed effect to the estimation equation allows a more precise analysis
by estimating the following equation:
yit = β1LAWtreatedi × AFTERt + β2AFTERt + β3Xit + υit + it (5.2)
The effect of interest is again the coefficient of the interaction LAWtreatedi×AFTERt
which estimates the effect of decentralizing university admission on the outcomes yit
representing matching efficiency and matching quality. In this specification, the fixed
effect υit captures all school-specific and time-constant variation in matching effi-
ciency and quality. Therefore, the time-constant indicator variable LAWtreatedi is
not identifiable – in other words not necessary – and is thus dropped. All other
covariates are the same as in Equation 5.1. The standard errors are clustered by
university departments.
The decentralization of university admission for law studies in 2002 is a suitable
natural experiment in university admission for several reasons. First, it offers two
appropriate control groups to identify the effect of decentralizing university admis-
sion. Second, it allows me to disentangle the change in university admission from the
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European Bologna Process introducing a new (Bachelor and Master) degree system
throughout Europe. Until this day, the degree system in law and medical studies
remains unaffected by the Bologna Process. As a certain quality standard of law
and medical graduates is of public interest, the final degree in both subjects has
always been a centralized national exam. Third, the decentralization in law stud-
ies was already implemented in 2001, which offers the opportunity to observe five
post-treatment years that are not affected by the introduction of tuition fees in some
federal states. Fourth, the same timing argument applies for the excellence compe-
tition carried out by the German government in 2006 and 2007. Hence, the natural
experiment in university admission for law studies allows me to identify the isolated
effect of a change from a centralized towards a decentralized admission procedure.
5.4 Data
For the evaluation of the change from a centralized towards a decentralized university
admission, I use administrative student data comprising individual information on all
matriculated students in Germany over the years 1995 to 2008. The data set is
provided by the statistical offices of Germany and relies on the registration data
reported by each German university.10 The advantage of the administrative student
data is that I can observe all students in Germany over a long period of time. The
data set contains detailed information on the course of studies and a limited number
of student background variables.
The outcome measures I use to evaluate the decentralization of university admission
aim at assessing the matching efficiency and the matching quality of the admission
procedure. Matching efficiency in this context means the quantitative outcome of the
10Statistical Office Germany, Higher Education Statistics.
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admission process, e.g. the number of students that are matched to a university. This
aspect is important as it may reveal that the admission procedure yields an inefficient
use of resources, which might be the case if not all supplied university places can be
filled. The matching quality additionally evaluates whether students are assigned
at universities that fit them with respect to e.g. their preferences or ability. The
outcome measures I use to proxy matching efficiency and matching quality are:
1. The number of first-year students
2. The number of unassigned university places
3. The drop-out rate
The number of first-year students assesses the matching efficiency of the student-uni-
versity matching, i.e. the number of recently matriculated students. This outcome
variable has been chosen in spirit of the matching function applied by the empirical
literature on job-matching, in which new hires represent the job-matching outcome.
For transferring the job matching function concept to student-university matching
one-to-one, I would need to explain the number of first-year students by the number
of applicants and the number of supplied university places. Unfortunately, no data on
the number of applicants is available for the law schools which decentralized admis-
sion. Therefore, I use the number of first-year students as a first crude proxy for the
matching efficiency and take the number of supplied university places into account
for my second outcome variable.
The second outcome measure of the matching efficiency is the number of unassigned
university places, i.e. the difference between the number of university places a uni-
versity supplies and the number of first-year students.11 This second indicator allows
11The numbers of supplied university places for the universities within the centralized admission
procedure have been provided by the central clearinghouse. The according data for the law schools
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a more detailed analysis with respect to the matching efficiency as it takes the supply
side into account. The effect of the decentralization on this outcome is especially
interesting as a high number of unassigned places has often been mentioned as a
disadvantage of the less regulated decentralized admission procedure. It is also im-
portant to mention that the differences between the amount of supplied university
places and the number of matriculated students can turn negative if the number of
matriculated students exceeds the a priori fixed amount of university places to be
supplied. This situation occurs for example if more students than expected accept a
university’s offer.12 Also, for this second outcome it would be desirable to account for
the number of applicants in order to focus solely on the matching efficiency. As this
data is unfortunately not available, the second measure of matching efficiency – the
number of unassigned university places – can also be influenced by changing numbers
of applicants. The measures of matching efficiency therefore may also comprise the
attractiveness to apply for studies under the respective admission procedure.
The third outcome measure I consider is the drop-out rate within the first year of
studies. It proxies the matching quality. As students who are allocated to a university
that does not fit them – with respect to their preferences or ability – will face a
higher risk of dropping out, the drop-out rate measures the consequences of the
initial matching quality. The drop-out rate of university i for the first-year students
of year t is calculated by dividing the number of second-year students at university i
in year t + 1 by the number of first-year students at university i in year t. I restrict
my analysis to the drop-outs after one year of studies as most drop-outs occur within
the first year. Furthermore, by restricting my analysis to a one-year time lag, I
lose only one year of observation (2008) for the drop-out analysis. Due to a missing
with decentralized admission has been inquired directly at all 16 federal state ministries of education
and research. For the federal state of Bavaria, I had to contact each university directly as the state
ministry could not provide the data.
12In fact, the number of matriculated students is regularly above the fixed number of university
places within the centralized admission procedure (see Figure 5.3 in Section 5.5).
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panel identifier on an individual level, I am not able to construct the individual drop-
out rate. The drop-out rate, as I define it, thus also captures the likelihood that
a student completely cancels his studies as well as the likelihood that he changes
subject or university within his first year of studies. Therefore, the drop-out rate is a
measure of the universities’ ability to retain its students. This approximation seems
to be reasonable because changes between universities are not very common within
the first year of studies.
For the differences-in-differences analysis, I apply two different samples. In order
to compare law schools in (control) and outside of (treated) the federal state of
North Rhine-Westphalia, I keep all German law schools (in and outside of North
Rhine-Westphalia) in the first sample. All university departments of other subjects
are dropped. The second sample consists of all law (treated) and medical (control)
schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. Thus, I delete all departments of other
subjects and all observations from within North Rhine-Westphalia. In both samples,
I do not consider students at two private universities13 as they have never been part
of the centralized admission process. Furthermore, I also restrict my analysis to the
semesters starting in fall. Although university admission in general is possible twice a
year – for the semester starting in spring and for the semester starting in fall – many
universities only admit students in fall.
All three outcomes are measured on the university department level. Therefore, I
aggregate the data by university departments.14 By aggregation, I obtain a panel
data set of law and medical schools. Table 5.1 lists the number of law and medical
schools in the sample for each year of the observation period. The table depicts the
13The University of Witten/Herdecke is the only private institution offering Medical Studies and the
Bucerius Law School the only private school in the field of Law.
14An analysis on the individual student level could also provide interesting insights e.g. with respect
to the drop-out risk and the amount of human-capital acquisition. However, the current data
protection law in Germany does not allow to follow individual students over time. Therefore, a
panel identifier on the individual student level is not available for the data.
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Table 5.1: Number of Law and Medical Schools by Year (1995-2008)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Law Schools “treated”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
33 34 33 34 34 34 34
Law Schools “control 1”
(in North Rhine-Westphalia)
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Medical Schools “control 2”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
24 26 25 26 26 26 26
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Law Schools “treated”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
34 34 33 33 33 33 32
Law Schools “control 1”
(in North Rhine-Westphalia)
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Medical Schools “control 2”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
treated law schools and the two control groups separately.15 In general, my data
contain all public law and medical programs existing in Germany. Only in two years
few observations are missing due to non-reported data of two federal states.
Until 2003, 34 law schools existed outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. Data for one
law school is missing in 1995 (University of Kiel) and for another one in 1997 (Uni-
versity of Hamburg). These two schools are missing because data on the federal state
of Schleswig-Holstein (1995) and Hamburg (1997) are not available. These missing
observations are most likely missing at random as the federal states have not reported
any data merely due to administrative problems. In 2004, the University of Dresden
and, in 2008, the University of Rostock closed their law programs. Consequently,
the number of treated law schools drops to 33 between 2004 and 2007 and to 32 in
2008.
15For a more detailed list of all included law and medical schools see Table A.5.2 in the Appendix.
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Within North Rhine-Westphalia, six law schools exist over the entire observation
period. Thus, although North Rhine-Westphalia is the largest German federal state,
the first control group is rather small. Therefore, I also consider all medical schools
outside of North Rhine-Westphalia as a second control group, which consists of 26
medical schools over the entire observation period. Data are only missing for two
medical schools (University of Kiel and University of Lübeck) in 1995 and for one
(University of Hamburg) in 1997. Again, the missing data is due to the unavailable
data of the two federal states Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg.16 The first sample
that I use for the comparison between law schools in and outside of North Rhine-
Westphalia, thus, consists of a total of 552 school-year observations. The second
sample comprises the treated law schools and the control medical schools outside of
North Rhine-Westphalia, which together amount to 829 school-year observations.
The panel of law and medical schools is not balanced over all years as data for two
federal states are missing for one year each and as two universities closed their law
programs. However, the number of law and medical schools in Germany overall
has been very stable within the entire observation period. This ensures that the
possibilities to study one of these two subjects (supply side) have not changed severely
over time.
Despite the number of law and medical schools being very stable over time, admis-
sion restrictions in the field of law changed in the course of decentralizing admission.
Figure 5.1 shows that, until 2002, all law schools had to fix the number of university
16Note also that the two medical schools in Munich (Technical University and Ludwig-Maximilian
University) merged their programs already in 2000 and that Berlin merged its two programs (Free
University and Humboldt University) in 2003. Therefore, I aggregate the number of students of both
medical programs in Munich and in Berlin in all years. Furthermore, the University of Heidelberg
offers two medical science programs, one combined with the University of Mannheim. Although
students apply separately for both programs, matriculated students are not reported disaggregated
in the administrative student data. Therefore, I consider both programs as one.
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Figure 5.1: Number of Universities with no Admission Restrictions (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
places they were able to supply.17 After the decentralization, 14 law schools allowed
prospective students to directly enroll into their program without any admission re-
strictions. This number dropped again to only two law schools with unrestricted
admission in 2005 and 2006 and subsequently increased to nine and ten schools in
2007 and 2008. These frequent changes in admission restrictions directly after the
decentralization, presumably, indicate that some law schools were experimenting to
find a suitable admission procedure.
In order to distinguish the effect of abolishing all admission restrictions from abolish-
ing the central coordination by the central clearinghouse, I estimate the decentraliza-
17However, for some unpopular universities these numbers in fact did not restrict admission because
the universities - especially in the years prior to the decentralization - could not fill all supplied
places (see Figure 5.3).
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tion effect also on a sample only consisting of universities that never (not in a single
year) abolished their admission restrictions. This constraint in general reduces the
number of treated law schools in the sample from 34 to 16 schools for which admission
has always been restricted. As admission to the control law and medical schools has
always been restricted within the centralized admission procedure, no observations of
the control groups are dropped. As a consequence, the number of observations in the
first sample, using the law schools in North Rhine-Westphalia as controls, drops from
552 observations to 301. The second sample, including the medical schools outside of
North Rhine-Westphalia as controls, is reduced from 829 to 578 observations.
5.5 Descriptive Evidence
By depicting the development of the three different matching outcomes over time, I
provide first descriptive evidence on whether the matching efficiency and the match-
ing quality have changed in the course of decentralizing university admission. Fur-
thermore, the descriptive analyses investigate whether the differences-in-differences
assumption of common trends between treatment and control group applies. There-
fore, Figures 5.2 - 5.4 depict the development over time for the number of first-year
students, the number of unassigned university places, and the drop-out rate.18
Figure 5.2 compares the number of first-year students at the treated law schools
outside of North Rhine-Westphalia with the law schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
(first control group) and with the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia
(second control group). Immediately after the decentralization of university admis-
sion, I observe a temporary increase in newly matriculated students from on average
300 students per university in 2001 to on average 350 students in 2002 and 2003
18For a mean comparison of all three outcomes see also Table A.5.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 5.2: Number of First-year Students over Time (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
for the treated law schools. This sudden increase after the decentralization is even
more remarkable as the number of first-year students has been constantly decreasing
prior to the decentralization. After 2003, the numbers of first-year students, how-
ever, decreased again and reached a level of about nearly the same level as before
the decentralization in 2001. If I restrict the sample to the treated law schools that
never dropped their admission restrictions, I only observe a slight increase in first-year
students for one year after the decentralization of admission. Thus, the temporary
increase in first-year students at all treated law schools seems to be mainly driven
by the schools which temporarily abolish all admission restrictions, i.e. which enable
students to directly enroll into their law programs.
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Comparing the two groups of treated law schools to the control law schools in North
Rhine-Westphalia (left panel in Figure 5.2) does not indicate a change in the average
number of first-year students at the control law schools in the year directly after the
decentralization. After 2002 however, the number of newly matriculated students
drops from above 350 students on average to about 300 students on average. This
suggests that the composition of the control law schools might indeed be affected by
the decentralization with a little time lag. The differences-in-differences assumption
of common trends, however, is supported as the development of the treatment and
control law schools over time is very similar prior to the reform in university admission.
The comparison with the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia (right
panel in Figure 5.2) shows that the number of first-year students within the second
control group does not seem to be influenced by the decentralization process. The
number of matriculated students at medical schools is constantly increasing to a
moderate extent over the entire observation period. The development of the treatment
and the second control group over time differ prior to the reform. Accounting for
differing time trends, therefore, is more important for the comparison with the control
medical schools.
As the development over time of the number of supplied university places is similar to
the development of the number of first-year students (see Figure 5.3), a change in the
number of first-year students after the decentralization could also be merely induced
by adjustments in the supply of places. Therefore, Figure 5.3 depicts the difference
between the number of university places and the number of first-year students per
university, i.e. the number of unassigned university places, which is an important
second outcome with respect to the matching efficiency.
For both treatment groups (two panels at the top of Figure 5.3), the number of
first-year students and the number of supplied university places diverge prior to the
decentralization. Neither the number of supplied places nor the matching mechanism
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changed within this period. Therefore, this development is most likely driven by
decreasing numbers of applications. This interpretation is even more likely as one
argument for the decentralization of admission has been that the supply of places is
not scarce anymore. The gap between the actually matriculated students and the
supplied places is larger in the sample containing all treated law schools than in
the restricted sample. Thus, I can infer that mainly the less demanded universities
decided to drop all admission restrictions. After the decentralization, the average
number of first-year students – as already shown in Figure 5.2 – increases instanta-
neously. In addition, the number of supplied places also increases in 2002, however,
only to a very moderate extent. This development of the number of first-year students
and supplied university places results in a decrease of unassigned university places.
Within the sample of treated law schools applying admission restrictions in all years,
the decrease in the number of unassigned places (as also the increase in matriculated
students – see Figure 5.2) has been smaller than within the full sample of treated law
schools. In the following years, the universities sometimes admitted more students
than they had offered places, and sometimes places remained unassigned. Despite
smaller gaps between the number of university places and the number of first-year
students after the decentralization, it seems as if universities that were responsible
for admission themselves were not able to allocate places very precisely.
Centralized admission to the control law and medical schools seems to yield a pre-
cise matching with a low level of unassigned places (see two panels at the bottom
of Figure 5.3). In fact, the average number of first-year students is always above
the a priori fixed number of supplied university places within both control groups. It
seems as if the centralized procedure admits rather too many than too few prospective
students.19 The centralized matching procedure, nevertheless, seems to be more pre-
cise compared to the decentralized admission as the difference between the supplied
19As universities within the centralized admission process still directly admit foreign students, this
could – at least to some degree – also induce the too high numbers of first-year students.
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Figure 5.3: Number of University Places and First-year Students over Time (1995-
2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
places and the newly matriculated students is basically constant over time. While
the control medical schools do not seem to adjust their number of supplied places
in course of the reform, the control law schools seem to adjust their supply similar
to the treated law schools. This indicates again that the composition of the control
group of law schools may not be independent of the reform process.
Descriptive evidence with respect to the drop-out rates exhibits no explicit influence
of the decentralization process (Figure 5.4). Neither the treatment groups nor the
control groups show major changes in drop-outs from 2002 onwards. Furthermore,
the development over time is fairly similar for both treatment groups, which suggests
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Figure 5.4: Mean Drop-out Rates over Time (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
that abolishing all admission restrictions does not affect drop-out rates. Drop-outs at
all treated law schools increase between 1995 and 2008 from about 10% on average to
nearly 20% on average. The drop-out rate at the control law schools in North Rhine-
Westphalia is lower compared to the other German law schools.20 Average drop-out
rates at the control medical schools are also low (about 5%) and hardly change over
the entire observation period.
In order to compare the treated schools and control schools more precisely, I use
differences-in-differences estimations. This multivariate approach also allows me to
account for other factors that may influence my outcome variables.
20The average drop-out rate at the control law schools is fairly volatile. This is due to measuring the
drop-out rate on the department rather than on the individual level and due to the small sample
size of only six schools.
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5.6 Results
The results of the differences-in-differences estimations are presented separately for
the three outcomes (i) the number of first-year students, (ii) the number of unassigned
university places, and (iii) the drop-out rate. I estimate different Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) models using both control groups – the law schools located in North
Rhine-Westphalia and the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. The
presented models are a standard OLS regression (OLS), an OLS school fixed effect
model (OLS FE I) and an OLS school fixed effect estimation using a sample that
is restricted to the treated law schools that have never abolished their admission
restrictions (OLS FE II).
5.6.1 Number of First-Year Students
Table 5.2 presents the results with respect to the number of first-year students when
using the law schools of North Rhine-Westphalia as controls. The classical differences-
in-differences estimates in the first column indicate a weakly significant increase in
the number of first-year students after the decentralization of admission. After the
reform, on average 42 more students matriculated at the treated law schools. The
control variables account for significantly less matriculated students at the law schools
outside of North Rhine-Westphalia and significantly less students at all law schools
from 2002 onwards.
Controlling for additional covariates and treatment- and control-specific time trends
(column 3) increases the treatment effect to about 89 students per treated law school.
The estimate of interest remains weakly significant. The significance of the other
covariates, however, mainly disappears when I control for differing time trends. The
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Number of First-Year Stu-
dents (Controls: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Law Treated × After 42.39* 31.16 88.79* 85.67** 35.48
(25.25) (25.43) (49.32) (22.78) (25.48)
Law Treated -56.05*** -56.05*** -27.23 – –
(17.84) (17.70) (30.25)
After -58.95** -45.31* -13.24 -13.74 -8.66
(23.25) (24.09) (45.72) (17.03) (17.27)
Covariates
Tuition Fees -31.84** 6.60 2.68 18.48
(16.17) (17.66) (10.28) (11.33)
Excellence Labels 134.66*** 227.02*** 47.42 52.22*
(45.03) (44.20) (29.13) (28.64)
Time Trends
Law Treated × Year -13.93*** -13.00*** -11.87***
(2.58) (2.19) (2.80)
Law Control × Year -6.79 -6.62 -8.32*
(5.94) (4.00) (4.15)
N 552 552 552 552 301
R2 0.0298 0.0483 0.0972 0.1571 0.3101
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clustered standard errors in paren-
theses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
treated law schools show a significantly negative time trend prior to the reform,
while the slightly negative time trend for the control law schools is not significant.
Estimating the same specification in an OLS school fixed effect setting (OLS FE I)
does not change the estimates remarkably. I find a significant increase in matriculation
by about 86 students when accounting for the negative time trend at the treated law
schools.
The decentralization of university admission, however, has no significant effect on
the number of first-year students if I restrict the sample to the law schools that have
always – also after the reform – applied admission restrictions. This suggests that the
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Table 5.3: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Number of First-Year Stu-
dents (Controls: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Law Treated × After -51.45*** -49.70*** 46.18 49.70** 2.65
(16.62) (16.26) (32.16) (19.05) (21.72)
Law Treated 68.38*** 68.38*** 123.91*** – –
(11.76) (11.50) (19.73)
After 34.89*** 30.93** 32.72 24.67* 27.12**
(12.49) (12.50) (24.41) (12.61) (12.82)
Covariates
Tuition Fees -18.92 6.60 8.10 20.13
(15.49) (16.44) (12.12) (15.28)
Excellence Labels 221.02*** 227.02*** 82.34 83.42
(35.57) (35.10) (59.30) (59.88)
Time Trends
Law Treated × Year -14.76*** -13.61*** -12.60***
(2.79) (2.19) (2.92)
Medicine × Year -.93 .93 .27
(3.14) (2.35) (2.43)
N 829 829 829 829 578
R2 0.0422 0.0855 0.1157 0.1232 0.1647
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clustered standard errors in paren-
theses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
estimated increase in matriculated students is mainly driven by law schools enabling
students to directly enroll into their program. It is likely that prospective students
are attracted to studying law at the schools which dropped admission restrictions by
the possibility to directly enroll into their law program. This is especially likely for
applicants who prefer to stay at their local university as they are guaranteed a place
by enrolling directly.
Estimating the differences-in-differences models with the medical schools outside of
North Rhine-Westphalia as controls yields similar results (see Table 5.3). The OLS
fixed effect model (OLS FE I) suggests a significant increase by about 50 students
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after admission has been decentralized. Again, this effect does not persist if I restrict
the sample to the law schools for which admission has always been restricted. The
effect of interest is negative in the classical differences-in-differences approach but
changes in sign when I add the subject-specific time trends. As I observe different
time trends for law and medical schools in the number of first-year students (see
Figure 5.2), accounting for different time trends is particularly important for the
estimations using this second control group.
5.6.2 Number of Unassigned University Places
Another outcome measuring the matching efficiency is the number of unassigned
university places. The advantage of this outcome is that it accounts for changes in
the number of supplied university places and thus can show whether the increase in
newly matriculated students merely reflects the increasing supply of university places.
The estimation results for this outcome are presented in Table 5.4. Using the final
specification of Tables 5.2 and 5.3, I find that the number of unassigned places at
treated law schools decreased after the change towards a decentralized admission.
Employing the law schools within North Rhine-Westphalia (the medical schools not
in North Rhine-Westphalia) as a control group, yields an estimate of on average 63
(48) less unassigned places per university in the OLS model. However, I once again
only observe this decrease in the number of unassigned places in the sample including
all treated law schools. For the law schools that restricted admission also after the
decentralization, the estimations do not reveal a significant influence of the change in
admission procedures.
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Table 5.4: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Num-
ber of Unassigned University Places
OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Control Group: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After -63.00** -52.09*** -35.65
(25.66) (17.40) (24.20)
Law Treated 9.01 – –
(15.69)
After 1.57 2.11*** 1.83
(23.41) (7.75) (7.74)
N 496 496 301
R2 0.1343 0.1194 0.0629
Control Group: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After -47.98*** -37.95** -23.11
(14.28) (16.46) (23.33)
Law Treated 6.90 – –
(8.62)
After -14.88 -13.05*** -13.02***
(10.37) (4.71) (4.66)
N 773 773 578
R2 0.2319 0.1245 0.0947
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1
percent level; additional covariates: tuition fees, excellence labels, treatment- and
control-specific time trends.
Hence, taking the number of supplied university places into account shows that the
increase in first-year students exceeds the increase in supplied university places. The
resulting reduction of unassigned places is, as the increase in first-year students,
mainly driven by abolishing admission restrictions. Therefore, my results with re-
spect to the first and second matching outcome suggest that the matching efficiency
improved after the decentralization by enabling less demanded universities to di-
rectly enroll prospective students without any admission selection. Note, however,
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that the underlying increase in first-year students could also be driven by an increase
in applicants. Due to a lack of data, I cannot control for changes in the number of
applicants. Thus, my measures of the matching efficiency also encompass changes in
the attractiveness to apply before and after the decentralization.
5.6.3 Drop-Out Rate
Estimating the influence of the decentralization process on the drop-out rate is espe-
cially interesting as the drop-out rate is an outcome with practical relevance, which
is difficult to assess in a theoretical framework. As some law schools had to drop
all admission restrictions in order to attract more students, the composition of the
student body could be affected. For example, students could be less suited for the
subject of law studies or for the respective university because students’ ability to
pursue studies is not assessed a priori by any admission criteria. Consequently, an
increase in drop-out rates could be expected. Whether the empirical data supports
this hypothesis is explored by my estimations with respect to the drop-out rate. The
estimation results are displayed in Table 5.5.
All specifications using both control groups show no significant effect of decentralizing
admission. However, the treatment effect is positive in the estimations on the full
sample of treated law schools (OLS, OLS FE I) and negative in the estimations
on the restricted sample of law schools that keep their admission restrictions (OLS
FE II). Despite all treatment effects being insignificant, this seems to support the
above stated hypothesis that lower admission restrictions could attract students with
a higher drop-out probability.
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Table 5.5: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on Drop-Out
Rates
OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Control Group: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After 1.73 1.63 -1.39
(4.30) (4.59) (4.64)
Law Treated 6.63** – –
(2.74)
After -2.14 -1.97 -1.37
(3.98) (4.32) (4.24)
N 513 513 279
R2 0.1526 0.1244 0.0959
Control Group: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After .21 .10 -2.58
(2.95) (3.40) (3.42)
Law Treated 6.27*** – –
(1.89)
After -.65 -.30 -.05
(2.23) (3.39) (3.47)
N 769 769 535
R2 0.2391 0.0578 0.0328
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1
percent level; additional covariates: tuition fees, excellence labels, treatment- and
control-specific time trends.
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5.7 Conclusion
This paper set out to examine a natural experiment in university admission. Using
a differences-in-differences approach, I estimate the effect of decentralizing admis-
sion to German law schools (outside the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia) on
the efficiency and the quality of the resulting student-university matching. My esti-
mation strategy employs two different control groups for which admission has been
centrally administered over the entire observation period. The first group are the
law schools within North Rhine-Westphalia, and the second are the medical schools
outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. Moreover, the administrative student data on all
students within Germany allow me to measure the effect with respect to three dif-
ferent outcomes: (i) the number of first-year students, (ii) the number of unassigned
university places, (iii) the drop-out rate. My quantitative evaluation complements
the prominent theoretical literature on college admission and its matching efficiency.
The advantage of evaluation studies, in this context, is that they can also quantify
how prevalent (theoretically identified) inefficiencies are in practice.
My results show that the number of first-year students on average increased and
that the number of unassigned places on average decreased at the law schools which
decentralized admission. This increase in the matching efficiency is mainly driven
by law schools abolishing all admission restrictions, which enabled students to enroll
into a law program without any application process. In fact, my estimations show
no significant effect of the decentralization for the highly demanded schools which
always restricted admission. However, the decentralization has positive effects with
respect to the matching efficiency for the less demanded schools because they can
adjust or completely abolish their admission restrictions. As the matching efficiency
increases by lowering admission restrictions, the decentralization of admission could
also be associated with a decreasing matching quality assessed by the drop-out rate.
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My results show no significant effects in this dimension but hint at higher drop-out
rates for universities softening admission restrictions.
The improved matching efficiency after the decentralization is based on an increase
in matriculated students. This increase may also be driven by changes in the number
of applicants before and after the decentralization process. As no data on the number
of applicants is available for the law schools which decentralized admission, I cannot
control for changes in the number of applicants. Therefore, my outcomes with respect
to the matching efficiency might also capture the difference in the attractiveness
to apply before and after the reform. In order to evaluate merely the matching
mechanism, it would be necessary to take the number of applicants into account. If
this data were available, an estimation strategy corresponding to the empirical job
matching literature could be a possible path to proceed. The matching function for
student-university matching would need to describe how the stock of applicants and
supplied university places translate into the matching outcome of newly matriculated
students.
In this regard, I believe that my study is only a first attempt to evaluate a reform
in university admission with respect to its matching outcomes in practice. Further
research exploiting other natural experiments in university admission is highly desir-
able. For example, a comparison of a theoretically more efficient centralized system
with a decentralized system is interesting empirical work for future research. More-
over, also changes within centralized admission procedures are important to evaluate
in order to improve our knowledge on optimal matching procedures. Assessing the
differences in real-life outcomes between the centralized student- and college-optimal
matching algorithm could be very promising as both procedures are efficient from
a theoretical perspective. Such an emerging empirical literature exploiting natural
experiments in the admission process could take on an important role in assessing
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how different admission procedures affect the student-university matching in practice
and, consequently, in designing better matching procedures.
Considering the theoretical knowledge on the optimality of different matching algo-
rithms, it is surprising how diverse admission procedures are organized all over the
world. At present, several countries are discussing to reform their centralized ad-
mission procedure. German politicians and practitioners, for instance, have been
discussing a new university admission procedure for several years now. Furthermore,
the central authority ‘UCAS’ administering admissions in the UK initiated the “Ad-
missions Process Review” that is supposed to “map future models of admissions that
could deliver improved efficiencies” (UCAS, 2011). Within this transformation pro-
cess, evaluating already existing admission procedures could be an important factor.
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Appendix
Table A.5.1: Mean Statistics of First-year Students, Unassigned University Places and
Drop-out Rates
Before Decentralization After Decentralization
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Treated Law Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 321.5 105.0 305.0 113.1
Unassigned Places 26.9 62.0 22.24 54.7
Drop-out Rate 13.2 7.9 17.2 8.9
Treated Law Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia (Adm. Restr.)
First-year Students 360.5 117.2 313.0 115.6
Unassigned Places 8.3 50.6 4.8 38.8
Drop-out Rate 10.0 8.3 12.3 8.0
Control Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 377.6 107.3 318.6 69.4
Unassigned Places -14.5 23.0 -11.8 28.2
Drop-out Rate 6.2 8.9 7.7 12.4
Control Medicine Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 253.1 104.7 288.0 150.6
Unassigned Places -13.6 26.9 -26.9 48.2
Drop-out Rate 4.4 15.1 4.0 7.4
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
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Table A.5.2: Universities Offering Law and/or Medical Studies in or Outside of North Rhine-Westphalia
University of... Law Medicine North Rh.-Westph. University of... Law Medicine North Rh.-Westph.
Aachen no yes yes Heidelberg yes yes no
Augsburg yes no no Jena yes yes no
Bayreuth yes no no Kiel yes yes no
Berlin (Charité) no yes no Cologne yes yes yes
Berlin (Humboldt) yes no no Constance yes no no
Berlin (Free U.) yes no no Leipzig yes yes no
Bielefeld yes no yes Lübeck no yes no
Bochum yes yes yes Magdeburg no yes no
Bonn yes yes yes Mainz yes yes no
Bremen yes no no Mannheim yes no no
Dresden yes yes no Marburg yes yes no
Duisburg-Essen no yes yes Munich yes yes no
Düsseldorf yes yes yes Münster yes yes yes
Erlangen-Nuremberg yes yes no Osnabrück yes no no
Frankfurt(Main) yes yes no Passau yes no no
Frankfurt(Oder) yes no no Potsdam yes no no
Freiburg yes yes no Regensburg yes yes no
Giessen yes yes no Rostock yes yes no
Göttingen yes yes no Saarbrücken yes yes no
Greifswald yes yes no Trier yes no no
Halle yes yes no Tübingen yes yes no
Hamburg yes yes no Ulm no yes no
Hannover yes yes no Würzburg yes yes no
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008).
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The history of the German education system is characterized by several reform pro-
cesses and broad debates about the design of educational institutions. In 1964 al-
ready, Georg Picht proclaimed the German “catastrophe of education” (“Bildungs-
katastrophe”). Several attempts to improve students’ competencies by reorganizing
the institutional setting have been undertaken since. However, it is not known which
reforms have improved student outcomes and which changes have had no or even a
negative effect.
Today, new empirical research methods and a better data availability within the field
of education research allow to evaluate the latest reforms of the education system.
This thesis, therefore, examined some specific aspects of the most recent debates
and changes within the German education system. My studies focus on both fringes
of the institutional system: early and higher education. Chapter 2 sheds light on
the effect of school entrance screenings and their importance for developmental het-
erogeneity within a class. In Chapter 3 the Bachelor introduction as a part of the
Bologna Process in higher education is evaluated, Chapter 4 asks whether prospective
students respond to university rankings and the university’s excellence status, and
Chapter 5 discusses the matching efficiency and matching quality of centralized and
decentralized university admission procedures.
The analyses with respect to school entrance show that strict cutoff rules determine
school entry merely by age, while school entrance screenings consider also a child’s
developmental status. By not recommending younger and developmentally disor-
dered children, they have the chance to catch up during a one-year delay of school.
Therefore, the school entrance screenings set a minimum development requirement
for school entry and harmonize the school entering cohort with respect to age and
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development. Hence, flexible school entry rules – particularly standardized entrance
examinations – could mitigate disadvantages for relatively young children. Given the
large empirical literature on school entry age and the disadvantages for young chil-
dren, these results on the effects of mandatory school entrance screenings are also
important for education systems on an international level. As standardization and
data availability of the screenings proceed within the German federal states, new
data might become available for future research to study the benefits of more flexible
school entry regulations in greater detail.
Regarding the recent trends in the German higher education system, university rank-
ings seem to be important if they provide new information within the application pro-
cess. The results regarding the different ranking indicators suggest that this rather
applies to the non-research dimensions than to the research-related indicators. This
is plausible as research quality seems to be common knowledge within the group of
high-ability students. In this case, the research-related ranking indicators do not pro-
vide any additional information. Note, however, that the different quality indicators
influence prospective students’ university choice only to a moderate extent. Distance
between a student’s hometown and the university remains the most powerful deter-
minant of university choice in Germany. Thus, in future research it will be interesting
to investigate whether the latest changes towards more competition within the Ger-
man (European) higher education sector might increase the mobility of prospective
students.
Drawing a final conclusion with respect to the Bologna Process or the different uni-
versity admission procedures is more difficult. The estimated short-run effects of the
Bachelor introduction suggest that especially students in the well-recognized German
field of engineering avoid the new degree because the traditional German engineering
degrees have a very good reputation. For a solid long-run evaluation of the Bologna
Process, however, more research is needed at a later point in time when the tradi-
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tional and the Bachelor degree system do not coexist any longer. During the time
for which data is currently available, it was still possible to avoid the new Bachelor
degree by opting into a traditional program. Furthermore, the number of students
that can be observed in Master programs are still low. Therefore, a comprehensive
evaluation of the Bologna Process is not possible at this point in time because the
transformation process has not been completed.
My analyses of the decentralization of university admission represent a first attempt
to provide empirical evidence using a natural experiment in university admission. The
study evidences an increasing matching efficiency for the change from a centralized to
a decentralized university admission procedure, which is mainly driven by enabling
universities to abolish admission restrictions. This result may be very specific to
the German context, though. As admission procedures vary substantially between
countries and have been restructured over time in several countries, further research
exploiting natural experiments in university admission may add to a more complete
picture of the optimal admission process. The efficiency of different admission proce-
dures is an important topic for the future because discussions on the most preferable
admission practice are currently ongoing in several countries.
The latest wave of reforms succeeding the international student assessments, on which
my thesis focusses, differs from the earlier reform processes in so far as the changes in
the institutional setting are now accompanied by evaluation studies following modern
empirical research strategies. Such evaluation studies allow to assess the effects of
a reform on the (individual) student performance. Hence, they can support more
profound and evidence-based school policy decisions. The advantage of studies ex-
ploiting natural experiments as opposed to international comparisons is that they
compare situations within a very specific institutional setting with the same national
peculiarities.
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It is therefore desirable to already think of the evaluation of a reform at the time of
implementing an institutional reorganization. However, this must not lead to even
more reforms within an even shorter period of time. Rather, the opposite is advisable:
reforms need time to develop their long-run effects, and researchers need time and data
to solidly analyze the reform process. Therefore, researchers and politicians should
work in unison in order to understand what fosters and what harms the efficiency of
the education system. Politicians may serve this aim by taking the time until a reform
is completely implemented and has unfolded its long-run effects before introducing
even new activities. Researchers in the field of policy evaluation, on their part, must
avoid being too much driven by short-run political interests.
Ultimately, this thesis does not only provide new evidence with respect to certain
aspects of education but has also promoted my personal education.
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